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I. INTRODUCTION
Joint ownership of real and personal property by husband and
wife in a common law jurisdiction is so generally accepted that to hold
property in the name of only one spouse is the exception rather than
the rule. This Article will attempt to outline the alternatives available
in planning for such jointly held property. It will consider the com-
monly used A and B trust device; the need to terminate all joint owner-
ship arrangements; and the appeal of terminating such arrangements
in contemplation of death. Special emphasis will be placed on the tax
planning potential of estate equalization. Also to be considered will
be the use of trusts where property management is important. Finally,
this Article will propose the use of a partially irrevocable trust where
taxpayers are reluctant to terminate their joint ownership arrangements
during their joint lifetimes. Special emphasis will be placed on the
inconsistency in the estate tax treatment of jointly held property which
is transferred in contemplation of death and that which is retained in
joint ownership until death.
This Article should make it apparent that taxpayers whose estates
will be subject to federal estate tax should be discouraged from holding
property as joint tenants because of the profoundly difficult estate plan-
ning that it makes necessary. Unfortunately, however, taxpayers often
postpone estate planning until late in life when their estates already
consist largely of property held as joint tenants with right of survivor-
ship or as tenants by the entirety.
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The discussion throughout this Article will be limited to cases
where the joint owners are husband and wife.
"II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A. Role of Inflation
For generations married persons in common law jurisdictions have
been counseled by bank personnel and real estate salespeople1 to take
title to real and personal property as joint tenants with rights of sur-
vivorship. The principal reason given is that the joint tenancy rela-
tionship2 will facilitate transfer to the survivor upon the death of the
first joint tenant to die.
This feature and the other so-called advantages of joint tenancy3
concededly have appeal in the estate not burdened by death taxation.
1. Lawyers have, on occasion, given the same advice where it is clear that the
client will never have an estate subject to the federal estate tax. See T. SHAFFER, THE
PLANNING AND DRAFnNG OF WILLS AND TRUSTS 62 (1972). The problem is one of
predictability. When is it clear that the client will never have any death tax problems?
The rule may be better expressed in these terms: "[T]he holding of property as
joint tenants with right of survivorship should be the deliberate exception rather than
the general rule ... " Worthy, Problems of Jointly Owned Property, 22 TAx LAWYER
601 (1969).
HEREAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
ARTICLE:
A. CASNER, ESTATE PLNING (3d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as A. CASNER];
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY (A.Y. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as AM.
LAW PROPERTY];
C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXEs (2d ed. 1962)
[hereinafter cited as C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER];
I. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL. GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION (1959) [hereinafter
cited as J. MERTENS];
C. MOYNIHAN, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY (1962) [hereinafter cited as C. MoYNIHAN];
R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1973) [hereinafter cited as
R. POWELL & P. RoHAN].
2. When the terms "joint tenancy," "jointly held property" or "joint tenancy with
right of survivorship" are used in this article, the reference includes tenancy by the
entirety except when the context otherwise requires.
3. The advantages of joint tenancy with right of survivorship include the follow-
ing:
a. Jointly held property oftentimes enjoys preferential treatment for state death
tax purposes. State statutes are of two kinds:
(1) Those which exempt from state death taxation one-half of all jointly held
property where the joint tenants are husband and wife. See, e.g., Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 5731.10 (1973). This is an advantage where the
first spouse to die provided all the consideration for the property. It
is hardly an advantage where the non-contributing spouse dies first. Ap-
parently these state rules were designed to avoid the proof problems pre-
sented survivors under federal law when jointly held property is involved.
The federal estate tax requires all of the jointly held property to be in-
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But in an increasing number of cases, prospective decedents with large
amounts of jointly held property are going to have to face the prospect
cluded in the estate of the first to die except to the extent the survivor
can prove contribution. See INT. Rsv. CODE OF 1954, § 2040.
(2) Those which exempt from state death taxation all real property held as
tenants by the entirety. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-1-1 (Code
ed. 1972). In such cases all other jointly held property will be included
in the estate of the first to die except to the extent the survivor can prove
contribution. Id. These statutes exempting tenancy by the entirety real
property from state death taxation may be reason enough for holding such
property as tenants by the entirety in those cases where the estate will not
be subject to federal estate taxation. The availability of this exemption
has initial appeal even in cases where there will be liability for federal
estate tax. However, for reasons which will be outlined in this Article,
such holdings should probably be limited to the taxpayers' residential
premises, and then, only after carefully considering both tax and non-tax
considerations. Perhaps it is appropriate to note that state death tax rates
are hardly confiscatory, ranging, as they frequently do, from a low of one
percent to a high of twenty percent (on property over one million dollars
in value). See, e.g., id. § 6-4-1-2.
b. Jointly held property is free from the claims of creditors of either spouse. For
example, in some states if the property is held by the spouses as tenants
by the entirety the property can be removed from the reach of the separate
creditors of the husband and wife and from the reach of prior spouses. See
Lewis v. United States, 485 F.2d 606 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (tenancy by entirety used
"to thwart significant third-party claims." Id. at 612). Nevertheless, this so-
called advantage has appeal only in those cases where a decedent's probate
property is inadequate to satisfy his creditor's claims. Even where claims ex-
ceed probate property, this incident of joint ownership will offer little real pro-
tection. For example, it is an unusual case for a lender to make a loan to
one spouse without securing the other spouse's personal guaranty. And if the
joint tenants are not married to one another, the existence of the joint property
will be disclosed on the borrower's financial data summary provided the lender,
and the lender no doubt will take steps to make this collateral available to se-
cure the debt.
c. Joint property expresses the idea of partnership in a marriage and reinforces
family security and harmony. This kind of argument is hard to combat, and
it cannot be dismissed as trivial.
The following advantages have appeal, but a revocable trust will accomplish the same
results (where the property is not jointly held) with greater predictability as to tax con-
sequences and with significant non-tax planning opportunities.
d. Joint property reduces administration costs. This is true in the sense that the
estate's administrator cannot include jointly held property in the base he uses
in computing his fee. It is, however, included in computing the attorney's fee,
albeit at a lower percentage.
e. Joint property avoids probate delays. Ordinarily probate property cannot be
distributed for at least six months after administration is commenced. See,
e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2113.53 (Supp. 1973). A substantial portion, but
generally not all, of the jointly held property is available to the survivor
immediately after death. See, e.g., id. § 5731.39(B).
. Joint property avoids publicity. It is common in some communities for the
newspapers to regularly publish the probate contents of a decedent's estate as
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of their estates being subjected to the federal estate tax.4 This is an
unfortunate result because in most cases it is only persons of modest
means who hold a substantial portion of their property in joint tenancy
form. In earlier times, death tax planning was unnecessary for the
person of modest means because the $60,000 federal estate tax ex-
emption5 spared him federal death taxation.6 Unfortunately, the fed-
eral death tax exemption has not been adjusted to reflect the effects of
inflation on property values.7 Consequently, a modest estate in terms
reported to the court having jurisdiction over estates. The joint property will
only appear on tax returns which are, theoretically, confidential.
g. Joint property is convenient. It is alleged that either party can deal with
jointly held property. That is not the case. If the property is held as tenants
by the entirety, the consent of both spouses is required for transfer. If held
as joint tenants with right of survivorship, either spouse may dispose of his frac-
tional interest (in most cases). See note 43 infra and accompanying text.
h. Joint property avoids fragmentations of ownership. Intestate distribution of a
decedent's property usually fragments ownership. The survivorship feature of
the joint tenancy avoids that result, but an ordinary will can be drafted which
will have the same effect.
See generally Worthy, supra note 1, at 606; Research Institute of America, Inc.,
Should You Own Property Jointly? appearing as a Special Study in TAx COORDINAToR,
June 21, 1973, 1, 1-2; Effland, Estate Planning: Co-Ownership, 1958 Wis. L. REv.
507, 539-40.
4. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2040.
5. See id. § 2052. The exemption has not been changed since 1942.
6. This Article will not concern itself with state gift or death taxation. See note
3 supra for examples of state laws concerning taxation of jointly held property.
7. The data available is "old" and clearly does not reflect the current growth in
property values due to inflation. But even that data suggests the magnitude of the in-
crease in property values. The number of persons dying each year in the United States
rose five percent between 1965 and 1971. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 709 (27th
ed. 1973). During that same period, the number of estate tax returns filed increased
approximately fifty-four percent. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMM'R OF INT. REv. 14 (Publication No. 55) (1966, 1971, respectively). Over a
slightly shorter period, 1966-1970, the total of all taxable estates increased approxi-
mately twenty-seven percent. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, STATISTICS OF INCOME FOR
1970: ESTATE TAx 2. Even more significant is the fact that for the fiscal year ended
June 30, 1972, the combined revenue collections for estate and gift taxes increased forty-
five percent over the prior fiscal year. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMM'R OF INT. REv. 74 (Publication No. 55, 1972).
Perhaps, it should be noted, too, that there is some disagreement about whether
the federal estate tax exemption is pegged too low. See Bittker, Federal Estate Tax Re-
form: Exemptions and Rates, 57 A.B.A.J. 236 (1971). Professor Bittker argues that
there is little correlation between the present $60,000 exemption and the needs of
the decedent's family, id. at 237; and the only justification for a flat exemption is to
keep small estates "out of the federal pipeline," id. at 239. Given the revenue needs
of an expanded governmental operation, he suggests the emphasis should be placed on
developing a basic exemption, perhaps $25,000, coupled with an unlimited marital de-
duction and a dependency exemption to avoid hardship. Id. While Bittker's argument
is an appealing one, there seems to be congressional sympathy for the plight of the
taxpayer with a modest estate. Congressman Mills, current chairman of the House
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of real purchasing power is a substantial estate under the federal death
tax standard of $60,000, and practicing attorneys writing wills for the
old "nonestate client"'8 will encounter special problems because of
jointly held property.
B. Marital Deduction
The need for tax planning in so-called "modest" estates can be
easily illustrated. For example, a taxpayer with an adjusted gross
estate9 of $200,000, all of which passes to someone other than his
surviving spouse, will incur a federal estate tax liability of $32,700.10
Committee on Ways and Means, has stated:
We are not going to wind up with a tax system that meets the.purist stand-
ards of academicians but shuts off the wellsprings of economic progress-
personal and business savings . . . . Wie are not going to have the Govern-
ment confiscate half or more of the estates people manage to build for their
families. 119 CONG. Rmc. H 4116 (daily ed. May 30, 1973).
His views have been interpreted as follows:
[Mills] wants to see more protection for medium-sized estates. The estate
taxes on farms and small businesses often force heirs to sell out in order to
raise the tax payment. And inflation has greatly eroded the value of the
$60,000 exemption . .. . Bus. WEEK, April 13, 1974, at 25.
8. This very descriptive phrase was coined by Thomas L. Shaffer in an extremely
lucid article first prepared in 1965 to describe the client for whom tax planning was
not important. T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 59.
9. "Adjusted gross estate" has been defined by Congress to be the difference be-
tween a decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes and the deductions al-
lowed his estate for expenses of administration, his debts, taxes assessed as a conse-
quence of his death, funeral expenses, and casualty losses incurred during the course
of settling the estate. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(c) (2) (A). Its only func-
tion for purposes of the federal estate tax is to serve as a basis for determining the
maximum marital deduction allowed a decedent's estate for property passing to his
spouse. The term is employed here for convenience of reference.
10. The following organizational scheme has been employed throughout this Article
in making the indicated federal estate tax computations. All references below are to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Decedents Gross Estate (§§2031-42) $xxxxx
Less: Expenses of administration, decedent's
indebtedness and taxes (§ 2053) $ xxx
Casualty losses incurred during
administration (§ 2054) $ xx xxx
Adjusted Gross Estate (§ 2056 (c) (2)) $xxxxx
Less: Exemption (§ 2052) - - $60,000
Charitable Deduction (§ 2055) xxx
Marital Deduction (maximum: 50% of
adjusted gross estate) (§ 2056) 
- xxxxx xxxxx
Taxable Estate (§ 2051) $ xxxx
Rate of tax (applied against taxable estate) (§2001) x%
Tax liability before credits _$ xxx
Less: State Death Tax Credit (§ 2011) $ xx
Gift Tax Credit (§ 2012) xx
Credit for Tax on Prior Transfers (§ 2013) xx
Credit for Foreign Death Taxes (§ 2014) _ xx
Credit for Death Tax on Remainders (§ 2015) - xx xx
Federal Estate Tax Liability $xx
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On the other hand, if the taxpayer's spouse survives him and she takes
all of his property, the marital deduction" available with respect to
fifty percent of his adjusted gross estate will cause his federal estate
tax bill to be reduced to $4,800. However, at the death of the sur-
viving spouse, all of the property which she owns at her death will be
subjected to the federal estate tax. In this example, if the wife had
taken all of her husband's property at his death and had not invaded
principal-a common occurrence-her federal estate tax liability (as-
suming she had no property of her own) would be $32,700, which,
when added to the tax liability of $4,800 at her husband's death, would
result in a total transfer tax liability of $37,500.12 Thus, while the
availability of the marital deduction is a distinct advantage to tax-
payers, in many cases it merely serves to postpone the tax until the
death of the second spouse.
C. Lifetime Gifts
In cases where property included in the estate of the first spouse
to die will also be included in the survivor's gross estate at her sub-
sequent death, it would be easy to argue that the surviving spouse
should divest herself of a substantial portion of her total property by
lifetime transfers after her husband's death. She could, for example,
11. Estates are allowed a deduction in computing federal estate tax liability for
property passing to the decedent's surviving spouse. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
2056. The purpose of the marital deduction is to place residents of common law juris-
dictions on approximately the same footing as residents of community property jurisdic-
tions for purposes of the federal estate tax. See C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER § 17.1.
When a married person died in a community property state ordinarily only
half of the community property was taxed to his estate, even though it had
all been accumulated due to his individual efforts. This discriminated against
the residents of common law states, since the entire estate which a married
man accumulated in a common law state was taxed at his death. Id. at 369(footnote omitted).
The statute is extremely complex and has generated volumes of commentary as well
as an enormous amount of litigation resulting from attempts by taxpayers to take advan-
tage of its provisions.
12. Double taxation of half of a decedent's property is not uncommon. The
Treasury Department reports, for example, that decedents with adjusted gross estates
under $300,000 made outright bequests of seventy-one percent of their estates to their
surviving spouses. Of this seventy-one percent, only forty-one percent qualified for the
marital deduction, indicating that thirty percent of the property transferred will be taxed
twice. TAx REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, HousE COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS AND SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, JOINT PUBLICATION 91st Cong., Ist
Sess., pt. 3, at 360 (Comm. Print).
In an effort to prevent the federal estate tax from becoming too oppressive to the
estate of a decedent who acquired property from a prior decedent who died within 10
years of the second decedent's death, the estate of the second decedent enjoys a credit
for the estate tax paid by the estate of the prior decedent upon property transferred
to the second decedent. See INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 2013.
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make gifts of that property which was included in her husband's estate
and which escaped taxation in her husband's estate because of the
marital deduction. Such transfers would be subject to the federal gift
tax,' 3 but the $30,000 federal gift tax exemption 4 and the $3,000 per
donee per annum exclusion' 5 would be available to reduce the ultimate
tax liability. Moreover, the federal gift tax rates are only seventy-five
percent of the federal estate tax rates.' Thus, in transferring
$100,000 during her lifetime, for example, (assuming it is divided
equally 'between two donees and assuming she had made no prior gifts)
the surviving spouse would incur gift tax in the amount of $7,965'1
and, at her death, her federal estate tax bill would be $4,800. Thus
the total federal transfer tax cost to husband and wife would be
$17,565 ($7,965 + $4,800 + $4,800) which would represent a sub-
stantial saving over the $37,500 which would be payable if she does
not make any lifetime transfers.
The counter argument is that the surviving spouse is accustomed
to the standard of living made possible by the $200,000 available to
the family unit during her husband's lifetime and therefore cannot
afford the luxury of transferring -a substantial portion of the fund after
her husband's death. The obvious response is to suggest that the wife
13. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1954).
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2521.
15. Id. § 2503(b).
16. Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2001 with INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
2502(a).
17. The following organization scheme has been employed throughout this Article
in making the indicated federal gift tax computations. All references below are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Transfers of property (§§ 2501, 2511) .$xxx
Less:
Marital deduction (where gift made to
spouse) (§ 2523) $xx
Charitable deduction (§ 2522) xx
Exemption (to the extent not exhausted by
prior gifts) (§ 2521) 30,000
Exclusion (to the extent gift is of a
present interest) (§ 2503 (b)) xx
Gift splitting between husband and wife as to
gifts to third parties, provided
spouse consents (§ 2513) xx xx
Taxable gifts this period (§ 2503 (a)) .$xxx
Plus:
Taxable gifts in prior periods xxx
Aggregate lifetime gifts $xxx
Rate of tax (applied against aggregate
lifetime gifts) (§ 2502 (a)) x%0/
Total lifetime gift tax liability $xxx
Less: Gift tax paid in prior periods xx
Federal gift tax liability this period (§ 2502(a)) $ xx
676
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could supplement the income from the property that she did not trans-
fer by consuming a part of the principal. This would, in fact, be quite
desirable because the principal that she consumed would obviously escape
federal estate taxation at her death. Unfortunately, not many sur-
viving spouses will agree to invade principal. They reason-and per-
haps properly-that an intact principal is protection against living too
long and becoming a ward of the state. Similar protection would be
available if the surviving spouse purchased an annuity for herself for
life,I s but an annuity suffers from lack of flexibility.
Whenever lifetime transfers are suggested, the client will generally
inquire about retaining the income from the transferred property. This
can be done, but only at the expense of having all the property in
which the transferor has an income interest for life included in the
transferor's estate for federal estate tax purposes. 9
D. The A and B Trust Arrangement
As life insurance has become an increasingly larger part of peo-
ple's assets, estate planning advice has come to be expressed primarily
in terms of a pour-over will and a revocable life insurance marital de-
duction trust.2 0  The plan, typically, will call for the insured, who for
purposes of illustration is the husband, to establish a trust with a local
financial institution and assign all of his life insurance to the trust. Under
the terms of the trust the insured husband will retain all the incidents
of ownership in the policies as well as the right to revoke the trust at
any time. The trustee, for his part, will agree that if the trust has
not been revoked before the husband's death, the trustee will collect
the proceeds of the insurance and hold those proceeds pursuant to the
terms of the trust. The plan will also call for the husband to execute
a will directing that, at his death, all of his probate property be deliv-
ered to the trustee.
At the husband's death, then, the trustee will collect both the life
insurance proceeds and the probate property. The trust agreement
will probably then provide that the trust corpus be split into two funds,
18. A life annuity has great appeal in that nothing will be included in the annui-
tant's estate at death for federal estate tax purposes and the annuitant has protection
against living too long. See INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(a).
19. See id. § 2036(a)(1). But see notes 274-75 infra and accompanying text.
20. All the advantages of the pour-over will-revocable trust scheme are available
in a testamentary trust. In many jurisdictions, however, the testamentary trust suffers
the disadvantage of continuous court supervision. Compare IND. STAT. ANN. § 30-
4-6-4 (Code ed. 1972) with Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2104.24(D), (M), 2109.02
(1968). For that reason so-called court trusts are more expensive and more cumber-
some to administer than inter vivos trusts. See A. CASNER 147.
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commonly known as Fund A and Fund B. The trustee will be di-
rected to allocate to Fund A an amount equal to the maximum marital
deduction reduced by any nonprobate property passing directly to the
surviving spouse which qualifies for the marital deduction. 2 Fund
A will either be (1) distributed directly to the wife, or (2) retained in
trust for the wife on terms which allow it to qualify for the marital de-
duction for federal estate tax purposes.22  The balance of the trust
property-Fund B-will continue to be held in trust for the wife's life-
time, and at her death the corpus will be distributed to the husband's
then living lineal descendants per stirpes.23
The practical effect of this plan on the hypothetical $200,000
estate described above is quite simple if the husband dies first. It
calls for half of the husband's estate to be taxed at his death, and the
21. For alternative allocation provisions having similar effect, see the references in-
cluded in note 27 infra.
22. In cases in which the husband wants his wife to have Fund A outright and
free of trust, it is customary to include such a provision in his will. It will direct the
husband's executor to distribute an amount equal to the maximum marital deduction
(reduced by any non-probate property passing to the spouse) directly to the wife and
pour-over the balance of the probate property to a trust with only Fund B provisions.
This procedure prevents probate property, ultimately destined for the wife, from passing
through the trust where the trustee may impose a distribution fee. See A. CASNER 308
(Supp. 1973). In some cases, however, the temptation to seek maximization of the
marital deduction and avoidance of the "second tax" will cause lawyers to have the
probate property pour-over into the trust where the trustee can take account of and
effect the distribution of life insurance in allocating between Fund A and Fund B.
While it would be possible for the insurance company to pay the life insurance directly
to the husband's estate (in which case the will could include appropriate allocation pro-
visions), it would mean that the proceeds of life insurance would be included in the
husband's estate for state death tax purposes. See, e.g., Omno REv. CODE ANN.
§ 5731.12(A) (1973). If such proceeds are paid to a named beneficiary-a trustee
of a revocable life insurance trust qualifies-those proceeds will be free of such taxa-
tion. See id.
When Fund A, the marital deduction fund, is to be held in trust, special care must
be taken to qualify the trust under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (5).
23. Most such trusts provide that Fund B will be distributed per stirpes to those
lineal descendants of the settlor (the husband) who are living at the time Fund B is
distributed. A per stirpes distribution means, for example, that if a child of the settlor
dies before distribution, the child's children will take the share the child would have
received. This device provides for changes in potential distributees between the date the
trust is created and the date of the distribution. By so doing it avoids having grand-
children disinherited because their parent, the settlor's child, did not survive until dis-
tribution of Fund B.
An alternative form would have the wife designate the ultimate takers of Fund
B by giving her a special power of appointment exercisable in favor of a limited class
of persons, probably lineal descendants of the settlor. So long as the power is not ex-
ercisable in favor of the wife or her estate, her creditors or creditors of her estate, the
property subject to the power will not be included in her gross estate for federal
estate tax purposes. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2041. See note 70 inlra.
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other half to be taxed to his wife at her death.24 Their combined fed-
eral estate tax liability will be reduced to $9,600, a substantial saving
over the $37,500 tax liability which would have resulted had the wife
received outright all of the property included in her -husband's estate
and died without consuming any of the principal. The tax savings
appeal of the A and B trust arrangement is customarily explained in
terms of having avoided the second tax on half the property.
More importantly, the A and B trust arrangement allows the wife
to have an income interest in both the A and B funds, yet exclude
the B fund from her gross estate. That would not have been possible
had the wife received outright all of the property included in her hus-
band's estate and then attempted to reduce her federal estate tax bur-
den by making gifts of her property during the remainder of her life.25
Unfortunately, some very real problems are presented when the A
and B trust arrangement is sought to be applied to taxpayers whose
estates consist largely of jointly held property. The A and B trust ar-
rangement is designed to minimize the tax cost of transferring prop-
erty from one generation to the next. Its efficiency is dependent, how-
ever, on all of the property in the settlor's taxable estate being subject
to its terms. Jointly held property, on the other hand, will vest in the
surviving spouse by operation of law and will not be subject to the
dispositive provisions of the A and B trust arrangement. For that rea-
son the tax savings of the A and B trust, which will result when the
spouse with the taxable estate dies first, will be progressively reduced
by the amount by which the jointly held property included in the
estate of the first spouse to die exceeds 50 percent of that spouse's
adjusted gross estate.2"
This principle can easily be illustrated. Assume that H has an A
and B trust arrangement; a $200,000 adjusted gross estate, $150,000
24. This analysis assumes that the wife will survive her husband and that her only
property for federal estate tax purposes is that received from her husband at his death.
In this case if the wife dies first, there can be no planning for the marital deduction.
For this reason it is often suggested that the optimum estate plan would call for husband
and wife to divide their property equally between them so that the order of their deaths
then becomes unimportant. However, it is not the purpose of this Article to consider
this proposal except as it relates to jointly held property. For such a discussion, refer
to the text accompanying notes 64-70 infra.
If, in this example, the wife dies first, the estate tax liability at the death of the
husband would be $32,700 if the estate has not been diminished.
25. See note 19 supra, notes 64-70, 274 infra and accompanying text.
26. Amounts in excess of fifty percent of the decedent's adjusted gross estate which
pass to the surviving spouse do not qualify for the marital deduction and therefore will
be taxed at the death of the first spouse to die and again at the death of the second
to die unless the survivor of the two consumes or disposes of this property during her
lifetime. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
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of which is jointly held with W; that H provided all the consideration
for the acquisition of the jointly held property; that W has no property
of her own; and that H dies first. The jointly held property will vest
directly in his surviving spouse and will not be subject to the terms of
his pour-over will-revocable trust arrangement. The jointly held prop-
erty will be taken into account, in all probability, for tax planning
purposes, by a formula marital deduction clause27 which provides that
the amount of property allocated to Fund A will equal the maximum
marital deduction allowed the decedent's estate reduced by the non-
probate property, e.g. jointly held property, passing outside the will to
the surviving spouse which qualifies for the marital deduction. In this
example nothing will be allocated to Fund A, $50,000 to Fund B,
and the surviving spouse will own $150,000 of jointly held property
in fee simple absolute. Nonetheless, the federal estate tax at H's death
will only be $4,800, but at W's death, her estate will include the
$150,000 jointly held property which vested in her at her husband's
death (unless she consumes it or disposes of it). Her estate's death
tax bill will be $17,900, or a total transfer tax bill for husband and
wife of $22,700. This result is the necessary consequence of the fact
that half the estate is taxed at the husband's death and that three-
fourths will be taxed at the wife's death. In other words, one-fourth of
the husband's estate will be taxed twice!
Thus, effective tax planning is impossible where jointly held prop-
erty makes up more than 50 percent of a taxpayer's estate. The tradi-
tional tax planning devices will simply not reach the jointly held
property because the survivorship feature of the joint tenancy relation-
ship causes property which would otherwise be sheltered in the B
trust to vest directly in the surviving spouse. As a consequence, fed-
eral tax liability cannot be minimized.
E. The Human Element
There are a number of possible solutions. They range from a
postmortem argument that the jointly held property was not a true
joint tenancy2 1 to a lifetime decision by the taxpayers to split their
jointly held property between themselves and to hold it as ten-
ants in common. 29  For many taxpayers, however, the only realistic
27. For a detailed outline of the different kinds of formula and non-formula mari-
tal deduction clauses, see Edwards, Marital Deduction Formulae-A Planner's Guide,
1967 DuKE LJ. 254; Polasky, Marital Deduction Formula Clauses in Estate Planning-
Estate and Income Tax Considerations, 63 MICH. L. REv. 809 (1965). See generally
A. CASNER 783-84; C. LowNDEs & R. KRAmER §§ 42.1-42.10.
28. See notes 306-11 infra and accompanying text.
29. See note 80 infra.
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solution for minimizing the tax bite is to devise a scheme which is
operative only after the death of one spouse.30  The author has ad-
vised a number of taxpayers whose estates consist largely of jointly
held property. Such taxpayers will often as not be neither mid-
dle-management nor middle-aged. 3  They will probably be over 60,
approaching retirement, and, at the urging of their spouses, will be
seeking a review of the simple wills they executed fifteen to twenty
years ago. They probably will not have more than $50,000-$60,000 of
life insurance. What they will have is a house without a mortgage, two
automobiles, $5,000 at most in stocks and bonds, cash, and perhaps
the wife will work 3 -assets of anywhere from $50,000 to $200,000.
Most importantly, everything will be jointly held.33 Beginning, prob-
30. See text accompanying notes 236-42 supra.
31. Taxpayers in middle age have not escaped the crushing financial burdens im-
posed by acquisitiveness and the educational needs of their children. Their estates con-
sist largely of substantial amounts of life insurance. See Corcoran, The Contingent
Insurance Trust-A Hidden Bonanza for Minor Children, 55 ILL. R. 596 (1967).
Middle management seems to go with middle age and those whose estates consist
largely of jointly held property are probably not middle aged. However, it would seem
that many older taxpayers whose careers long ago plateaued could be described as mid-
dle management.
32. Many of the principles outlined in this Article apply to farmers, many of
whom hold title to their increasingly valuable farm lands as tenants by the entirety.
However, as a general proposition, estate planning for farmers is a specialty of its own
and reference must be had to other materials written with farmers specifically in mind.
See, e.g., A. CASNMR 1001-06; Kelley, The Utility of the Close Corporation in Estate
Planning & Administration, 49 NoTRE DA M I WYER 334 (1973).
33. While much of the discussion in this Article has general application, the Arti-
cle itself is directed to planning for the estate which is made up largely of jointly held
property. It is believed that there are large numbers of taxpayers who hold substan-
tially all their property as joint tenants with right of survivorship and as tenants by
the entirety and that, in future years, the estates of many of these taxpayers will incur
federal estate tax liability. Unfortunately there is little or no information available as
to the numbers of such persons. This is probably attributable to the fact that many
persons who would be included in this group are still living. See note 7 supra. Infla-
tion at current levels is a fairly recent phenomenon. Given this fact, the limited data
which is available is "old." For example, the most recent study available examined 659
estates obtained from the Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio Probate Court docket.
M. SussmAN, J. CATES & D. SmrrH, THE FAMiLY & INHmRITANcE 45 (1970). This rep-
resented a five percent random sample of estates closed between November 9, 1964 and
August 8, 1965. Id. Obviously, the decedents whose estate proceedings were studied
had died, at the latest, in the early part of 1964. Interestingly, that study disclosed
that only thirty-two of the 659 estates examined incurred federal estate tax liability.
Id. at 73 n.20. The mean gross of all testate estates was $41,218 but the median was
only $15,000. Id.
The data gathered in the Cleveland study suggests that only a small percentage
of decedents' estates incur federal estate tax liability. That would appear to be a valid
conclusion. There were approximately 1.9 million deaths each year in the United
States during the period 1965-71. INFoRmATON PLFASE ALMANAC supra note 7, at 709.
During this same period the number of estate tax returns filed ranged from a low of
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ably, in the depression these taxpayers and their spouses have been
conditioned to think "ours" and now, in their later years, it is difficult
to rethink ownership in terms of "his" and "hers." 34 While a lifetime
split of jointly held property into a tenancy in common would possibly
enable the former joint tenants to mentally characterize the property
as "ours," the important survivorship feature would be gone.
1IH. CO-OWNERSHIP: STATE LAW AND THE
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES
There are three forms of co-ownership: tenancy in common,
94,000 in 1965 to a high of 149,000 in 1971. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE COMM'R OF INT. REV. 14 (Publication No. 55) (1966, 1971 respectively). Further
support is given this conclusion by the announcement of the Urban Institute that there arc
only five million taxpayers with a net worth of $60,000 in the United States. Wall Street
Journal, Feb. 20, 1974, at 1, col. 5 (Midwest ed.). This conclusion was based on ex-
trapolating data from 1969 estate tax returns. Whether these numbers reflect life in-
surance was not clear from the report. It would seem that they do not. For example,
it was reported that $1.4 trillion of life insurance was in force in the United States
and that the average family with life insurance had $24,800 of protection. R. KELSEY,
HANDBooK OF LiFE INSURANCE 11 (1966).
Nonetheless it appears that joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety are ex-
tremely popular forms of property ownership. See Hines, Real Property Joint Tenan-
cies: Law, Fact and Fancy, 51 IowA L. REv. 582 (1966). Professor Hines' study con-
cluded that the popularity of joint ownership is a fairly recent phenomenon. It began
to develop in the 1930's as property was sold out of foreclosure, and enjoyed a dramatic
increase during and after World War II, probably as the result of the wartime psycho-
logical fears of death and the popularity of War Bonds which had a built-in survivor-
ship feature. Id. at 586-90. (It was recently estimated that seventy-five percent of the
500 billion dollars worth of Series E United States Savings Bonds outstanding are regis-
tered in co-ownership form. United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257, 262 n.4 (1973).)
By the 1960's joint ownership had become a part of the conventional wisdom and in
1964 Professor Hines reported that fifty-two percent of Iowa land transfers created joint
tenancies. Hines, supra, at 587.
The continuing popularity of joint tenancies in the face of mounting criticism has
also been explained in terms of the general practitioner's failure to understand the
drawbacks of joint ownership and to offer "equally attractive but more economical al-
ternatives." Riecker, Joint Tenancy: The Estate Lawyer's Continuing Burden, 64
MICH. L. Rv. 801, 802 (1966). In fact, lawyers may have encouraged joint tenancies
through benign neglect as a result of congressional response to the increasing popular-
ity of the joint tenancy. Id. at 805-10. Whatever the explanation for this popularity,
the common myths about the advantages of joint ownership need debunking. Id. at
810-16.
34. See Riecker, supra note 33, at 830. Congress recognized this preference on
the part of taxpayers when it passed a special gift tax provision which excepted real
property held by husband and wife as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. See
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2515. The Treasury Department, in its 1969 proposals
for reform of the estate and gift tax provisions, also expressly recognized the prevalence
of the "ours" concept and recommended that transfers between husband and wife not
be subject to the transfer tax.
The present system of taxing transfers between spouses does not accord with
the common understanding of most husbands and wives that the property they
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joint tenancy with right of survivorship, and tenancy by the entirety. 5
A tenancy in common is a type of a co-ownership of real or personal
property in which each of the cotenants has a distinct and separate in-
terest in the property but each tenant is entitled to possession and en-
joyment of the entire property subject to the same right in the other
cotenants.3* More importantly, each tenant in common has the un-
fettered right to dispose of his interest by will; if he fails to do so,
it will pass at his death under the controlling intestate statute.37  Dur-
ing his lifetime he may transfer his interest or encumber it without
the consent of the other tenant in common. Moreover, any transferee
will be admitted to all the rights and privileges enjoyed by the trans-
ferring tenant in common.38
A joint tenancy with right of survivorship is distinguished from a
tenancy in common essentially only in respect to the survivorship fea-
ture. 9 A cotenant in property held as joint tenants with right of sur-
vivorship may alienate or transfer his fractional interest in the jointly
held property at any time during his lifetime.40 At his death, however,
he loses control over the property. The survivorship feature causes
the deceased cotenant's fractional interest to expire and the surviving
cotenant's interest to expand to include the entire interest in the prop-
erty.
41
have accumulated is "ours". TAX REFORM STuDiEs AND PROPOSALS, supra
note 12, at 358.
35. For a discussion of the characteristics of joint tenancies, tenancies by the en-
tireties and tenancies in common, see 1 J. MERTENS §§ 11.03 & 11.04; Effland, supra
note 3. See also Rich, Joint Ownership of Property and Joint Wills, 15 N.Y.U. INST.
OF TAXATiON 825 (1957).
36. C. MoYNmAN 224.
37. See 2 AM. LAw PROPERTY § 6.10, at 46.
38. Id. See also A. CASNER 401.
39. There are some other technical differences, the practical consequences of which
vary from state to state. The joint tenancy relationship is described as the fictional unity
of persons as co-owners. This unity is usually expressed in terms of unity of interest,
unity of title, unity of time, and unity of possession. At common law this concept of
unity of persons required co-owners to acquire their interest at the same time and by
the same instrument. In some jurisdictions, this remains the rule and a husband, for
example, cannot create a joint tenancy with his wife without deeding the property to
a strawman and having the straw deed it back to husband and wife as joint tenants
with right of survivorship. C. MoYN-uN 216-23; see 2 AM. LAw PROPERTY § 6.2.
40. The transfer of a fractional interest in property held as joint tenants with right
of survivorship converts the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common. If there were
originally more than one joint tenant, the remaining original joint tenants continue to
hold their interests as joint tenants with right of survivorship but the transferee tenant
holds as a tenant in common. "The transfer destroys the unities of title and of time
since the transferee acquires his interest by a different title and at a different time
." C. MOYNHAN 221.
41. See generally 2 AM. LAW PROPERTY § 6.2, at 7-11.
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A tenancy by the entirety (which also has a survivorship feature)
is distinguished from a joint tenancy in several respects: (1) it may
be created only between husband and wife; 42 (2) neither spouse can
alienate or transfer his interest in the subject premises without the con-
sent of the other tenant by the entirety;43 (3) not all states recognize
tenancy by the entirety;44 and (4) of those states recognizing tenancy
by the entirety, the majority restrict it to real property.45 It is also
important to note that in some jurisdictions the husband has full con-
trol of the tenancy by the entirety property during the joint lives
of himself and his spouse. In those jurisdictions, the husband has the
right to all of the income from the entirety property and, in some
cases, he can encumber it or subject it to the claims of his creditors .4
On the other hand, the majority rule is that each tenant by the entirety
has an equal right to the income from the entirety property and that
creditors of one tenant by the entirety may not subject the entirety
property to their claims. 47  In fact, however, even in those jurisdictions
in which the husband can subject the entirety property to the claims
of his creditors, those claims will be defeated if the other spouse sur-
vives. In other words, the survivorship feature is superior to the right
of a creditor of one of the tenants to subject the entirety property to
his claims. 48
It must be emphasized that when title is taken by husband and
wife as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety, each of them will be
deemed to have a vested present (but undivided) fractional interest
in the tenancy. This is a state law determination made without regard
to the respective contributions of the spouses to the purchase price.40
In cases where the contributions of the spouses are not equal, it would
seem appropriate to conclude that the spouse contributing the greater
amount has made a gift for state law purposes to the other spouse by
42. See id. § 6.6, at 23-24.
43. In a few jurisdictions, including New York and New Jersey, it has been held
that each tenant by the entirety may dispose of his interest in the tenancy by the en-
tirety without the consent of the other tenant. However, even in those jurisdictions,
the conveyance will not defeat the right of survivorship nor the right to possession of
the tenant who has not conveyed his interest. Id. § 6.6, at 28-29; C. LOWNDES & R.
KRAMER § 11.1, at 230.
44. See 4A R. POWELL & P. RorEAN U 621, at 684.
45. See 2 Am. LAw PROPERTY § 6.6, at 30; C. Mo mA 230-35.
46. 4A R. PowELL & P. ROHAN U 623, at 696, 703, 705.
47. Id. at 697.
48. See 2 Am. LAw PROPERTY § 6.6, at 28-29.
49. See C. MoYNIHAN 217, 229. The ownership interests of tenants in common
need not necessarily be equal although there is a presumption of equality of interest
where property is transferred to two or more persons. Id. at 224 n.3.
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the amount by which his contribution exceeds the value of the interest
in the tenancy which state law gives him. 50
There is a glaring exception to these -principles when joint bank
accounts are involved. In many cases there is often genuine concern
-and real litigation-over whether a deceased joint tenant who has
contributed to a joint bank account intended his contribution to be-
come the sole property of the surviving joint tenant at the deceased
tenant's death. While each tenant is presumed to have an equal un-
divided fractional interest in the joint bank account, the courts are
increasingly willing to take evidence directed toward overcoming this
presumption.51
Thus, a general rule of state property law is easily stated: Except
in the case of bank accounts, title appears determinative of ownership
questions without regard to the respective contributions of the co-
owners. Applying the old bromide that federal taxing statutes follow
state property law determinations, 52 it would seem logical that each co-
owner would have included in his gross estate for federal death tax
purposes the fair market value of the fractional interest state law be-
lieves him to have. It would also seem logical to conclude that when
title is taken as joint tenants, the federal gift tax would apply to the
difference between the fair market value of the interest acquired by a
co-owner and his contribution to the purchase price.
Federal tax law, however, does not follow state law in this area.
Under federal law, all jointly held property is included in the estate of
the first to die of the joint tenants except to the extent the survivor
can prove contribution.5" The emphasis is on contribution without
50. See notes 57-63 infra and accompanying text for discussion of federal gift tax
consequences.
51. See, e.g., Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962); Annot., 43
A.L.R. 3d 971 (1972); Effland, supra note 3, at 517-21.
52. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); see C. LowNDnS &
R. KRAMER §§ 4.15-.28, 52-57.
53. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2040. The term "property held jointly" is de-
fined in Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(b) (1958). The term includes both real and personal
property held in a joint tenancy, a tenancy by the entirety, or a joint bank account
payable to the survivor. Id. Property held in a tenancy in common is specifically ex-
cluded from jointly held property. Id.
The amount excluded from the estate of the first joint tenant to die is not the
amount contributed by the survivor but that portion of the value of the joint property
which is proportionate to the survivor's contribution. C. LowNDES & R. KRAMER §
11.2, at 231. There is considerable litigation with respect to what constitutes the sur-
vivor's contribution. See 2 J. MERTENS §§ 15.05-.06 (Supp. 1970).
There is an important exception in the statute for jointly held property acquired
by gift, devise or bequest. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2040. Where property is
thus acquired, the proportionate contributions of the joint tenants are determined by
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regard to state law determinations of the respective ownership inter-
ests.54  More importantly, the statute expressly contemplates "trac-
ing."55  This means that the source of the contribution made by the
surviving joint tenant is always at issue. If the surviving joint ten-
ant's contribution is made from resources provided to her by the de-
cedent, the value of the jointly held property proportionate to these
recources will be included in her gross estate. 6  It is an efficient
mechanical rule that puts the burden of proof on the surviving joint
tenant.
It is surprising, then, to note that the federal tax on gifts-life-
time transfers for less than adequate and full consideration in money
or moneys worth in other than a business contextr 7-- follows state law
determinations with one notable exception. The importance of the
exception is such that it is frequently stated first. When husband and
wife take title to real property as joint tenants with right of survivorship
(or as tenants by the entirety) 58 they have the option of reporting
the interests which the tenants take under local law. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c)
(1954).
54. More important, perhaps, is the fact that payment of federal gift tax by the
spouse who made the larger contribution at the time property becomes jointly held does
not avoid application of the federal estate tax to such jointly held property at the death
of the first joint tenant to die. There is, of course, a credit against the decedent's fed-
eral estate tax liability for federal gift taxes paid on property included in the decedent's
gross estate. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2012.
55. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2040. The difficulty of tracing the survivor's con-
tributions is well illustrated by Estate of Mead v. Commissioner, 11 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
42,236 (1942).
56. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2040.1(c) (4) (1954). Thus, the survivor cannot claim
as her contribution a gift she received from the decedent. Cf. Estate of Edward T.
Kelley, 22 B.T.A. 421 (1931).
The tracing principle represents a reasonable attempt to emphasize substance over
form. A taxpayer should not be able to defeat the death tax on jointly held property
by funneling a portion of the consideration for such property through the other joint
tenant. There is, however, a surprising limitation to this doctrine where income pro-
ducing property is involved.
If the decedent, before the acquisition of the property by himself and the
other joint tenant, transferred to the latter for less than an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth other income-producing property,
the income from which belonged to and became the other joint owner's entire
contribution to the purchase price, then the value of the jointly-held property
less that portion attributable to the income which the other joint owner did
furnish is included in the decedent's gross estate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c)
(5) (1954).
57. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2501, 2511, 2512; Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-
8 (1958). See generally 5 J. MERTENS §§ 36.06-36.07 (Supp. 1971).
58. The Service construes the meaning of real property narrowly. "In providing in
section 2515(a) of the Code an exception from gift tax provisions of the creation of
tenancies by the entirety in 'real property,' Congress indicated in no way a modification
of the concept as used at common law." Rev. Rul. 66-40, 1966-1 CuM. BuLL. 227,
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or not reporting the transaction for federal gift tax purposes.5 9 With
respect to all other property, federal law defers to state law. If state
law declares that a co-owner took a greater interest in property than
his contribution would entitle him to, the other co-owner is deemed
to have made a taxable gift to the extent the fair market value of the
interest taken by the other co-owner exceeds his contribution." In
the case of joint bank accounts, federal law also follows state law.
Since under state law, the interest of each co-owner in a joint bank
account is limited, practically speaking,61 so too, under federal law,
no gift is made until a co-owner withdraws an amount in excess of her
contribution to the account. 62
229 (for example, a taxpayer's interest in a cooperative apartment does not qualify as
real property for purposes of section 2515(a)).
59. See INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2515. See notes 92-101 infra and accompany-
ing text.
60. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (5) (1954). See notes 92-99 infra and accom-
panying text.
The Treasury Regulations are silent with respect to the gift tax consequences of
creating tenancies in common, but it seems clear that a taxable gift will occur where
the fractional interests received by the tenants in common are disproportionate to their
contributions to the purchase price of the property. C. LowNDFS & R. KRAMER § 30.2,
at 657.
It would be unusual to find that the joint owners had considered the gift tax im-
plications of taking title as joint tenants. Rarely is a gift tax return filed in these
cases. Of course, in many cases, the $3,000 per donee per annum exclusion and the
$30,000 exemption provided by sections 2503(b) and 2521, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
respectively, frequently eliminate any tax liability. In those cases where the annual
gifts exceed $3,000, however, gift tax returns must be filed even if no tax is due be-
cause of the exemption. More often than not, it is difficult at estate planning time
to determine if gift tax returns should have been filed for gifts made in prior years.
In most cases, the client has no records from which to reconstruct these transactions,
and, for that reason, the tendency seems to be to shy away from filing delinquent re-
turns. Unfortunately, the statute of limitations will not begin to run on these trans-
actions until a return is filed. See id. § 6501(c)(3). A delinquency penalty of
25% of the tax, id. § 6651, and a negligence penalty of 5%, id. § 6653(a), may
be due. See Ellen W.S. Johnston, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1401 (1968) (Dec. 29,233
(M)) (gift tax penalties assessed in 1966 on a 1945 gift resulting from the creation
of tenancy by the entirety).
61. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
62. See Treas. Reg. 25.2511-1(h) (4) (1958) which provides:
If A creates a joint bank account for himself and B (or a similar type of
ownership by which A can regain the entire fund without B's consent), there
is a gift to B when B draws upon the account for his own benefit, to the
extent of the amount drawn without any obligation to account for a part of
the proceeds to A. Similarly, if A purchases a United States savings bond,
registered as payable to "A or B," there is a gift to B when B surrenders the
bond for cash without any obligation to account for a part of the proceeds
to A. Id.
Lowndes and Kramer speculate about the situation where under local law the
donor-spouse does not have the right to regain the entire fund:
Presumably, if under some peculiar doctrine of the local law, or some contrac-
tual arrangement, when a person deposited money in a joint bank account this
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In the case of tenancy by the entirety property, the value of the
gift is calculated differently to reflect the fact that neither tenant can
sever the tenancy without the consent of the other tenant. This re-
straint on alienation places a premium on survivorship probabilities.
The spouse with the greater life expectancy clearly has a more valuable
interest in the property. The Internal Revenue Service provides tables
and factors which take into account the actuarial probability that one
tenant will survive the other.63
IV. TERMINATION OF JOINT TENANCY DURING LIFE
A. Objective: Estate Equalization
It is fairly clear that federal estate tax considerations make it
highly desirable for a husband and wife to have equal estates, and
that accordingly, it is often desirable to accomplish such equalization
through lifetime property transfers between the spouses. This can be
illustrated by a simple example. Assume H and W are husband and
created a joint tenancy with respect to the money so that the depositor lost
title to half of the money at the time the deposit was made, and he could
not withdraw half of the account so that the transfer of that half was com-
plete and irrevocable, this would be a gift of half of the account to the other
depositor at the time the deposit was made. C. Lowie s & R. KRAMR §
30.10, at 666-67.
The Service has ruled that where a United States savings bond is acquired by one
person from his separate property and is payable either to him or another person, there
is not a completed gift unless (1) the noncontributing co-owner cashes the bond or (2)
the bond is reissued in the name of the noncontributing co-owner alone. Rev. Rul. 55-
278, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 471, 472; see C. LowNDns & R. KAmvER § 30.10, at 667.
The courts at first did not follow this ruling. In Silverman v. McGinnes, 259 F.2d
731 (3d Cir. 1958), the Third Circuit held that a completed inter vivos gift of savings
bonds had been made where the contributing co-owner had delivered the bonds into
the possession of the noncontributing co-owner with the intention of making a gift. The
bonds had not been cashed by the noncontributing co-owner nor had they been reissued
in his name alone. However, in United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257 (1973) (per
curiam), the Supreme Court held that even though the decedent had made a valid gift
of savings bonds under state law, the bonds were includible in his estate under section
2040 because the federal regulations require that the bonds be reissued in order to
change ownership. See also Estate of Curry v. United States, 409 F.2d 671 (6th Cir.
1969); Mae Elliott, 57 T.C. 152 (1972) (upholding the Service's position).
See generally Rev. Rul. 68-269, 1968-1 Cm. BULL. 399 (Situations 2-5, 7-gift
tax payable on savings bonds in various factual situations).
Joint brokerage accounts where the contributing co-owner could withdraw all of
the funds are also treated like joint bank accounts. See Rev. Rul. 69-148, 1969-1
Cum. BuLL. 226.
63. IRS PUBLICATION 723A, SUPPLEMENT 1 (4-71), ACTUARL VALuES II: FAc-
TORS AT 6 PERcENT INVOLVING ONE AND Two LIvEs, in 2 CCH FED. EsT. & G]Fr TAX
REP. % 8033 (1971).
There has been some question whether the creation of a tenancy by the entirety
could constitute a gift, but that has been clearly settled in favor of gift treatment. See
5 J. MERTENS § 36.09.
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wife and that H has a $200,000 adjusted gross estate and that W has
no property of her own. If H predeceases W and devises all of his
property to her, his federal estate tax liability will be $4,800, but at
W's death, her federal estate tax liability will be $32,700 unless she
consumes some of H's property after his death or otherwise disposes
of it. Of course, if W predeceases H, there would be no federal estate
tax liability at W's death. In such cases, however, the federal estate
tax liability at H's subsequent death would be $32,700.
On the other hand if H were to be taxed on only $100,000 of the
$200,000 and W on the other $100,000, their respective federal estate
tax bills would each be $4,800. To accomplish this objective it is
important that none of the property included in the estate of the first
spouse to die be included in the estate of 'the survivor at her subsequent
death.4
Thus, it is imperative that all joint tenancies with right of survivor-
ship and tenancies by the entirety be terminated. To allow such ar-
rangements to continue would mean that all jointly held property will
be included in the estates of both spouses"5 (unless they die simul-
taneoasly 6), thereby making equalization impossible.Y6
64. This is necessary to avoid taxing the same property in both estates. The im-
portance of this principle was discussed earlier. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
65. Inclusion of the same property in the estate of the second spouse to die would
not have any effect on the federal tax liability of the estate of the first spouse to die
because of the availability of the marital deduction in the estate of the first spouse to die
as to that property passing to the surviving spouse. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
It would, however, increase the total transfer tax to be borne by the estates of both
spouses. The inclusion of the same property in both estates would inflate the survivor's
estate and thereby substantially increase her federal estate tax liability largely because of
the progressive rate structure of the federal estate tax. See id. § 2001. For example, as-
sume each spouse dies with a $100,000 adjusted gross estate and makes no gifts to char-
ity and no part of either estate qualified for the marital deduction. After taking the
$60,000 estate tax exemption, see id. § 2052, each taxable estate will be $40,000 and
thus taxed as an 18% bracket estate. Id. The tax will be $4,800 on each estate. On
the other hand, if the respective estates were combined and all included in the estate
of the first spouse to die, his adjusted gross estate would be $200,000, and, after allow-
ing for the marital deduction as to that property passing to the surviving spouse, his
estate would also be taxed as an 18% bracket estate. Id. The tax on his estate would
again be $4,800. However, at the death of the survivor, the full $200,000 will be in-
cluded in her estate (unless she consumes it or disposes of it during lifetime). The
survivor's $200,000 adjusted gross estate (assuming no gifts to charity and no marital
deduction) will be treated as a 28% bracket estate. Id. The tax at her death will
be $32,700.
66. See UNiFoRM SiMuLTANEoJs DEATH AcT § 3. In those cases where there
is no sufficient evidence of the order of deaths, jointly held property will be dis-
tributed "one-half as if one (joint tenant) had survived and one-half as if the other
had survived." Id. All jurisdictions except Ohio have adopted the Uniform Act. For
local variations, see 8 UNIFoRm LAws ANNOTATED 617-18 (Master ed. 1972).
Rev. Rul. 66-60, 1966-1 Cum. Butt. 221, provides that
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Estate equalization may be less than appealing to many taxpayers
if they are told that at the death of the first spouse to die, the survivor
can have no further interest in the decedent's property. For that rea-
son, it is imperative that any suggestion of estate equalization be ac-
compahied by a recommendation that the property belonging to the
first spouse to die will be placed in a trust for the surviving spouse.
If the trust is properly drafted, the survivor will have the enjoyment
of the property included in the estate of the first spouse to die without
the burden of having it included in her gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes. This can be accomplished by virtue of a carefully
drafted trust agreement included in the will of the first spouse to die.0 8
The trust should provide that the surviving spouse shall enjoy all of
the income from the trust property for life. The draftsman can go even
further and give the survivor a power to appoint the remainder in-
terest among a limited class of persons (excluding herself, her estate,
her creditors, or the creditors of her estate) without adverse death tax
consequences. 9 With even more careful craftmanship, the survivor
could be made trustee of her deceased spouse's property and the prop-
erty would still not be included in her gross estate.70
under section 3 of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, a presumption of
survivorship in the wife is created with respect to half of the property held
by the entirety. With respect to this property she has survived and the
property passes to and is includible in her estate. Therefore, the husband's
estate is entitled to a marital deduction to the extent of the one-half interest
passing to the wife. Id.
Thus, in such cases, one-half of the jointly held property will be included in the estate
of each decedent. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2033.
67. Jointly held property would be included in the estate of the first spouse to die
except to the extent the survivor could prove contribution. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2040. It would subsequently be in the estate of the survivor at her subsequent death
unless she consumed it or disposed of it during her lifetime. See text accompanying
notes 24-25 supra.
Even if contribution to the jointly held property can clearly be established when
the first spouse dies, it would not be appropriate to continue to hold property as joint
tenants with right of survivorship or as tenants by the entirety. To do so, would, of
course, mean that the portion taxed in the estate of the first spouse to die would again
be included in the estate of the survivor at his subsequent death unless the jointly held
property was consumed or disposed of by the survivor. However, in fairness, it must
be said that if contribution to the jointly held property can be established, estate equali-
zation would be possible without terminating the joint tenancy arrangements if only
there were some way to predict which spouse will die first. If their order of deaths
cannot be determined, all attempts at equalization will be frustrated so long as the
spouses have jointly held property since there is no way to prevent all of the jointly
held property from vesting in the surviving spouse at the death of the first to die.
68. In those jurisdictions where testamentary trusts are subject to continuing court
supervision, an alternative would be to pour-over the decedent's probate property to an
existing revocable trust. See note 20 supra.
69. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2041. See note 23 supra.
70. In order for the federal estate tax to be applied to property interests passing
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There are two possible disadvantages of this scheme. The first
is that the trust device denies the survivor the unfettered dominion
and control over the deceased spouse's property which she would have
if she took this property outright. This, however, is a modest restric-
tion on the enjoyment of the property and one that the taxpayer must
be prepared to accept. All tax planning is a process of compromising
objectives. If a taxpayer wants to enjoy tax savings, he must give up
some control over his property. If control is a premium item, the
taxpayer must be prepared to pay a full share of taxes. He cannot have
it both ways.
The second reason which may be advanced as a disadvantage of
this scheme has to do with the suggestion that all joint tenancies and
tenancies by the entirety should be terminated. In many cases one of
the spouses has made all of the contributions necessary to acquire the
jointly held property. In that case, if the noncontributing spouse is
the first to die and the surviving spouse can prove the extent of his
contribution to the jointly held property, the deceased spouse's estate
may be reduced to the point that al of her estate will pass tax free to
the survivor.7 1  But whether there is any ultimate transfer tax sav-
ings in such a case will, of course, depend upon the survivor with the
larger estate undertaking an aggressive gift program to reduce the size
of his gross estate. Otherwise the federal estate tax liability at his
death will greatly exceed the total federal estate tax liability which
would have been incurred had the property been split between the
spouses while they were both living.71 But even an aggressive gift
program after the death of the spouse with the smaller estate has ser-
ious disadvantages. It means the surviving spouse cannot retain a life
from the still to the quick, two conditions must be satisfied. First there must be a
transfer at some time-either during lifetime or at deathtime-from this decedent. Sec-
ond, there must be a shifting of economic benefit-direct or indirect-from this dece-
dent at his death. In the case where the surviving spouse has a life estate in the de-
ceased spouse's property, a power to appoint among a limited class of persons, and is
also the trustee of that property, nothing will be included in her estate because she
has never made a transfer of this property even though the economic benefit of the
property shifts from her at her death. In other words, she has not satisfied both of
the conditions for the application of the federal estate tax. See INT. REV. CODE OP
1954, §§ 2033-42.
Perhaps it is appropriate to note that in cases where the surviving spouse is trustee,
she can be given discretion to distribute principal to herself provided her discretion is
limited by an ascertainable standard such as "maintenance, care and support." See id.
§ 2041(b) (1) (A).
71. Combining the marital deduction (INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056) and the
federal estate tax exemption (Id. § 2052) will allow $120,000 to pass from a decedent
to his surviving spouse free of any tax.
72. See notes 64-67 supra and accompanying text.
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estate in any of the property he transfers if he wants to keep that
property out of his gross estate.73 On the other hand, if the respective
estates are equalized while both spouses are living, the survivor can
enjoy a life estate in the deceased spouse's property without adverse
tax consequences. 74  The only real advantage, then, of not equalizing
the estates is the possibility that there will be a tax deferral if the
spouse with the smaller estate dies first. Thus, when the estates are
equalized some tax will be paid at each spouse's death. In the case
where they are not so equalized and the spouse with the smaller estate
dies first, in many cases no tax will be immediately due and payable and
the tax dollars saved will be available to the survivor.
This can be illustrated by reference again to the case of a taxpayer
with a $200,000 gross estate, $150,000 of which consists of jointly
held property for which he provided all the consideration. This tax-
payer and his spouse should make a lifetime split of their jointly held
property so as to give each spouse a $100,000 gross estate. Each
spouse should then execute a will providing the survivor of them a life
estate plus a limited power of appointment over the property included
in the estate of the first spouse to die.78  Assuming no increase in the
value of the survivor's estate, the death tax bill at the death of each
spouse will be $4,800 or a total transfer cost of $9,600. Had the
property remained in joint tenancy and the surviving spouse received
the entire estate of the first to die, the death tax bill would be $4,800
upon the death of the first to die, and $32,700 upon the death of the
second to die, for a total transfer cost of $37,500.76 Or if the tax-
payer had employed the traditional A and B trust arrangement for the
property, the death tax bill at his death would again be $4,800 and at
his spouse's subsequent death, $17,900, for a total transfer tax cost
of $22,700. 77
73. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. Of course the donor could make
a lifetime transfer of property in trust and give the trustee absolute discretion over
whether to make any distributions of principal or income for his benefit. See note
274 infra and accompanying text.
74. See text accompanying notes 64-70 supra.
75. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
76. The tax consequences would be approximately the same even in cases where
the first spouse to die provided none of the consideration for the jointly held property
and had no other property. For example, all the jointly held property would initially
be included in her gross estate under a rebuttable presumption. INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 2040. If the presumption was not overcome, the tax bill at the death of
the first to die would be $1,050. When coupled with the tax bill of $32,700 at
the death of the survivor (assuming he neither disposed of nor consumed any of the
$200,000) it would mean a total transfer tax of $33,750.
77. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. The tax consequences which result
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This comparison can be illustrated by the following table. Line
one shows the total estate tax liability of both spouses if their total
estate is valued at $200,000 and includes $150,000 of jointly held
property purchased by the husband. The second line indicates the
total estate tax liability if an A and B trust arrangement is established
by the husband for the same $200,000 estate. Finally, the estate tax
results of applying the estate equalization device to the $200,000 estate
are shown in line three. In all three cases, the first column represents
the total cost of transferring the property to the next generation in those
cases where the husband dies first; the second column shows the re-
sults if the wife dies first.
Sum of Federal Estate Taxes Paid by the Spouses
Husband Dies First Wife Dies First
1. Jointly held property $37,500 $33,75078
2. A and B Trust $22,700 $33,75079
3. Estate Equalization $ 9,600 $ 9,600
The table makes clear the potentially disastrous estate tax conse-
quences when spouses hold their property jointly. In sum, from an
estate tax minimization standpoint, holding property jointly should be
strongly discouraged.
B. Obstacle: Federal Gift Tax Considerations
The tax planning advantages that can be obtained by equalizing
the respective estates of husband and wife are complicated when jointly
held property is present because of the federal gift tax consequences
which frequently result from the termination of such ownership ar-
rangements as the spouses bring about equalization. 0 These conse-
if the A and B trust arrangement were used and the wife died first would be $1,050
at her death and $32,700 at his death. The reasons are the same as those given in
note 76 supra. Since the taxpayer husband is the survivor, the A and B trust arrange-
ment with its marital deduction feature (INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056) will not be
operative.
78. It is assumed that all the jointly held property was included in the wife's estate
when she died first. See note 76 supra.
79. See note 77 supra. Had the estates not included any jointly held property, then
the total federal estate tax when the husband dies first would be $9,600, and when the
wife dies first, $32,700. See note 81 infra.
80. See Worthy, supra note I at 620-26. See generally 5 J. MERTENS §§ 36.11-18
(Supp. 1971). Perhaps special attention should be called to the fact that equalization
can mean that the jointly held property is converted to tenancy in common ownership.
The spouses need not have equal interests as tenants in common but their interests as
tenants in common will be a factor in determining gift tax consequences upon termina-
tion of the joint tenancy arrangement. The discussion in text which follows will illus-
trate these points. However, in cases where the spouses seek to equalize their estates
and contemplate using a trust to hold the property of the first spouse to die, it is ques-
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quences are rarely foreseen by the client and often overlooked by the
attorney. Perhaps this is understandable in light of the complexities
inherent in making such gift tax determinations. This complexity re-
sults from two factors: (1) tax consequences which result from ter-
minating joint tenancies depend upon the kind of property in which the
joint tenancy existed; and (2) in determining gift tax consequences
federal law attempts to follow state property law determinations (with
some notable exceptions).81
tionable whether holding property as tenants in common is advisable. That form
of ownership would mean that at the death of one spouse, the trustee of his trust would
succeed him as partial owner of the tenancy in common property. That split of
ownership could create administrative difficulties. Perhaps a better solution would
be to equalize estates by dollar values of entire properties between the spouses rather
than fractional interests.
Fortunately, income tax considerations affecting lifetime splits of jointly held
property are limited to concerns about basis for purposes of determining gain upon ulti-
mate sale of the property. It is well settled, for example, that a division of jointly held
property between co-owners or modification of the form of ownership does not consti-
tute a sale or exchange within the contemplation of section 1002 Internal Revenue Code
of 1954. See Rev. Rul. 56-437, 1956-2 CoM. BULL. 507; A. CASNER 417 n. 58. But
see note 261 infra. For a detailed examination of the income tax consequences which
result from property divisions, see Dickinson, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Divi-
sions of Property: Marital Property Settlements, Estate and Trust Distributions, and
Other Transactions, 18 KAN. L. REv. 193 (1970).
The federal income tax cannot be ignored, however, in planning lifetime splits of
jointly held property. Property included in a decedent's gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes will have as its basis for federal income tax purposes the value at which
it was reported for federal estate tax purposes. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1014.
On the other hand property transferred during lifetime will have as its basis in the
hands of the transferee the transferor's basis plus any gift tax paid at the time of the
transfer. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1015. Thus, lifetime splits of jointly held
property can have income tax consequences in the sense that appreciated property will
continue to have a low basis for income tax purposes in the hands of the transferee
whereas that same property would have a stepped-up basis if it were included in the
transferor's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. Whether this consequence is
sufficient to warrant keeping property in joint tenancy form can only be determined
by a comparison of the estate tax savings possible if the jointly held property was split
with the anticipated income tax liability when the property is sold.
81. See text accompanying notes 57-63 supra. A brief overview of gift tax consid-
erations in terminating joint tenancies has appeared in the context of Michigan law. See
Kahn, Joint Tenancies to Tenancies by the Entirety in Michigan-Federal Gift Tax
Considerations, 66 MicH. L. REv. 431 (1968).
Perhaps it is also appropriate to comment that because of gift tax considerations,
the spouses' respective estates may be more easily equalized where they have jointly
held property. For example, assume H has $200,000 of separate property and W has
none. While H would probably be inclined to use an A and B Trust for tax purposes,
see text accompanying notes 20-24 supra, it would have the tax savings effect of equal-
izing the spouses' respective estates only if H died first. On the other hand, if H's and
W's respective estates were equalized, the order of the spouses' deaths would be irrele-
vant provided the first to die made certain that no part of his property would be in-
cluded in the survivor's estate. See note 67 supra and accompanying text. But the
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(1) Joint Tenancy with Right of Survivorship
There will be no gift tax consequences upon termination"' of a
joint tenancy arrangement provided each spouse receives property
having a value equal to the value of the interest state law gives him or
her in the jointly held property. 3 Valuation of these interests depends
upon whether the property is held as joint tenants with right of sur
vivorship or as tenants by the entirety. With respect to property held
as joint tenants with right of survivorship, each spouse will be deemed
to have acquired an undivided one-half interest in the property when
the joint tenancy was created. 4 The" respective contributions of the
spouses are irrelevant to this determination. Federal law, in this re-
spect, is merely recognizing the fact that under state law either joint
gift tax cost of equalizing the estates would mean that equalization was more expensive
for tax purposes than would be an A and B trust arrangement, provided, of course,
that H died first. If W dies first, equalization would be cheaper.
If H dies first and the A and B trust is used, the estate tax at the death of each
spouse will be $4,800 respectively. There will be no gift tax consequences. On the
other hand, if W dies first, there will be no tax at her death, and at H's death the
estate tax will be $32,700.
Equalization of H and W's respective estates will incur a $952 gift tax liability
provided neither H nor W has exhausted any part of his or her $30,000 lifetime exemp-
tion. The fact of this gift tax liability will increase the cost of equalization by $952
over the A and B trust arrangement in cases where H dies first. Of course, where
W dies first, equalization will reduce the total estate tax to H and W to $9,600
($4,800 each) which when added to the $952 gift tax liability means a total transfer
cost of $10,552 versus $32,700 without equalization.
Total tax if Total tax if
H dies first W dies first
A and B Trust $ 9,600 $32,700
Equalized Estates $10,552 $10,552
Of course the gift tax effect will be much greater as the value of H's estate increases.
The advantage of jointly held property in the event of equalization is that there
may not be any gift tax consequences because each spouse may be deemed to own (for
gift tax purposes) one-half of the jointly held property. See notes 82-101 infra and
accompanying text.
82. Termination of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship or a tenancy by the
entirety due to the death of one of the tenants is not treated as a termination because
any transfer which occurs at that time is testamentary in nature and is subject to the
federal estate tax and not the gift tax. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(b) (1954). How-
ever, a termination is deemed to have occurred when the tenancy ends in any other way
unless the property subject to the tenancy is converted in whole or in part into other
real property held under an identical tenancy. See id. § 25.2515-1(d) (2). The termi-
nation will not change the fact that gift tax may still be owing from the time when
the joint tenancy was created. See note 60 supra.
83. C. LowNDEs & R. KRAMER § 30.5, at 661. This rule has an exception for real
property acquired as joint tenants with right of survivorship or as tenants by the en-
tirety after December 31, 1954 for which no gift tax returns have been filed. See notes
92-101 infra and accompanying text.
84. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(5) (1954).
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tenant may sever the joint tenancy and transfer his one-half interest
without the consent of the other tenant. 5 Therefore, if upon termina-
tion, each spouse receives one-half of the property, there will be no gift
tax consequences. 80 If either spouse receives more or less, a taxable
gift will have been made by the spouse receiving less than one-half.
(2) Tenancy by the Entirety
Where tenancy by the entirety property is involved, the only dif-
ference in treatment has to do with valuation of the spouses' respective
interests in the jointly held property. To determine whether a gift is
made at the time of acquisition, the value of the spouses' respective
interests in the jointly held property is determined by use of actuarial
factors which take into consideration the probability of one spouse sur-
viving the other.87 The probabilities of survival change as the spouses
get older.18 Accordingly, at the time of termination, the interests of
the respective spouses in the jointly held property must again be de-
termined actuarially. As in the case of joint tenancy with right of
survivorship, the tenancy by the entirety property must be divided so
as to enable each spouse to receive property having a value equal to
the actuarially determined value of his or her interest in the jointly
held property at the time of termination. 89 Otherwise, a taxable gift
will be made by the spouse receiving less than the actuarially deter-
mined value of his interest.
(3) Joint Bank Accounts
Where the property being divided is a joint bank account, dif-
ferent rules will be employed. At the time the account was established,
the interests of the respective co-owners for federal gift tax purposes
were deemed to be proportionate to their contributions. 0° A gift from
one co-owner to the other is recognized only when a co-owner draws
from the account an amount in excess of his contribution."' Thus any
85. See id. § 25.2515-2(b) (1). See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
86. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-4(b) (1954); C. LowNDEs & R. KRAMER § 30.3,
at 659.
87. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(b) (2) (1954).
88. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
89. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-4(b) (1954).
90. See note 62 supra.
91. See note 62 supra. There is a taxable gift only if a direct payment of the
amount withdrawn would have been a gift. C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER § 30.10, at
666. Thus, where the wife withdraws funds from the joint account to apply against
household expenses there would be no gift. Id.; Rudick, Federal Tax Problems Relat-
ing to Property Oivned in Joint Tenancy and Tenancy by the Entirety, 4 TAX L. Rnv.
3, 21 (1948).
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division of the joint account other than in proportion to the respective
contributions of the co-owners results in the imposition of the federal
gift tax on the amount by which each co-owner's distribution exceeds
the portion of the account attributable to his contribution.
(4) Section 2515 Property
Special legislation exists to exempt from gift taxation, at the tax-
payer's option, real property acquired after 1954 by husband and wife
as joint tenants with right of survivorship or as tenants by the en-
tirety." If no gift tax returns have ever been filed -to reflect any
transactions with respect to the section 2515 property, gift tax conse-
quences, at the time of termination, depend upon whether the spouses
receive property having a value equal to the value of their interests in
the section 2515 property.9 3  In this case, valuation depends upon
contribution.94 Each spouse's interest in the section 2515 property is
determined by a fraction, the numerator of which consists of his or her
contribution to the property; and the denominator of which is total
contributions to the property.95 So long as each spouse receives upon
termination of the joint tenancy arrangement the value of his or her
fractional interest in the section 2515 property, no taxable gifts will
have been made.9"
On the other hand in cases where the spouses elect to report tax-
able gifts with respect to section 2515 property, gift tax treatment at
the subsequent termination of the co-ownership arrangement will be
identical to that experienced with other forms of property held as joint
tenants with right of survivorship or as tenants by the entirety.
97
In summary form, then, the following points must be noted with
respect to section 2515 property:
a. Whether the property is held as joint tenants with right of
survivorship or as tenants by the entirety is only important as
to property acquired prior to 1955 and property acquired sub-
sequent to that time for which federal gift tax returns have
been filed. In such cases which involve joint tenancy with
right of survivorship property, a taxable gift will have been
made if one tenant contributed more than one-half the total
92. INT. REV. CODE oi 1954, § 2515(a); C. LOWNDES & R. KMmER § 30.4, at
659-60.
93. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2515(b).
94. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(b) (1954).
95. See id. §§ 25.2515-3(a), (b).
96. See id. § 25.2515-1(b).
97. See id. §§ 25.2515-2(b) (1), (2), (c), (d); C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER § 30.5.
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consideration provided for the property.98  At termination a
taxable gift will have been made if one tenant receives less
than one-half the total property." Thus, in the case where
one spouse provided all the consideration and, at the termina-
tion of the joint tenancy, took back all the property, he would
be deemed to have made a taxable gift to his spouse at the
time of acquisition and she would have been deemed to have
made a taxable gift to him at termination. These tax liabili-
ties cannot be offset against each other.
The only difference in treatment where tenancy by the
entirety is involved has to do with the computation of the
value of the respective tenant's interest in the entirety prop-
erty at the time of acquisition and at the time of termination.
These are questions of valuation only.100
b. Whether the property is held as tenants by the entirety or
joint tenants with right of survivorship is completely irrelevant
in determining federal gift taxes at termination of the co-own-
ership arrangement where real property was acquired after
1954 and no gift tax returns were filed to reflect the taxable
transfer, if any, which took place at the time. In cases like
this, termination of the co-ownership arrangement will have
no gift tax consequences unless the property is divided other
than according to the spouses' respective contributions.' 0 '
(5) Illustration: Real or Personal Property Held as Tenants
by the Entirety
Tenancy by the entirety in personal property whenever acquired 0 2
(except bank accounts);10 3 tenancy by the entirety in real property
acquired prior to 1955;104 and tenancy by the entirety in real property
acquired after 1954, but reported for gift tax purposes' 0 5 enjoy the
same treatment for federal gift tax purposes. At the time of ac-
quisition, a tenant by the entirety will be deemed to have received a
taxable gift from the other tenant to the extent the interest he received
in the property exceeds his contribution. The issue here, however,
98. See notes 83 & 95 supra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 85 & 95 supra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 88 & 95 supra and accompanying text.
101. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(b) (1954).
102. See notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text.
105. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
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is to measure the respective interests of the co-owners. Where neither
co-owner has a right to sever unilaterally the tenancy and each spouse
is entitled to share in the income or other enjoyment of the property,
"actuarial factors for the spouses at their respective attained ages at
the time the transaction is effected" must be employed.10 6 The fol-
lowing example from the Treasury Regulations illustrates the use of
actuarial factors: 1°7
A husband with his own funds acquires real property valued at $10,000
and has it conveyed to himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety.
Under the law of the jurisdiction governing the rights of the parties,
each spouse is entitled to share in the income from the property but
neither spouse acting alone could bring about a severance of his or her
interest. The husband elects to treat the transfer as a gift in the year
in which effected. At the time of transfer, the ages of the husband
and wife are 45 and 40, respectively, on their birthdays nearest to the
date of transfer. The value of the gift to the wife is $5,708.90, com-
puted as follows:
Value of property transferred $10,000.00
Less $10,000 X .42911 (factor for value of
donor's retained rights) 4,291.10
Value of gift $ 5,708.90
The foregoing example illustrates the computation of federal gift
tax consequences at the -time property is acquired as tenants by the
entirety. In cases where a tenancy by the entirety is to be terminated,
the value of the spouses' respective interests in the property will have
to be recomputed using actuarial factors for the ages attained by the
spouses at the date of termination. 08  If the tenancy by the entirety
described in the prior example were terminated when the husband is
80 and the wife 75, the recomputation will look like this:
Value of property transferred $10,000.00
Less $10,000 X .35795 (factor for value
of husband's interest) 3,579.50
Value of wife's interest $ 6,420.50
That means upon termination of the tenancy by the entirety, the hus-
band must receive 35.795 percent of the property and the wife must re-
106. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(b) (2) (1954).
107. Id. § 25.2515-2(d). The quoted passage reflects the new six percent factors to
be used in valuing interests in property transferred after December 31, 1970. Such
amendment was made to the regulation for purposes of including it in this Article but
the Treasury has not amended the original published version. It did, however, amend
Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(a) in Treasury Decision 7238, 1973 INT. Rnv. BuLL. No. 9,
at 37 but ignored this section.
108. Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-4(b) (1954).
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ceive 64.205 percent. If either spouse receives more or less than the
indicated percentages, the spouse receiving less will be deemed to have
made a taxable gift to the other spouse of the amount by which the
value of the percentage received by the other spouse exceeds the value
of her percentage interest in the property. For example, if the prop-
erty has appreciated to $100,000 during the period it was held as
tenants by the entirety, the wife must receive $64,250 of property to
avoid having made a taxable gift to her husband.Y0 9
(6) Illustration: Real Property Held as Joint Tenants with
Right of Survivorship
The Treasury Regulations are quite detailed, and perhaps attention
should be given to several points to illustrate the complexity of the
problem. A common transaction is one in which husband and wife
acquire residential real property as joint tenants with right of survivor-
ship or as tenants by the entirety. To secure the indebtedness nor-
mally incurred to finance such purchases, it is customary to place a
mortgage on the property. Specific timing rules then dictate tax con-
sequences:
a. If the property was acquired prior to 1955, and the respective
interests of the spouses in the property at the time of acquisi-
tion were not proportional to their respective contributions to
the purchase price, gift tax returns should have been filed to
reflect the fact that one spouse made a gift to the other. 10
109. In cases where the real or personal property is held as joint tenants with right
of survivorship, the controlling principle is the state law determination that either ten-
ant has an undivided one-half interest in the property, and either may sever the tenancy
by transferring his one-half interest without the consent of the other tenant. See note
85 supra and accompanying text. Thus in the following cases there will be no gift
tax consequences at termination of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship provided
each tenant receives one-half of the property:
a. Where real property is acquired prior to January 1, 1955; and
b. Where real property is acquired after December 31, 1954 and gift tax returns
were filed at the time of acquisition.
See notes 98-101 supra and accompanying text. Conversion of a joint tenancy into
a tenancy in common, for example, would have no gift tax consequences so long as
each spouse has a one-half interest in the property as a tenant in common. See note 80
supra.
However, where the real property is acquired after December 31, 1954, and no
gift tax returns were filed, the property must be divided according to the contributions
each made to the property. See notes 92-101 supra and accompanying text. Whether
the property is held as joint tenants with right of survivorship or as tenants by the
entirety is irrelevant to this inquiry. Actuarial computations will be similarly irrele-
vant where tenancy by the entirety property is involved.
110. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(b) (1954). See notes 82-89, 97 supra and accom-
panying text.
[Vol. 1974:669
Vol. 1974:669] PLANNING FOR JOINT TENANCIES
b. If the property was acquired subsequent to 1954, the spouses
had the option whether to report any taxable gifts at the time
of acquisition.".
Those rules, however, settle the issue of taxable gifts only with respect
to the initial transaction. For example, if one spouse goes on to make
all the mortgage payments, he will be deemed to have made a gift to
the other spouse each time he discharges her portion of the mortgage
obligation."' Nonetheless, when this reduction of indebtedness is ac-
complished after 1954, the donor spouse has the option of reporting
or ignoring these gifts for federal gift tax purposes 11 3
a. If he chooses to ignore these gifts, when the tenancy is subse-
quently terminated, the value of the property (or the pro-
ceeds, if sold) must be prorated according to the total contri-
butions made prior to 1955 and the total contributions made
after 1954.114 The property allocated to the post-1954 con-
tributions must be distributed to the donor spouse to avoid
gift taxes.1 15 The property allocated to the pre-1955 con-
tributions must be allocated between the spouses according to
the interest each had in the property under state law. 1 6
b. If the gifts of the mortgage payments are reported for gift tax
purposes as made, gift tax consequences upon termination
will depend upon whether the property is held as joint tenants
with right of survivorship or as tenants by the entirety. If
held as joint tenants with right of survivorship the jointly held
property must be equally divided between the spouses at termi-
nation.1 7  If held as tenants by the entirety, on the other
hand, the division must be according to the interests of the
respective spouses but these interests are determined by ac-
tuarial factors.11 8
111. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 2515.
112. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-3(b) (1954). It is assumed that both spouses are
jointly liable on the mortgage.
113. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
114. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-4(c) (1954). Unless the husband was planning to
retitle the property as his separate property, he was probably unwise not to elect to
report this as a gift since the annual gift to his wife was only one-half of the $2,000
mortgage payment, or $1,000-well below the annual exclusion of $3,000. Because all
of the consideration was paid by the husband, the decision about filing a gift tax return
would have no impact on the husband's or wife's estate tax liability.
115. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
116. See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
117. See notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text.
118. The value of the gift can only be determined after determining actuarially the
value of each tenant's interest in the property at the time of each mortgage payment.
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These principles can be easily illustrated. Assume that certain
property was acquired on December 31, 1954 by husband and wife as
joint tenants with right of survivorship for $40,000, consisting of cash
in the amount of $10,000 and a 15 year non-interest bearing mortgage
for the balance. The mortgage loan called for annual payments of
$2,000 until the debt was discharged. The husband provided the
$10,000 down payment from his separate property and made all the
mortgage payments until it was discharged in 1969. No gift tax re-
turns have ever been filed to reflect any of these transactions. In 1973
the spouses decided to split the property between themselves as ten-
ants in common. To avoid gift tax, the property must be split ac-
cording to their proportional interests in the property determined by
reference to their respective contributions. Thus, the fair market value
of the property must be prorated between the pre-1955 contribution
of $10,000 and the post-1954 contribution of $30,000. Gift tax
returns should have been filed at the time the property was acquired
to reflect the fact that the husband then made a gift of $5,000 to his
wife. The gift consisted of the value of the undivided one-half interest
in the property taken by the wife at the time the property was ac-
quired. (This event was taxable because the wife had not made an
equal contribution to the purchase price.) The portion of the prop-
erty allocated upon termination to the pre-1955 contribution should
be equally divided between the spouses; the portion of the property
allocated to the post-1954 contributions should be allocated to the hus-
band. Thus, the wife should be given one-eighth ($5,000/$40,000)
interest as a tenant in common and the husband should be given a
seven-eighths ($35,000-$40,000) interest as a tenant in common if
gift tax liability at the time of -the termination of the joint tenancy is
to be avoided.119
The rules with respect to determining the contributions made by
joint owners become even more complex when the property has ap-
preciated or depreciated between contribution dates. The regulations
require this appreciation or depreciation to be treated "as though it were
additional consideration furnished by the person who furnished the
prior consideration."' 20  In the previous example, the husband had
made all the mortgage payments from his separate property. Assume
now that the wife made an addition to the property on December
But ci.,Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(c)(2), Example (3) (1954). (Accumulated apprecia-
tion ignored because the appreciation is so gradual and the contributions so numerous.)
119. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-3(b) (1954).
120. Id. § 25.2515-1(c) (2).
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31, 1959, by an expenditure of $12,000 from her separate property.
In this case, not only would there be a proration according to the pre-
1955 contributions, but there would also have to be a proration as of
the time the wife made the addition if the fair market value of the
property at that time could have been determined. 2' The total con-
tribution is now $52,000 ($40,000 purchase price + $12,000 addi-
tion), $10,000 of which was made prior to 1955. As a result, on
contribution principles the wife has at least a one-eighth interest in the
property. 122 What additional interest does she have? If the fair mar-
ket value of the property was $70,000 in December 1959 when the
addition was made, it means the property had appreciated $30,000
since its acquisition in 1954. That appreciation constitutes an addi-
tional contribution by each spouse in proportion to their respective
total contributions as of the date of the addition. However, for the
purposes of allocating appreciation between husband and wife in this
example, the wife will be treated as having made no contribution
to the acquisition of the property prior to her expenditure of $12,000
for the addition. 2 Thus, all of the appreciation between contribu-
tion dates will be allocated to the husband. His total contributions
at the time of the addition, then, are $45,000 ($15,000 allocated con-
tribution ± $30,000 allocated appreciation) and her total contribu-
tions are $5,000 (representing her allocated appreciation). In 1973
when the jointly held property is split between the spouses, he is deemed
to have made a contribution of $65,000 ($45,000 ± $20,000 of addi-
tional mortgage payments). She is deemed to have made a contribu-
tion of $17,000 ($5,000 ± $12,000 addition in 1959). If the hus-
band receives less than a seventy-nine percent [$65,000 -- ($65,000
+ $17,000)] interest in the property, he is deemed to have made a
taxable gift to his wife. 124  The following schedule summarizes these
computations:
121. Id.
122. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
123. Thus, even though the down payment was made prior to 1955 and therefore
constituted a gift of one-half to the contributor's spouse at that time, this gift is appar-
ently not treated as a contribution by the wife for the purposes of allocating apprecia-
tion. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(c) (2), Example (1) (1954):
In 1940, H purchased real property for $15,000 which he caused to be
transferred to himself and W (his wife) as tenants by the entirety. In 1956
when the fair market value of the property was $30,000, W made $5,000 im-
provements to the property. In 1957 the property was sold for $35,000. The
general appreciation of $15,000 which occurred between the date of purchase
and the date of W's improvements to the property constitutes an additional
contribution by H, having the same characteristics as his original contribution
of $15,000.
124. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(c) (2) (1954).
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Husband Wife
1954 down payment $ 5,000 $ 5,000
Mortgage payments 1954-59 10,000 -
Share of appreciation 1954-59 30,000 -
1959 addition - 12,000
Mortgage payments 1959-74 20,000 -
Total contributions $65,000 $17,000
Interest in property 79% 21%
(7) Summary
Notwithstanding these rather complex and sometimes onerous
federal gift tax computations, lifetime splits of jointly held property
remain an attractive alternative. The federal gift tax rates are seventy-
five percent of the federal estate tax rates,' 25 and the taxpayer can take
advantage of the gift tax marital deduction for gifts to his spouse, 120 the
$30,000 exemption, 2 7 and the $3,000 per donee per annum exclu-
sion. 2" If neither spouse has made any taxable gifts in prior years,
the availability of the exemption, the exclusion, and the marital deduc-
tion will allow one spouse to make $66,000 of tax free gifts to the
other spouse in the first year of gift giving. In later years the con-
tinued availability of the $3,000 per donee per annum exclusion and
the marital deduction will allow $6,000 of tax free gifts from one
spouse to the other. In light of these liberal gift tax provisions, the
careful planner will frequently be able to accomplish a split of jointly
held property free of all gift tax liability. In some cases it may be
necessary to accomplish the split over a period of years to avoid all
gift tax, but even in cases when it is deemed expedient to bring about
an immediate split, the gift tax rates are hardly confiscatory, begin-
ning, as they do, at 2/4 percent of -the first $5,000 of taxable gifts.' 20
C. Non-Tax Considerations
One of the most significant problems encountered in planning a
lifetime termination of jointly held property is the -taxpayer's inability
to supply records reflecting the respective contributions of the co-
owners to the jointly held property. Admittedly, determination of re-
spective contributions is only important for gift tax purposes in the
125. Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2001 with INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2502(a).
126. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2523.
127. Id. § 2521.
128. Id. § 2503(b).
129. Id. § 2502(a).
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case of joint bank ,accounts and post-1954 -transactions in real property
where the co-owners ignored the transaction for gift, tax purposes. s0
But, as a practical matter, it would seem that the bulk of jointly owned
property consists of this sort of property rather than stocks and bonds.
If there are adequate records to solve this problem, there is the
larger issue of whether the joint tenants want to split their property.
Will they continue to be wedded to the "ours" concept when it is
clearly not to their -advantage?13' The answer, in many cases, will be
yes! The senior citizen seeking estate planning counsel is concerned
with death far more than the younger taxpayer who is attending to the
matter of a will much as he attends to the purchase of a house, an
automobile, or life insurance. The older taxpayer will be concerned
about putting his affairs in order, but he will clearly want to avoid dis-
rupting established patterns. Splitting up his jointly held property
will have little appeal at a time when he seeks strength and comfort
from the concept of family.
Nonetheless, a persuasive case can be made for urging the split
of jointly held property and the equalization of the taxable estates of
husband and wife. The argument is expressed not only in terms of
tax savings but also in terms of non-tax considerations. In cases where
one joint tenant becomes incompetent, the other tenant may be severely
restricted in the management of the jointly held property. The extent
of that restriction will depend upon the kind of protection given the
incompetent by the local court. Moreover, the joint tenancy feature
will prevent the use of the dispositive provisions of the will of the first
spouse to die as a means to protect the surviving joint tenant who may
be incompetent. The disadvantages of a legal guardianship of an in-
competent are too well known and too numerous to enumerate here,
and one can only speculate about the helplessness engendered by a
situation where one joint tenant is legally incompetent and the other
joint tenant cannot effectively prevent the jointly held property from
130. See text accompanying notes 90-101 supra. In the case of other property held
as joint tenants with right of survivorship, no gift tax liability will arise if the property
is split in proportion to the joint tenants' respective fractional interests in the property
determined by state law. See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra. Where such other
property is held as tenants by the entirety, no gift tax will result if the property is
split according to actuarially calculated fractions. See text accompanying notes 87-89
supra.
131. As one commentator has observed:
Simply recommending a division of the joint ownership into proportionate
separate pieces will not win acceptance by every client. In addition to being
fraught with complexity and misunderstanding, this approach seems wholly
negative to a person seeking constructive alternatives. Riecker, supra note 33,
at 819.
See text accompanying notes 28-34 supra.
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falling subject to the legal guardianship. There is also risk of litiga-
tion on the question whether the joint tenant who provided the con-
sideration for the property really intended to give the other joint ten-
ant an interest in the property or whether the joint tenancy was es-
tablished only for convenience.' 32
V. TERMINATION OF JOINT TENANCY IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH
A. Estate Planning Possibilities
A persuasive case can be made for urging that serious consider-
ation be given to splitting jointly held property in those cases where
death is imminent. That is to say that, with one exception to be noted
below, transfers in contemplation of death are positively encouraged
by the tax law. In fact, the tax savings possibilities here are positively
exciting.
The rules are fairly simple. Section 2035133 requires property
transferred in contemplation of death to be included in the transferor's
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes at his death. 3 4  To the
132. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
133. Section 2035 provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property . . . to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or oth-
erwise, in contemplation of his death.
(b) APPLICATION OF GENERAL RULE.-If the decedent within a pe-
riod of 3 years ending with the date of his death (except in case of a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth)
transferred an interest in property, relinquished a power, or exercised or re-
leased a general power of appointment, such transfer, relinquishment, exercise
or release shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made
in contemplation of death within the meaning of this section and sections
2038 and 2041 (relating to revocable transfers and powers of appointment);
but no such transfer, relinquishment, exercise, or release made before such 3-
year period shall be treated as having been made in contemplation of death.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
It probably should be noted that involuntary transfers may be deemed transfers
in contemplation of death for purposes of section 2035. See City Bank Farmers Trust
Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594 (1945) (transferor institutionalized and court directed
transfer of property to presumptive heirs prior to death of transferor).
134. All property included in a decedent's gross estate is valued as of the date of
death or as of the alternate valuation date regardless of whether the property was trans-
ferred by the decedent during his lifetime. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1954). Valu-
ation problems are occasionally presented when property transferred during lifetime is
included in the decedent's gross estate under one of the attribution sections such as sec-
tion 2035. The appreciation enjoyed by the property while in the hands of the trans-
feree is subject to the estate tax, but care must be taken to exclude the value of addi-
tions or improvements made by the transferee. Id. § 20.2035-1(e). When cash is the
subject matter of the transfer, no valuation problems should be presented. The actual
cash transferred (unadorned by any interest earned while in the hands of the trans-
feree) should be included in the gross estate of the transferor.
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extent that federal gift tax has been paid at any time on property in-
cluded in a decedent's gross estate, the decedent's estate will enjoy a
credit against its estate tax liability. 3 5  Moreover, the amount of gift
tax paid will be removed from the base used in computing the taxable
estate of the decedent for purposes of applying the federal estate tax
rate schedule! In other words, there is no disadvantage to a transfer
in contemplation of death; in fact there may be a benefit. 3 "
(1) Joint Tenancy with Right of Survivorship
There is additional incentive to make transfers of jointly held
property in contemplation of death as a result of the restrictive inter-
pretation the courts have given section 2040,117 the federal estate tax
provision which expressly includes jointly held property in the gross
estate of the first to die of the co-owners (except to the extent the
survivor can establish his contribution). In a series of cases, section
204038 has been limited to property which is held in joint tenancy at
135. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2012. Where the gift tax has not been paid
at the time of the donor's death, it may still be claimed as a deduction in computing
the donor's taxable estate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2012-1(a) (1954).
The purpose of the gift tax credit is to prevent the same transfer from being taxed
under both the estate and gift taxes. C. LowNDEs & R. KRAMER § 20.4, at 515. For
that reason, the gift tax credit is limited to the lesser of the two taxes. While the
gift tax rates ari three-fourths of the estate tax rates, see note 125 supra, a donor prob-
ably would actually increase his total transfer tax liability if he attempted to transfer
all of his property in contemplation of death.
136. Moreover, the property which is subsequently included in the transferor's gross
estate as a transfer in contemplation of death will take as its basis, for income tax
purposes, the value at which it is included in the decedent's gross estate. See INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 1014. This may be an important benefit where the jointly held prop-
erty has appreciated.
137. Section 2040 provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of the interest therein held as joint tenants by the decedent and any
other person, or as tenants by the entirety by the decedent and spouse, or de-
posited, with any person carrying on the banking business, in their joint
names and payable to either or the survivor, except such part thereof as may
be shown to have originally belonged to such other person and never to have
been received or acquired by the latter from the decedent for less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth: Provided, That
where such property or any part thereof, or part of the consideration with
which such property was acquired, is shown to have been at any time acquired
by such other person from the decedent for less than an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth, there shall be excepted only such
part of the value of such property as is proportionate to the consideration
furnished by such other person: Provided further, That where any property
has been acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, as a tenancy by the
entirety by the decedent and spouse, then to the extent of one-half of the
value thereof, or, where so acquired by the decedent and any other person
as joint tenants and their interests are not otherwise specified or fixed by law,
then to the extent of the value of a fractional part to be determined by divid-
ing the value of the property by the number of joint tenants. Id. § 2040.
138. Textual references to "section --" are references to the indicated sections of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
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the death of a co-owner.1"' Where a joint tenancy has been termin-
ated prior to death, even if in contemplation of death, section 2040
will not be applied. In this kind of case, section 2035 is deemed
controlling and the question becomes one of valuing the interest the
decedent transferred in contemplation of death. The joint tenancy
cases have answered this question, not by reference to the respective
contributions of the joint tenants, but by reference to state property
law notions. It has been held that each joint tenant has an undivided
half interest in the jointly held property under state law and, therefore,
the only interest the deceased co-owner could have transferred in con-
templation of death was his fractional interest.
The landmark decision which gave rise to this restrictive inter-
pretation of section 2040 was Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner.4 '
In -that case the decedent and his wife owned certain property in joint
tenancy but transferred a portion of it to their son in contemplation of
death.' 4 ' The Commissioner sought to include the entire value of this
property in the decedent's estate under the predecessor of section 2040,
but the Ninth Circuit held that only one-half could be included because
the decedent had ownership in only one-half to transfer in contemplation
of death:
Under the law of California, one joint tenant cannot dispose of
anything more than his own interest in the jointly held property. "Dur-
ing the lives of the tenants, the rules regulating the transfer of their
interests are substantially the same, whether they hold in joint tenancy
or in common. Neither a joint tenant nor a tenant in common can
139. The following cases involved property held as joint tenants with right of survi-
vorship: United States v. Heasty, 370 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1966) (transfer of jointly held
property to an irrevocable trust subject to retained life estates); Sullivan's Estate v. Com-
missioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949), rev'g 10 T.C. 961 (1948) (transfer to third
party of jointly held property in contemplation of death; split of jointly held property
in contemplation of death into tenancy in common); Estate of Don Murillo Brockway,
18 T.C. 488 (1952), affd on other grounds, 219 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1954) (transfer
to third party of jointly held property in contemplation of death). Contra, Harris v.
United States, 193 F. Supp. 736 (D. Neb. 1961) (split of jointly held property in con-
templation of death into tenancy in common).
See note 143 infra for cases where the same result was reached which involved
property held as tenants by the entirety.
140. 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949).
141. Id. at 658. The decedent and his wife also made a second transfer of jointly
owned property in Sullivan. Property held in joint tenancy was converted into a tenancy
in common between the husband and wife. The Ninth Circuit held that even if this
transaction were to be construed to be a transfer made in contemplation of death, it
was one made for adequate consideration and thus only one-half was includible in the
husband's estate. Id. at 659-60; see C. LowNuEs & R. KRAMER § 11.10, at 240-41;
Riecker, supra note 33, at 824. For criticism of this conclusion, see text accompanying
notes 175-76 infra.
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do any act -to the prejudice of his co-tenants in their estate." Where
a joint tenant has purported to convey more than his interest, his trans-
feree is held to have taken only the interest that could be transferred,
i.e., the transferor's share.
It is obvious that the half interest conveyed by the wife was not
in contemplation of death. She is still living.
1 42
(2) Tenancy by the Entirety
Sullivan's Estate involved property held as joint tenants with
right of survivorship. Other cases have extended the Sullivan rationale
to property held as tenants by the entirety; the landmark case was Es-
tate of A. Carl Borner.1 43  In Borner, the Tax Court reasoned as fol-
lows:
We agree with petitioner that -the rationale of the Sullivan and
Brockway cases is applicable here. It is true that these cases involved
joint tenancies, while here the property transferred was held in a ten-
ancy by the entireties. Differences do exist between the two estates
but such differences are not sufficient to compel unlike tax results un-
der the provisions of section 811(c). The only difference is a tenancy
by the entireties is based on the ancient common law fiction that hus-
band and wife are one, and the right of survivorship cannot be de-
stroyed without mutual consent, while in a joint tenancy one tenant,
by transferring, can destroy the survivorship right. We conclude as a
practical matter, the tenancy by entirety and joint tenancies are so
much alike that the rule applied in the joint tenancy cases should be
applied here where the tenancies are by the entirety, which means each
tenant owns one-half. This conclusion does not rest upon any peculi-
arities of Pennsylvania property law. Pennsylvania law, while deter-
minative of the nature of the property rights in joint tenancies and ten-
ancies by the entireties, cannot control the application of the Federal
tax statutes to such property rights.14 4
On October 6, 1969, the Internal Revenue Service 'announced its
142. 175 F.2d at 658-59, quoting Stark v. Barrett, 15 Cal. 361, 368 (1860) (citations
omitted).
143. 25 T.C. 584 (1955); see Glaser v. United States, 306 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1962)
(transfer of tenancy by the entirety property to children subject to retained life estates);
Baltimore Nat'l Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 642 (D. Md. 1955) (tenancy by
the entirety in securities changed to tenancy in common in contemplation of death); Es-
tate of Edward Carall, 25 T.C. 654 (1955) (tenancy by the entirety in securities
changed to tenancy in common in contemplation of death). Contra, Commonwealth
Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 50 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 137 F.2d 653 (3d
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 764 (1944) (transfer in contemplation of death of
tenancy by the entirety in real estate to surviving tenant).
144. 25 T.C. at 587-88.
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intention to follow these two lines of cases. 14" This relatively new
policy is a positive inducement to plan transfers of jointly held prop-
erty in contemplation of death at least in the following two cases: (1)
where there is no evidence to establish the respective contributions of
the joint tenants in the jointly held property; and (2) where the joint
owner whose death is imminent has provided more than fifty percent
of the contribution to the jointly held property. In the case where
the death of the joint tenant making the smaller contribution is im-
minent, it may be il-advised to split the jointly held property between
the spouses or make any other transfers of the jointly held property in
contemplation of death if the only goal is to minimize the taxable
estate of the first to die. Since that person's contribution is less than
fifty percent of the total contributions to the jointly held property, the
only portion of the jointly held property that will be included in her
estate at her death if the -property remains jointly held is that portion
attributable to her contribution. 146  If the joint tenancy is terminated
in contemplation of death, however, it is probable that her actual con-
tribution to the jointly held property will be disregarded and one-half
of the property will be included in her gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes. 4T Sullivan and its progeny would seem to provide the
145. 1969-2 CuM. BULL. xxiii.
146. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2040.
147. See Miller v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Estate of
Koussevitsky, 5 T.C. 650 (1945). See text accompanying notes 191-92 infra. In Miller,
the court held that one-half the property subject to an irrevocable trust in which the
decedent had a life estate should be included in her gross estate. The decedent and
her husband had established the trust many years before her death. Although the prop-
erty placed in the trust had been acquired by the decedent's husband from his separate
property, it had been held by the decedent and her husband as tenants by the entirety
prior to the establishment of the trust. In finding for the government, the court rea-
soned that the decedent had transferred to the trust an interest in property given her
by local law and retained a life estate in the transferred property.
Koussevilsky was much more complicated but eventually was decided for the
taxpayer. It is probably of little precedential value since it was decided before Sullivan
and its progeny, but the court's analysis of several complex issues is interesting. In
this case, Mrs. Koussevitsky transferred property shortly before her death from her
name into that of herself and her husband as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
The property had originally been given to Mrs. Koussevitsky by her husband. The
government relied upon a number of different theories in attempting to include the
jointly held property in Mrs. Koussevitsky's estate. It was first argued that the prop-
erty belonged to her at the time she created the joint tenancy and therefore she should
be deemed to have furnished all the consideration for the property which became
jointly held. The government, however, conceded that this position was incompatible
with that which it would have assumed had the husband died first. It was acknowl-
edged that had the husband died first, section 2040 would have required the government
to disregard state property law conceptions and include all the jointly held property in
his gross estate since he provided all the consideration for the jointly held property.
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government with an opportunity, in the name of consistency, to dis-
regard the contribution rules of section 2040 and emphasize that the
decedent transferred in contemplation of death the interest local law
gave her in the jointly held property. 148
It must be emphasized, however, that even in those cases where
a termination of the joint tenancy in contemplation of death will bring
about a greater immediate federal estate tax bill, it will probably con-
tinue to be advisable to bring about such terminations. Such a life-
time split will enable the spouses to equalize their estates and the first
spouse to die will be able to create a trust of a portion of the jointly
held property for the survivor and thereby keep the jointly held prop-
erty out of the survivor's gross estate. 149
The government then argued that Mrs. Koussevitsky made a lifetime transfer and
retained a life estate when she placed her property in the joint tenancy with her hus-
band. It also argued that she made a transfer revocable until her death. On either
of these theories, it was alleged that the jointly held property should be included in
Mrs. Koussevitsky's gross estate. The court rejected these arguments after finding that
Congress legislated specifically with respect to jointly held property and that the more
specific section controlled. Since the property was not included in her gross estate as
jointly held property, the court held that it could not be included under any other sec-
tion unless that section was even more specific. The government then argued that the
transfer was made in contemplation of death and argued that this section of the Code
was more specific than that provided for joint tenancies. The court agreed in principle
but determined as a factual matter that Mrs. Koussevitsky did not create the joint ten-
ancy in contemplation of death.
Is there any inconsistency in Koussevitsky? On the one hand, the court said that
had Mr. Koussevitsky died first, it would have traced the consideration for the jointly
held property to him and included the jointly held property in his gross estate. For
that reason, the court then concluded that it would be inconsistent to include the jointly
held property in Mrs. Koussevitsky's estate on the ground that she created the joint
tenancy with property that had belonged to her but which had originally been a gift from
her husband. Essentially the court was saying that the government could not, on one
hand, say the property belonged to Mrs. Koussevitsky for purposes of taxing it to her
and, on the other hand, trace through her if her husband were the first to die for pur-
poses of taxing it to him. After having expressed concern about an inconsistent applica-
tion of the taxing statutes, the court turned around and agreed in principle that the
jointly held property could be included in Mrs. Koussevitsky's gross estate if she had
transferred it in contemplation of death. Thus the court first found that the federal estate
tax provision on joint tenancies compelled it to ignore state-created property rights (the
fact that the property actually belonged to Mrs. Koussevitsky), but it then concluded that
state-created property interests could have carried the day for the government after all.
148. See cases collected in notes 139, 143 supra. Where the property is held as
joint tenants with right of survivorship, she will be deemed to have transferred a one-
half interest in the jointly held property. Moreover, the same rule will apply to ten-
ancy by the entirety property transferred in contemplation of death given the tendency
of the courts (and the government since 1969, see note 145 supra and accompanying
text) to disregard state property law distinctions between the two estates.
149. See notes 64-79 supra and accompanying text.
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(3) Joint Bank Accounts
There also continues to be some uncertainty about the treatment
of joint bank accounts transferred in contemplation of death. Joint
bank accounts are different from other kinds of jointly held property
in that, practically speaking, under state law each co-owner's interest
in the account is limited to the proportion of the account attributable
to his deposits. 50 Since the courts appear to be deferring to state
law concepts of ownership in resolving the contemplation of death
issues for transfers of other types of jointly held propertyr" one can
only speculate whether the rule announced as applicable to all other
jointly held property will apply to the joint bank account. It is certainly
arguable that where joint bank accounts are transferred in contempla-
tion of death, the value of the property transferred when included in
the decedent's gross estate will be the value of the property for federal
gift tax purposes. 52 The value of the property for federal gift tax
purposes is the amount withdrawn by a co-owner in excess of the
portion of the account attributable to his deposit. 5 3
B. Policy Considerations
Notwithstanding the acquiescence of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice in the Sullivan and Borner lines of decisions, it has been argued
that the cases reach "an undesirable result" and do not "represent a
necessary construction of the statute."'"5  The restrictive interpretation
given to section 2040-that it applies only to property which is jointly
held at the death of a co-owner-undermines the purpose of section
150. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. This certainly is the view taken
by the government. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (4) (1954) (example).
151. See cases collected in notes 139, 143 supra.
152. There are several cases which contradict this position. They are frequently
cited as holding that when a joint bank account is transferred in contemplation of
death, the entire amount transferred (not merely one-half) will be included in the es-
tate of the decedent in cases where he furnished all the consideration. See Estate of
Frank K. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 175 F.2d 657 (9th
Cir. 1949); Estate of Henry Wilson, 2 T.C. 1059 (1943); Estate of Harold W. Grant,
1 T.C. 731 (1943) (dictum); Effland, supra note 3, at 532-33.
For example, H and W have a joint bank account containing $4,000. H contrib-
uted $3,000 and W $1,000. In contemplation of H's death, H and W transfer the bal-
ance of the account to an account standing in W's name alone. In this case H will
probably be deemed to have transferred $3,000 in contemplation of death. On the
other hand, if jointly held property other than a bank account were transferred, H could
be deemed to have transferred only $2,000 in contemplation of death.
153. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (4) (1954) (example).
154. C. LowNDF-s & R. KRAmER § 11.10, at 241; see Note, Joint Tenancy and Estate
Tax Avoidance: A Widening Loophole for Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 66
YArn LJ. 142, 146-48 (1956).
WVol. 1974:669
Vol. 1974:669] PLANNING FOR JOINT TENANCIES
2035 which is to prevent the depletion of a decedent's taxable estate
through transfers in contemplation of death.'55 The rationale under-
lying Sullivan and its progeny was -that the decedent only owned, and
therefore only transferred, one-half of the property under state prop-
erty law concepts and thus could only transfer that amount in contem-
plation of death.156 But, as one commentator has observed, "the con-
cept of 'ownership' for estate tax purposes is based on economic con-
tribution and control rather than the legal abstraction of 'title.' "157
Furthermore, section 2035 has been given an expansive interpretation
where sections other than section 2040 of the federal estate tax scheme
have been involved. 58  Examples of two situations wherein section
2035 has been utilized to tax property transferred in contemplation of
death as part of the decedent's estate as if no transfer had been made
will be set forth for purposes of illustration.
The first example is drawn from the case of United States v.
Allen, 59 in which the Tenth Circuit refused to permit a decedent's
estate to be depleted through the sale, in contemplation of death, of a
retained life interest. Mrs. Allen had transferred property some years
before her death and had retained the income from the property for
her life. Within three years of her death, she transferred her retained
life estate in exchange for consideration worth more than the actuari-
ally determined fair market value of her life interest. Hence, at her
death Mrs. Allen had no interest in the property under state law. The
court not only held this transfer to have been made in contemplation
of death but also held that it was made for less than adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth. 60 The court included in
her gross estate the value of the transferred corpus in which Mrs. Allen
had retained a life estate and allowed as an offset the consideration
she had received in exchange for the life interest. The court reasoned
155. See United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931); C. LowNDEs & R. KRAMER
§ 5.1. In commenting upon its decision, regarding the gift of jointly held property, in
Estate of Don Murillo Brockway, 18 T.C. 488 (1952), afl'd, 219 F.2d 400 (9th Cir.
1954), the Tax Court said: "If this result [laid down by Sullivan] is contrary to the
basic purpose of the estate tax statute and there is a loophole in section 811(c)
[predecessor of section 2035], the remedy lies with Congress." Id. at 499.
156. See notes 140-42 supra and accompanying text.
157. Note, supra note 154, at 147 (footnotes omitted and emphasis supplied).
158. The regulations discuss the application of other sections of the estate tax code
provisions to section 2035 and, by omission, recognize the nonapplicability of section
2040 to section 2035. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(b) (1954).
159. 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961).
160. Id. at 917-18. Section 2035 includes property to the extent the decedent has
made a transfer in contemplation of death "except in case of a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth . . . ." INT. Ruv. CODE
op 1954, § 2035(a).
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that if she had not sold the life estate in contemplation of death, the
entire corpus would have been included in her gross estate because she
had retained a life estate in the property when she originally transferred
the corpus. In order to achieve the purpose of section 2035, which is
to prevent depletion of the estate, the court disregarded the fact that
the life interest had been transferred before death. 61
The second example illustrating the expansive interpretation given
to section 2035 is taken from the tendency of courts to look beyond
state law determinations when including life insurance in a decedent's
estate. Under present estate tax law, the proceeds of life insurance
will be included in the insured's gross estate only if (1) the proceeds
are receivable by his executor or (2) the insured had any of the in-
cidents of ownership at his death. 162 Whether or not the insured paid
the premiums to keep the insurance in force is now irrelevant under
the Internal Revenue Code as to whether the proceeds are includible
in his gross estate. Congress abandoned the premiums-paid standard
in 1954, and ever since the Internal Revenue Service has been ad-
ministratively chipping away at this congressional pronouncement.
The Service had initially contended that, while premiums payments
could not be used to determine includibility of insurance proceeds in
the insured's gross estate as a general rule, if the premiums were paid
in contemplation of death, the proceeds attributable to those premium
payments were includible under section 2035.103 The courts rejected
this blanket rule of inclusion on the ground that it was in effect a re-
turn to the old premium payment test, but the decisions did allow the
premiums themselves to be included in the insured's gross estate where
he paid the premiums in contemplation of death.' 64 But other more
161. 293 F.2d at 918, citing Lowndes, Cutting the "Strings" on Inter Vivos Trans-
fers in Contemplation of Death, 43 MINN. L. REv. 57, 71 (1958):
[Tihe determination of what interest is transferred in contemplation of death
and of what is adequate consideration to prevent a transfer in contemplation
of death from being taxable, should be made on the basis of the tax effect
of the transfer and the effect of the consideration on the transferor's taxable
estate, rather than by the comparatively irrelevant rules of property law.
In spite of the seemingly broad application of the rationale of Allen, the Tenth Circuit
held in a subsequent case that Allen was restricted to its facts. United States v.
Heasty, 370 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1966); see Schwartz, Estate Tax Aspects of Joint Ten-
ancies and Tenancies by the Entirety, 1970 TAXATION AND ESTATE PLANNING SYM-
POSIUM 90, 103.
162. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042.
163. Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 Cum. BuLL. 327, revoked in part, Rev. Rul. 71-497,
1971-2 Cum. BULL. 329.
164. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970); Estate of
Inez G. Coleman, 52 T.C. 921 (1969). In 1971, the Internal Revenue Service revoked
Rev. Rul. 67-463 in part. Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 Cum. BuLL. 329.
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recent decisions have given more encouragement to the Service.1" 5 It
now appears clear that the proceeds of insurance will be included in the
insured's gross estate where the policy was taken out (or renewed in
the case of term insurance) within three years of the insured's death
and the insured paid the premiums or provided the funds from which
some other person paid the premiums.166 The fact that the insured
had none of the incidents of ownership and that the proceeds were not
receivable by his estate appears to be irrelevant.
These examples suggest a willingness on the part of the courts to
give an expansive interpretation to the inclusion aspects of section
2035. Thus, it is surprising to find that transfers of jointly held prop-
erty in contemplation of death enjoy such favorable tax treatment.
Regrettably, there is nothing in -the legislative history of the estate tax
provision taxing jointly held property at death to indicate congressional
intent regarding treatment of transfers of jointly held property in con-
templation of death. 1 67  Given the uncertain doctrinal foundations of
the favorable treatment accorded jointly held property in this context,
estate planners might be well advised not to rely too heavily on the con-
tinued vitality of that treatment in long-term planning.
C. Some Speculative Suggestions: Tenancies by the Entirety
(1) Criticism of Borner
It is apparent that, notwithstanding the favorable tax advantages
which Sullivan and Borner present -to estate planners, those two de-
cisions are subject to some criticism on the ground that they permit a
165. See, e.g., First Nat'! Bank v. Slade, 488 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1974); De-
troit Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 929 (1973); Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971).
166. The position of the Service is presently this: (1) With respect to policies of
life insurance (other than one year term insurance) transferred by the insured more
than three years before his death, only the premiums paid within three years of his
death will be included in his gross estate as transfers in contemplation of death; (2)
as to one year term insurance policies, the entire proceeds will be included in the in-
sured's gross estate where he pays the premiums even in those cases where ownership
was transferred more than three years before the death of the insured. Rev. Rul. 71-
497, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 329.
167. The Committee Reports on the Revenue Acts from 1916 to 1939 do not deal
with joint property as affected by transfers in contemplation of death. The reports for
the acts from 1916 to 1938 are found in 1939-1 CuM. BULL. (Pt. 2) 101, 127, 151,
179, 198-200, 229, 261, 289, 308, 324, 338, 432, 489-94, 530-36, 581-82, 620-21, 770-
72, 786, 807-09. The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 made no change in existing law.
1939-2 CuM. BULL. 532, 533. Similarly the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 made
no substantive change in existing law when promulgating sections 2035 and 2040. 3
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4459, 5116 (1954).
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decedent to deplete his estate by terminating a joint tenancy or a ten-
ancy by the entirety in contemplation of death.' The Borner de-
cision is subject to even further criticism because, while purporting to
follow Sullivan, it ignores the fundamental underpinning of that case-
that property law concepts govern the interest which can be included
in a decedent's gross estate under section 2035.19
If you are going to exclude part of the common property from the es-
tate tax when it is transferred in contemplation of death by the tenant
who paid the entire consideration for the property, because of technical
conceptions of the property law that the transferor only transferred the
interest which he owned in the property, it would seem only fitting to
give due attention to the interest which the tenant owned and to the
fact that a tenant by the entirety, who has no right to sever the tenancy,
owns an entirely different interest in the common property than a joint
tenant, who has a right of severance. 170
While there may be some dispute as to how the interest transferred by
the decedent in Borner should be valued, it is at least clear that the
amount actually included in his estate (one-half) in no way represents
the interest transferred under property law concepts.
(2) Transfers for Adequate and Full Consideration
Perhaps this criticism could be turned into an even bigger tax
"break" in cases where property held as tenants by the entirety is
transferred to third parties in contemplation of death. Since transfers
for adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth17' can-
not be taxed under section 2035 as transfers in contemplation of death,
it could be argued, for example, that the mutual relinquishment by
the tenants by the entirety of their respective interests in the whole at
the time of the conveyance constitutes adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth.'12  Each tenant by the entirety has an
interest in the whole, and usually neither tenant can unilaterally sever
the tenancy. Thus, upon termination, each tenant will have given up
his right to enjoy the entire premises in exchange for the other tenant
giving up his right in the whole.'1 3
168. See notes 154-67 supra and accompanying text.
169. See notes 140-42 supra and accompanying text.
170. C. LowNDEs & R. KnAMmR § 11.10, at 244; see Note, supra note 154, at 145.
171. This term has enjoyed a rather precise definition. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-
1(a) (1954).
172. Id. Even if the interests relinquished were not equivalents, the regulation pro-
vides that "only the excess of the fair market value of the property... over the price
received by the decedent is included in ascertaining the value of his gross estate." Id.
173. This argument would have no purpose if made where spouses have divided
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In those jurisdictions where the wife's interest in a tenancy by
the entirety does not include a right to income or possession, the ter-
mination of the tenancy means that she has relinquished a lesser in-
terest, namely, the right to possibly survive the other tenant by the en-
tirety and enjoy the entire premises. Nevertheless, this possibility of
survival can be actuarially valued for purposes of the adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth standard.1
74
It should also be clear, however, that the adequate and full con-
sideration question has no place in a discussion of death tax conse-
quences that result from a termination in contemplation of death of a
joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Unfortunately the court in
Sullivan muddied the waters by engaging in just such a discussion:
If, on the other hand, the contract be construed to involve a transfer,
it was a bona fide transfer for money's worth because the younger
wife's joint interest transferred to the older husband is worth at least
as much as the husband's interest transferred to "her."
The Commissioner also contends that it was not bona fide because
the negotiations between the spouses were not at "arms' length." There
is no evidence to support such a contention. The actual contract is
such a fair one to each, that it is of the sort which would be the result
of arms' length bargaining. 175
jointly held property among themselves in contemplation of death even if the split was
into other than equal shares. In those cases where the spouses take equal shares of
the jointly held property at termination of the joint ownership arrangement, the dece-
dent will include one-half the property in his gross estate as a transfer in contempla-
tion of death, see note 143 supra and accompanying text, or on alternate grounds
as probate property. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2033. Similarly, if the decedent
acquired more than one-half of the property upon termination of joint ownership, the
portion he owned at his death will be included in the gross estate because it is that
portion which passes at his death. Id. In such a case, the transfer in contemplation
of death principle would not be argued by the government because it would cause a
lesser amount (only one-half) of the jointly held property to be included in his gross
estate. On the other hand, if the joint ownership arrangement is terminated and the
surviving spouse, for example, takes all of the jointly held property, only one-half of
that property will be included in the decedent's estate as a transfer in contemplation of
death. See notes 139-43 supra and accompanying text.
However, it must be noted that the argument made in text may have application
in cases where the jointly held property is transferred to an irrevocable trust which gives
the trustee complete discretion over all distributions of principal and income. See note
199 infra and accompanying text.
174. Cf. Rev. Rul. 69-505, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 179, discussed in note 205 infra.
175. Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir. 1949). It has
been suggested that the transfer for consideration argument has merit. Effland, supra
note 3 at 532.
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The only possible consideration furnished in Sullivan was the wife's
consent to transfer her fractional interest in the jointly held property
in exchange for her husband's agreement to transfer his fractional in-
terest in the same property. Her consent was consideration only to the
extent a peppercorn is consideration at common law. No money value
could be attached to it as contemplated by the adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth standard.176
(3) Actuarial Valuation of Transfers in Contemplation of Death
Another argument which the taxpayer might use to carve out
some additional benefit from transferring his tenancy by the entirety
in contemplation of death is, first, to acknowledge that his interest and
that of his spouse in the tenancy by the entirety can be valued actuari-
ally, and then, to argue that the rules employed in valuing lifetime
gifts of tenancy by the entirety property' 77 should be used in deter-
mining the value of the interest he transferred in contemplation of
death. Assume a taxpayer was intent on transferring all of his interest
in his tenancy by the entirety property to his spouse before his death.
If he was forty-five at the time of the transfer and she was forty, and
the property had a value of $10,000 both at the time of transfer and
also at the date of his death, the following computation indicates that
$4,291.10 would be subject to federal gift tax. It would seem equally
appropriate to suggest that the value of his gift in contemplation of
death was $4,291.10 rather than one-half the value of the transferred
property as it would be valued under existing law.'78
Value of property transferred -$10,000.00
Less: Value of wife's interest in the
property $10,000 X .57089) 7  5,708.90
Value of gift for federal gift tax purposes and
value of gift in contemplation of death $ 4,291.10
This is really the actuarially determined value of the interest in the
property which he transferred in contemplation of death.""0 The bal-
ance of the property was already vested in the wife.
176. See note 171 supra.
177. See notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text.
178. See notes 139, 143 supra.
179. For actuarial factors, see IRS PtuBLICATION 723A, SUPPLEMENT 1 (4-71), supra
note 63.
180. Lowndes and Kramer suggest this result in commenting upon the conduct of
the Borner case before the Tax Court by Borner's executrix. The Commissioner had
sought to include all of the tenancy by the entirety property in the decedent's estate,
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(4) Section 2515 Property
These arguments (based on actuarial valuations and transfers for
consideration) should also be available even in those cases where real
property is involved and the taxpayer has elected under the authority
of section 2515 not to file gift tax returns at the time the tenancy by
the entirety was created. In determining what interest a decedent has
transferred in contemplation of death, the government looks to local
property law concepts. The fact that no gift tax was paid when the
tenancy by the entirety was created is a neutral factor in this deter-
mination.' Thus, the adequate and full consideration argument and
the actuarial value argument outlined above could be made with re-
spect to section 2515 property transferred in contemplation of death.
Perhaps there is another question with respect to section 2515
property. No court has yet considered whether Sullivan and its pro-
geny apply to section 2515 cases. Technically, section 2515 property
which is transferred in contemplation of death should enjoy the same
treatment for federal estate tax purposes as other jointly held prop-
erty transferred in contemplation of death.' 82 Nonetheless, some court
confronted by section 2515 property transferred in contemplation of
and in response the executrix merely argued that one-half should be excluded, "instead
of some different and larger amount on the theory that the husband had transferred
only the actuarial value of his interest in the property." C. LowNDES & R. KRAMER
§ 11.10, at 243. Expressed another way:
Although the Tax Court said in the Borner case that there was no difference
between a tenancy by the entirety and a joint tenancy as far as the estate
tax on the transfer of a tenant's interest in contemplation of death is con-
cerned, it might be argued that all that the court actually held was that since
the decedent's executrix only sought to exclude half of the common property
from his gross estate, it was not up to the court to exclude more than this.
Id. (Emphasis in original.)
Perhaps it would be appropriate to argue that the decedent's actual physical condi-
tion ought to be considered in determining the interest in the jointly held property that
was transferred at death. The government has made such a proposal in connection
with the valuation of life estates. See Rev. Rul. 66-307, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 429.
181. It should be noted, however, that a transfer in contemplation of death of sec-
tion 2515 property may actually increase the total cost of transferring this property.
In the case where the decedent terminates the section 2515 joint tenancy in contempla-
tion of death by transferring his interest in the joint tenancy to his spouse, he will
incur federal gift tax liability to the extent the value of the property exceeds the value
of the portion of the tenancy attributed to the spouse's contribution. If she made no
contribution, the full value of the entire property will constitute a taxable gift to her.
While a credit for gift taxes paid will be available to the decedent's estate under section
2012, the credit is available only with respect to gift taxes paid on property included
in the decedent's estate. Under this actuarial value rule of inclusion (or, for that mat-
ter, under Sullivan and its progeny), it is possible that the decedent's estate may not
enjoy credit for all the federal gift tax paid when the property was transferred in con-
templation of death. See C. LOWNDES & R. KRAmER § 20.4, at 518-19.
182. See notes 139, 143 supra.
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death may be tempted to analogize to joint bank accounts 8 3 and hold
that the full value of the section 2515 property transferred in contem-
plation of death should be included in the gross estate of the decedent.
(5) Conclusion
It must be emphasized that the method of evaluation applied in
the Borner case is still being followed and the Semrice has acquiesced
therein. Thus, as logically appealing as the criticism of that case may
appear, it would be unwise for estate planners to rely upon that criti-
cism.
VI. JOINT TENANCiES AND TRUSTS
Trusts have come to be virtually synonymous with estate plan-
ning. They are employed in almost every estate plan for both tax
and nontax reasons. In planning for jointly held property, however,
the trust has limited utility so long as the property remains in joint
ownership.
It would seem that the only reason for employing trusts to hold
jointly owned property would be for purposes of providing property
management during the joint lifetimes of the co-owners. Such trusts
should have appeal only in those cases where the co-owners are re-
luctant to bring about a lifetime split of the property and insist upon
retention of joint beneficial interests in their property. Property man-
agement can be an important consideration in such cases as inflationary
pressures intensify. Increasing longevity may heighten fears of senility
and other mental or physical disability. Where these considerations
are present, a trust is clearly preferable to the agency or custody account
because the trust may provide for the ultimate disposition of the prop-
erty and provide protection against incompetency, as well as provide
current -professional management.
Taxpayers have, on occasion, transferred jointly held property
directly into irrevocable trusts, but it is fairly clear that little is to be
accomplished in the ordinary case by such transfers."8 4 While there
are some tax advantages to such transfers, even more significant tax
advantages can be obtained if the spouses equalize their respective
estates and terminate such joint tenancy arrangements. 8 At that
point the spouses can then employ a revocable trust device as both a
management and dispositive vehicle for their respective estates.' 80
183. See notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text.
184. See notes 190-200 infra and accompanying text.
185. See notes 64-79 supra and accompanying text.
186. See notes 198-99 infra and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, where revocable trusts have been employed
to hold jointly held property, the tax consequences have been unpre-
dictable. 187 Nevertheless, the revocable trust has appeal as a property
management device even for property presently jointly held, and if the
trust agreement is properly drafted, it may be possible to obtain some
tax advantage from such a trust. In order to enjoy any tax advant-
age, however, the trust would have to become partially irrevocable
at the death of the first joint tenant to die. 18  The portion that be-
comes irrevocable would be held for the benefit of the survivor for
life, and, under a properly drafted agreement, the property subject to
the irrevocable portion of the trust would be excluded from the sur-
vivor's gross estate. 18 9 To the extent that co-owners are reluctant to
equalize their estates, the partially irrevocable trust has distinct appeal.
The irrevocable trust will be discussed first, followed by the re-
vocable trust, and, finally, the partially irrevocable trust.
A. The Irrevocable Trust
(1) Estate Tax Consequences
While there are many reasons why a taxpayer would want to
establish an irrevocable trust, the fact that he has jointly held property
is a neutral factor. There appear to have been only two litigated cases
involving a transfer of jointly held property to an irrevocable trust, and
one of the cases involved a transfer in contemplation of death. 190 None-
theless, the estate consequences of such transfers are clearly predict-
able. Where jointly held property is transferred to an irrevocable trust
and the transferors retain joint life estates in the trust, one-half of the
trust property will be included in the estate of the first of the joint own-
ers to die 91 even if the first spouse to die made no contribution to the
187. See notes 214-33 infra and accompanying text.
188. See notes 236-47 infra and accompanying text.
189. See notes 236-84 infra and accompanying text.
190. Miller v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Pa. 1971), discussed in
note 147 supra; Estate of A. Carl Boner, 25 T.C. 584 (1955) (transfer in contempla-
tion of death), discussed in text accompanying note 144 supra.
191. See Rev. Rul. 69-577, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 173; cf. United States v. Heasty, 370
F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1966) (transfer of joifit tenancy with right of survivorship property
to children and grandchildren subject to retained life estate); Glaser v. United States,
306 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1962) (transfer of tenancy by the entirety property to children
subject to retained life estate). In Heasty the court explained its decision thusly:
[S]ection 2040 has no application to a case like this because after the
husband and wife took the property as joint tenants there was another
transfer . . . . Each spouse individually conveyed some interest to their [sic]
children and grandchildren. Whatever law we apply to this case, we cannot
say that the wife had no interest to convey because she did have; and she did
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jointly held property. 192  This result can be explained on the grounds
that each spouse has an interest in the property under state law, 0 3 and
it is that interest which has 'been conveyed in trust subject to retained
joint life estates.' From the taxpayer's standpoint this result is pref-
erable to having all of the jointly held property included in the estate
of the first of the joint tenants to die, which would have been the re-
sult if the transfers in trust had not been made.'
Perhaps this reason motivated the transfers. If so, it would
seem that the respective taxpayers would have been better advised to
have split their jointly owned property between themselves during
their joint lifetimes in such a way as to equalize their estates.'0 0 Each
of the taxpayers could then have created a trust (by will, for example)
for his surviving spouse, giving her the income for life with remainder
as she may appoint among a limited class of persons. 0 7 Like the
irrevocable trust, this scheme will keep the property included in the
estate of the first to die out of the surviving spouse's gross estate for
federal estate tax purposes. In addition, it has several advantages over
an irrevocable trust created by the spouses during their joint lifetime.
If their estates are equalized, for example:
a. Each spouse could enjoy unfettered dominion and control
over half of the property for life without the restrictions in-
herent in any irrevocable trust.
b. When the first spouse dies, only one-half of the combined es-
tates of the spouses would become irrevocable. Thus, the
survivor would retain absolute control over his half of the
property for the rest of his life.
Perhaps another reason for establishing an irrevocable trust is
to obtain professional management for the jointly held property. If
that is the case, the client should still be advised to split his jointly
convey it. She transferred a one-half "interest" in the property. The husband
cannot be said to have transferred that "interest". They cannot both own
it. . . The "interest" contemplated by section 2036 must, in a case like the
one at bar, be determined according to the state law. 370 F.2d at 528-29.
In Heasty and Glaser, the respective courts rejected all efforts by the government to
include all the property that was once jointly held in the estate of the co-owner who
had provided all of the consideration for the property. Each court reasoned that section
2040 was limited in application to property held jointly at the time of death and that
it would not otherwise be applied.
192. See Miller v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
193. See notes 50, 57-63 supra and accompanying text.
194. See note 191 supra.
195. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2040.
196. See notes 64-70 supra and accompanying text.
197. See notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
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held property so as to equalize his estate and that of his spouse and
then establish a trust for his post-split share. Such a trust could
either be revocable or irrevocable depending upon the client's objec-
tives. If the trust is irrevocable and the client retains a life estate in
the trust property, it would clearly not have any tax advantage over a
revocable trust. 9 ' However, if the client is willing to commit all trust
distributions of principal and income to the discretion of the trustee
and retain no right to any of the trust property, use of an irrevocable
trust would mean that no part of the trust property would be included
in his or her gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.' 99 In some
cases this feature could be a substantial advantage and a real induce-
ment to establish this kind of irrevocable trust.
With respect to non-tax considerations, the irrevocable trust would
seem to be distinctly disadvantageous relative to a revocable trust in
terms of loss of flexibility. 200 By that it is meant that neither spouse
can ever change the trust to meet changing conditions. This is a high
price to pay where there does not appear to be any special benefit to
be obtained.
(2) Gift Tax Consequences
While it is relatively easy to generalize about the estate tax con-
sequences of establishing an irrevocable trust for jointly held prop-
erty, similar generalization is not possible with respect to federal gift
tax consequences. These can only be considered in terms of the kinds
of property subject to the gift; when the property was acquired; and
whether it is held as tenants by the entirety or as joint tenants with
198. In either case the trust property would be included in the settlor's gross estate
at his death. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2036, 2038. Nor would it be possible
to obtain any tax benefits by having each spouse create a trust (revocable or irrevoca-
ble) for the other spouse for that spouse's lifetime. See United States v. Grace, 395
U.S. 316 (1969).
In cases where the trust is already irrevocable but subject to retained life estates
in the settlors, it may be possible for the setflors (or one of them) to release their
respective life estates in the trust and thereby remove their portion of the trust property
from their respective gross estates. What little authority there is available on this point
is confusing. See United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916, 918 (10th Cir.) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961). But see Burrill v. Shaughnessy, 71 F.
Supp. 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1947). The Internal Revenue Code does not seem to contemplate
the release of a retained life estate although it provides for the relinquishment (in con-
templation of death) of a power to revoke, alter, amend, modify or terminate a trust.
Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036 with id. § 2038.
199. See notes 274-84 infra and accompanying text.
200. See Sargent, Should a Trust be Irrevocable?, 4 REAL. PROPERTY, PROBATE &
TRUST J. 176, 180-81 (1969).
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right of survivorship.201 Assume, for example, that on December 31,
1973, H and W established an irrevocable trust which provides that
they are each to have equal rights in the trust income for their joint
lives and that, after the death of one of them, the survivor is to receive
all the trust income. The trust is to terminate at the death of the
survivor of H and W and the trust property is to be distributed to their
child, C. Assume H and W are fifty and forty-seven respectively at the
time the trust is established.
Careful analysis indicates that the following property interests
have been created in the trust:
a. A vested equitable life estate for H in one-half of the trust
income.
b. A vested equitable life estate for W in one-half of the trust
income.
c. A contingent equitable life estate for H in W's share of the
income if W predeceases H.
d. A contingent equitable life estate for W in H's share of the
income if H predeceases W.
e. A vested remainder in fee for C.
At the time the trust was established, H and W made the follow-
ing transfers to the trust. These transfers illustrate the categories into
which jointly held property can be grouped for federal gift tax pur-
poses.
Example 1
H contributed all the funds to purchase common stock in ABC corpora-
tion which is now worth $20,000 and is held by H and W as joint ten-
ants with right of survivorship. The stock is transferred to H and W's
irrevocable trust at the time it is established.
In this case H will be deemed to have made a taxable gift of one-half
of the property less the actuarially determined value of the life estate
that he has retained in the property.20 2  H's gift is to C, who gets the
remainder interest, and to W, who gets a contingent interest in H's
201. In analyzing the gift tax cost of any proposed transaction, one must consider
the $30,000 lifetime exemption, the $3,000 per donee per year exclusion, the gift tax
marital deduction, and the gift splitting provisions. See notes 125-28 supra and accom-
panying text. The $30,000 lifetime exemption particularly encourages lifetime transfers
because it is lost unless exhausted before death.
202. See Rev. Rul. 69-505, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 179 (presenting facts upon which this
example is based). The tables to be used in determining the present worth of a life
interest are found in Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-9(f) (1970). However, at the time of the
issuance of the Ruling, the tables in Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(f) (1954) were in effect.
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half of the income if H predeceases W.20 3  W will be deemed to have
made a similar gift to H and C except that the actuarial values used
in determining the value of her retained life estate may be different
from H's.204 Interestingly, the gifts from H to W and W to H can be
netted against each other so that only one will actually pay gift tax.
20 5
203. See note 202 supra.
204. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
205. See Rev. Rul. 69-505, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 179. This netting actually provides
a "tax break" for the transferor-spouses by reducing their total gift tax liability (and
it will not increase their estate tax liability). Using the same facts as Example 1 and
assuming H was fifty and W age forty-seven, the method of computation shown in this
ruling is as follows:
Donor H:
One-half value of property $10,000.00
Less retained rights (10,000.00 x
factor 0.51970) 5,197.00
4,803.00
Property transferred:
(a) to W-$10,000.00 x factor 0.11731 1,173.10
(b) to C-$10,000.00 x factor 0.36299 3,629.90
4,803.00
Donor W:
One-half value of property 10,000.00
Less retained rights ($10,000.00 x
factor 0.55436) 5,543.60
4,456A0
Property transferred:
(a) to H-$10,000.00 x factor 0.08265 826.50
(b) to C-$10,000.00 x factor 0.36299 3,629.90
4,456.40
Recapitulation
Donor H Donor W
Transfer to C $3,629.90 $3,629.90
Net transfer to other joint tenant 346.60 0.00
Total gifts made by parties $3,976.50 $3,629.90
See id. at 180.
Explanatory notes to table: (1) The designation of "H" and 'W" have been sub-
stituted for "A" and "B," respectively, which appeared in the original text of this reve-
nue ruling. (2) The .51970 factor for H and the .55436 for W are the entries for
ages fifty and forty-seven, respectively, in Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(f) (1954), column 3,
Table I (which is based on a factor of 33/2 percent). Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(f) (1954)
directs the use of this table. However, Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-9 (1970) indicates that 6
percent factor tables are to be used to value life estates after December 31, 1970. (3)
The .11731 factor is the present worth of the right to receive the income from $1.00 for
the period of time that W is expected to survive H. (4) The .36299 factor is the pres-
ent value of $1.00 that C will receive in the future after H and W are both expected
to be dead.
The table indicates that H is deemed to have transferred to W an interest in prop-
erty valued at $1,173.10 and W has transferred to H an interest valued at $826.50.
Since the gift by W is less than the gift by H, H is deemed to have made a gift to
W of the difference in the amount of $346.60. This gift qualifies for the $3,000 per
donee per annum exclusion. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (1954).
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The gift to C will not qualify for the $3,000 annual exclusion because
it is not a present interest. 20 6
These principles are applicable where the following kinds of prop-
erty held as joint tenants with right of survivorship (and not as tenants
by the entirety) are transferred to an irrevocable trust:20 7
a. Personal property whenever acquired (except bank accounts
and United States Savings Bonds).
b. All real property acquired before 1955.
c. Real property acquired after 1954 for which gift tax returns
were filed to report the gift of one-half interest from H to W.
Example 2
H provided all of the consideration to purchase Neuteracre on Decem-
ber 31, 1954; the title was taken by H and W as tenants by the en-
tirety. Neuteracre is transferred to H and W's irrevocable trust at the
-time the trust is established; at that time Neuteracre has a value of
$20,000.
Because neither H nor W can unilaterally terminate the tenancy by
entirety, the valuation of their interests must take into account the life
expectancies of H and W. The first step is to calculate the value of
the respective interests of H and W in the trust on December 31,
1973:
Value of Property transferred $20,000
Less: Value of ITs interest ($20,000 X .41806)208 8,361
Value of W's interest _$11,639
H will then be deemed to have made a taxable gift of $8,361 (rather
than one-half of the corpus as in the previous -example) to W and C
less the actuarially determined value of the life estate he retained in
the $8,361. W's taxable gift to H and C will be deemed to be $11,639
less the actuarially determined value of her retained life estate in the
$11,639.
These principles are applicable where the following kinds of prop-
erty held as tenants by the entirety are transferred to an irrevocable
trust:
206. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (1972).
207. The taxpayer may be in the unfortunate situation of paying a second gift tax.
If H's contingent life estate were smaller than W's (so there would be a gift from W
to H) and H originally put up all of the funds and paid the gift tax, then when the
trust is set up, W will have to pay a gift tax for the privilege of giving H's property
back to him. See id. § 25.2515-4(b) (1954).
208. See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the computa-
tion of H's interest.
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a. Personal property whenever acquired.
b. Real property acquired before 1955.
c. Real property acquired after 1954 for which gift tax returns
were filed reporting the gift from H to W when the property
was taken as tenants by the entirety.20 9
Example 3
H and W have $20,000 in a bank account which they own as joint
tenants with right of survivorship. H made the entire deposit from his
separate property, and neither spouse has made any withdrawals from
the account. No gift tax return has been filed to cover the establish-
ment of the account. The funds in the account were transferred to
H and W's irrevocable trust when it was established.
H would be deemed to have made a taxable gift of the full $20,000
to W and C less the actuarially determined value of his retained life
estate in one-half of the transferred property.21 0 W would incur no
gift tax liability.
These principles are applicable where the following kinds of prop-
erty are transferred to an irrevocable trust:
a. Bank accounts or United States Savings Bonds held as joint
tenants with right of survivorship.21 1
b. Real property acquired after 1964, for which no gift tax re-
turn was filed, which is held either as joint tenants with right
of survivorship, or tenants by the entirety.2 12
(3) Conclusion
Notwithstanding the obvious complexities involved in determin-
ing the federal gift tax consequences of establishing an irrevocable
trust for jointly held property-and despite some uncertainty as to
specific points-these gift tax considerations, in and of themselves, do
not argue against the irrevocable trust for jointly held property. Any
such argument must be expressed in terms of the alternatives. 213  For
example, a lifetime split of joint property followed by the establish-
ment of a revocable trust for each spouse's portion of the split
property, simply put, has distinct advantages not enjoyed by the ir-
revocable trust.
209. See notes 82-89, 97 supra and accompanying text.
210. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4) (1972). See notes 90-91 supra and accom-
panying text.
211. See notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text.
212. See notes 92-101 supra and accompanying text.
213. See text accompanying notes 195-200 supra.
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B. The Revocable Trust
(1) Estate Tax Consequences
The revocable trust is an appealing management concept. The
creator of such a trust parts with no real dominion over the property,
yet by a judicious selection of a trustee, he can obtain top quality fi-
nancial management.21 4 For these reasons, it should have particular
appeal for owners of jointly held property who want to continue their
joint beneficial interest in the property but want expertise in property
management. Unfortunately, where jointly held property is made the
subject of a revocable trust, the estate tax consequences are somewhat
unpredictable and definitely less appealing than those associated with
an irrevocable trust.215 An analysis of several cases will suggest this
conclusion and also focus on the underlying policy consideration.
In Hornor's Estate v. Commissioner210 the taxpayer had estab-
lished a revocable trust of jointly held property for the joint lives of
himself and his wife. The trust was expressly revocable but only with
the consent of both joint tenants. Neither could revoke the trust acting
alone. By its terms the trust became irrevocable upon ithe death of
the first to die of the joint tenants. In determining the taxpayer's fed-
eral estate tax liability, the court held that the trust should be ignored
and the property treated as if the taxpayer and his wife had made no
transfer of the title to the trustee and had continued to hold legal title
as tenants by the entirety. Having disregarded the trust, the court then
easily applied section 2040 and included the full value of the trust
property in the gross estate of the first of the joint tenants to die sub-
ject to' proof of contribution by the survivor. Here, the decedent
was found to have provided all the consideration. 17
The Hornor trust generated more litigation when Mrs. Hornor
214. See generally American Bar Association Committee on Estate and Tax Plan-
ning, The Revocable Living Trust as an Estate Planning Tool, 7 REAL PROPERTY, PRO-
BATE AND TRUST J. 223, 223-25 (1972).
215. It is assumed that the trust will continue to be revocable until both joint ten-
ants are dead. For a discussion of the tax consequences where a trust becomes irre-
vocable upon the death of one of the spouses, see notes 236-73 infra and accompanying
text.
216. 130 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1942), affg 44 B.T.A. 1136 (1941); accord, Estate
of Frank N. Derby, 20 T.C. 164 (1953).
217. The lower court based its conclusion on the alternative grounds that (1) the
trust was created in contemplation of death, 44 B.T.A. at 1139, and (2) the trust
lacked substance because it was revocable and reserved the income interest, id. at 1140.
In affirming, the Third Circuit specifically held that the fact that the trust was estab-
lished in contemplation of death was irrelevant, 130 F.2d at 651. See also C. LOwNDES
& R. YAmER § 11.10, at 242.
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died some years later. The trust had become irrevocable upon Mr.
Hornor's death and continued by its terms for Mrs. Hornor's life. The
court held in Estate of Julia Crawford Hornor v. Commissionerz18
that one-half the value of the trust should be included in Julia's estate
on the ground that she had retained a life estate in the trust property.
Here the case was not one of disregarding the trust but recognizing
it and applying section 2036.
The court's position in Mrs. Hornor's case is arguably inconsistent
with the position taken in her husband's case. In the first Hornor
case, the court wanted to apply the federal estate tax rules on joint
tenancy but found it could not do so because the statute did not con,
template application in a trust context.2 19 The court, therefore,
claimed the revocable trust to be a fiction and determined that the trust
property retained its original character as jointly held property. Then
it became easy to take the next logical step and apply the mechanical
rule of the federal estate tax and include all of the jointly held property
in the estate of the first to die (except, of course, to the extent the
survivor could prove contribution). 220
William Hornor was the sole contributor to the jointly held prop-
erty; that fact resulted in the inclusion of all of the jointly held property
in his gross estate at his death. Nonetheless, the court in Julia Hornor
found that Julia's life estate in the trust which became irrevocable at
William's death should cause one-half of the trust corpus to be in-
cluded in her gross estate. To do that, the court had to find that
Julia transferred the trust property during her lifetime and retained a
life estate in the transferred property.221 The court did so by finding
that Julia had an interest in the jointly held property which she trans-
ferred to the trust when it was initially established. It was acknow-
ledged that prior to the establishment of the trust Julia had only an
expectancy in the jointly held property and under state law could not
have unilaterally severed the joint tenancy by disposing of her interest
during her lifetime. The court concluded, however, that state law re-
quired her consent to transfer the property to the trust and that she
voluntarily joined in the conveyance. As to the question of how much
to include in Julia's estate as a transfer subject to a retained life estate,
218. 305 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1962), aff'g 36 T.C. 337 (1961).
219. 130 F.2d at 651. Even though a trust agreement might duplicate the legal ef-
fects of holding property as joint tenants with right of survivorship, section 2040 and
its predecessor section would not reach the trust property. Hence, the court was forced
to disregard the trust in order for the estate tax law to reach it.
220. Id.
221. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
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the court explained its decision to include one-half in the following
language: "Since neither petitioners nor respondent contend that a
figure other than 50 percent of the property is includible in Julia's
gross estate, assuming some percentage is includible, no discussion of
this point is indicated." '222
In the first Hdrnor case the court disregarded the state property
law conception that the revocable trust had ended the joint tenancy
and applied the federal estate tax rule of section 2040 as though the
title was still held by William and Julia Hornor as tenants by the en-
tirety. In the second Hornor case, Julia's actual ownership of an in-
terest in the property, a state property law conception, was looked to
as a means of qualifying Julia as a transferor for purposes of section
2036. From these cases, it is clear that the client who transfers jointly
held property to a revocable trust with a reserved power of revocation
in either joint tenant will have that property included in the estate of
the first to die except to the extent the survivor can prove contribu-
tion. It appears, too, that the trust property will be included in the
estate of the first to die (except to the extent the survivor can prove
contribution) even where both joint owners must concur in order to
revoke the trust.22 However, if the survivor can indeed establish her
contribution, the question becomes one of whether the trust would
be disregarded in order for the federal estate tax mechanical rule to
apply in the taxpayer's favor. For example, if the non-contributing
spouse was the first to die and the trust were disregarded, the contri-
bution rules of section 2040 would exclude from her gross estate all of
the trust property.
Whether the government will allow a revocable trust to be disre-
garded in such circumstances is difficult to assess. For example, it
would be consistent with Julia Hornor for the government to claim
one-half the trust property is includable in the non-contributing
spouse's gross estate where she died first. The government could
theorize that it was by her act and her act alone that half of the jointly
222. 305 F.2d at 772.
223. See Hornor's Estate v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1942), discussed
in notes 216-17 supra and accompanying text. It is arguable that the position taken in
Hornor was erroneous because neither spouse could revoke without the consent of the
other spouse. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a)(2) (1962) which states that section
2038 does not apply "[i]f the decedent's power could be exercised only with the consent
of all parties having an interest (vested or contingent) in the transferred property, and
if the power adds nothing to the rights of the parties under local law . . . ." Id. In
the case where jointly held property is transferred to a trust revocable only with the
consent of both spouses and joint life interests are reserved, the trust instrument in
most cases seems to add nothing to the spouses' rights in the joinly held property un-
der state law.
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held property was transferred to the trust in which she had a life
estate.224 Thus she would be deemed to have made a transfer of
property in which she retained a life estate. 22 '5  To reach this result,
the government would have to recognize the validity of the revocable
trust. Ordinarily the revocable trust is disregarded for tax purposes on
the grounds that the transfer in trust is incomplete.226 Under state
law, however, the revocable trust is deemed to create an interest in
the trust estate in someone other than the grantor even though the
trust remains revocable at the grantor's option.227 Admittedly, the
state courts have been forced to this position in order to sustain re-
vocable trusts as valid will substitutes against the argument that they
are essentially testamentary and, as such, must comply with the for-
malities of execution required of wills if they are to be effective to pass
property at the death of the grantor.228  Could it not be argued that
the principles employed in the irrevocable trust cases229 should also
apply here to include, for example, only one-half the trust property
in William Hornor's gross estate? Clearly, the quality of William
Hornor's ownership interest changed once the jointly held property was
placed in the trust, if for no other reason, because the trust was re-
vocable only with the consent of his wife. That means, at the very
least, that the trust had more substance than the garden variety re-
224. Cf. Miller v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Pa. 1971), discussed in
note 147 supra. But cf. Estate of Koussevitsky, 5 T.C. 650, 659 (1945), discussed in
note 147 supra; 2 J. MmrTENs 276 & n.36 (1959). In Miller, the government also
sought to include all of the trust property in the non-contributing spouse's gross estate
on the ground that the terms of the trust allowed the Millers to appoint new trustees
(although it did not give them power to remove the existing trustees) if a vacancy oc-
curred. The trustees would manage the trust property as if it were "their own individ-
ual property." 325 F. Supp. at 1292. The government theorized that the Millers could
have appointed themselves successor trustees and in that capacity enjoyed a tainted
"power to alter or amend (the trust) within the meaning of Section 2038." Id. at
1293. The court rejected this position. Id.
225. See INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
226. See id. § 2038; Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1972).
227. Although state law will ignore certain intended gifts when the transferor fails
to completely surrender dominion over the property, see A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 32-33 (3d ed, 1967), it is well-settled that a
trust is not incomplete merely because the settlor reserves power to revoke or
to alter the trust. There is a sufficient surrender of control over the property
if the settlor transfers title to it to the trustee, even though he reserves power
to undo what he has done. Id. § 37, at 299 (footnotes omitted).
Thus, it would seem logical to conclude that both a joint tenancy and tenancy by the
entirety will be severed when title to the property is transferred to the trustee of a re-
vocable trust since the joint tenants no longer have legal title to the property. Joint
tenancy is a legal concept that looks to the state of the legal title rather than an equit-
able concept which considers who holds the beneficial interest in the property.
228. See, e.g., Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955).
229. See note 191 supra and accompanying text.
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vocable trusts that consistently withstand attack in -the state courts.2380
A different decision in the William Hornor case would have been
logically consistent with the decisions in Julia Hornor and Sullivan as it
relates to the termination of joint tenancies in contemplation of
death.2 31 In Sullivan the emphasis on state property law principles
worked to the advantage of the taxpayer. In Julia Hornor it worked
against the taxpayer. While there is a desirable consistency here in the
application of state property law conceptions to determine federal tax
consequences, this line of cases emphasizes form over substance. The
premise of the federal estate tax is that those transfers of property
(whether made during lifetime or at deathtime) in which dominion and
control does not shift from the transferor until his death will be in-
cluded in the transferor's gross estate for federal estate tax pur-
poses. 32 This same principle would have enabled the William and Ju-
lia Hornor trust to have escaped inclusion in Julia's gross estate. After
all, so the reasoning goes, it never was Julia Hornor's property for fed-
.eral estate tax purposes; for those purposes it was always her hus-
band's. Thus, in this context, Julia Hornor was incorrectly decided and
the William Hornor decision reflects the basic policy of the federal
estate tax.
So too, in this context, was Sullivan incorrectly decided. Section
2035 was developed to prevent tax avoidance by taxpayers divesting
themselves of all of their property as death approached. It provides
generally that transfers within three years of death will be disregarded
and that the federal estate tax will apply to the transferred property.
In Sullivan that principle would have caused all the jointly held prop-
erty transferred in contemplation of death to be taxed as if it had re-
mained in joint tenancy. 33
(2) Gift Tax Consequences
Establishment of a revocable trust which remains revocable until
the death of both joint tenants has no federal gift tax consequences. 23 4
230. See, e.g., Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60
(1961). See also Annot., 39 A.L.R. 3d 14 (1971).
231. See notes 140-42 supra and accompanying text.
232. See INT. RIv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2033-42.
233. For a discussion of the policy considerations see notes 154-67 supra and ac-
companying text.
234. See Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-2(b), (c) (1954).
The federal income tax also generally disregards revocable trusts and imputes the
income from such a trust to the settlor. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78; Rev.
Rul. 66-283, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 297; Rev. Rul. 66-159, 1966-1 CuM. Bum.. 162; 6
J. MTmTNs § 37.01-.52.
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(3) Conclusion
In these uncharted waters the courts should be looking to the
substance of a transaction, and their decisions should reflect a basic
policy to tax transactions which appear to be motivated by a desire
to avoid estate tax. For this reason it becomes impossible to pre-
dict when state property law notions will control and when federal
,tax considerations will control. The tax strategist will shout "foul"
in many of these cases but that is only because he exalts form over
substance. It would seem that most of the transactions that run afoul
of the tax laws are not the result of innocent decisions but the result
of conscious design gone astray. Sometimes the courts go too far the
other way and use a form of "hanging justice" to reflect the basic
policy of the taxing statutes. That approach should be severely criti-
cized.2 35  The lesson, then, is to test every proposed transaction against
the policy of the taxing statute.
Nonetheless, because of the confusion in this area of the law and
the possibility that the Service will take inconsistent positions, taxpayers
should be aware that the transfer of jointly held property to a revo-
cable trust may actually worsen estate tax consequences. Where the
revocable trust is the only alternative acceptable to the taxpayer, he
may be better advised to continue to hold the property in joint ten-
ancy.
C. The Partially Irrevocable Trust" 6
(1) Generally
There is another option available to the taxpayer who does not
want to split his jointly held property during his lifetime but wants to
do some tax planning and also seeks professional management for
235. Such criticism might be appropriate with respect to the line of cases in which
life insurance proceeds have been included in the insured's gross estate because owner-
ship of the policies was transferred within three years of death and, as such, the trans-
fers were presumptively deemed to be in contemplation of death. These cases seem
to represent the use of "loopholes" in the tax law against the taxpayer rather than for
him. See notes 162-66 supra and accompanying text. The Supreme Court, on the
other hand, seems to have placed formalistic conceptions of dominion and control over
transferred property ahead of substance. See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125
(1972).
236. This term seems to have been first used to describe a trust which is fully re-
vocable but gradually over a period of time becomes partially irrevocable as the grantor
releases percentile interests in the trust. See Sacher, Estate Planning and the Partially
Irrevocable Trust: Another View of United States v. Byrum, 48 Nonm D mE LAwY
581 (1973).
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his property. It calls for the establishment of a revocable trust to
which the jointly held property would be transferred. The trust agree-
ment would contain special provisions that would make it become
partially irrevocable on the death of the first to die of the joint ten-
ants. The portion23 7 of the trust to become irrevocable would be that
portion of the trust which is in excess of the amount of the trust prop-
erty necessary to obtain the maximum marital deduction in the estate
of the first to die.238 In determining the amount of trust property
necessary to obtain the maximum marital deduction, the governing
instrument must include a mechanism to take account of other property
passing to the survivor which qualifies for the marital deduction in
order to avoid over-qualifying the gift to the surviving spouse.280
This plan is based on the A and B trust arrangement discussed
earlier.240 Essentially, this scheme contemplates the standard qualify-
ing gift to the surviving spouse of an amount of the trust property
equal to the maximum marital deduction reduced by any other prop-
erty passing to the survivor and qualifying for the marital deduction.241
The balance of the trust property which is included in the decedent's
estate is to be set aside irrevocably in trust as the non-marital share.
The share held in the non-marital or irrevocable portion of the trust
237. Throughout this discussion reference will be made to the "irrevocable portion"
of the trust. It is intended and assumed throughout that separate trust funds will be
created to shelter the revocable and irrevocable portions of the trust when one part be-
comes irrevocable on the death of the first spouse to die. While it is possible for one
trust fund to contain both revocable and irrevocable portions, see Sacher, supra note 236,
at 584, the reference in this Article to "irrevocable portion" which implies that there
is only one trust fund, is used for convenience of reference only. It is suggested that
such fractionalization will greatly compound the problems inherent in this scheme, par-
ticularly with respect to the marital deduction. See C. LOWNDEs & R. KRAMER § 42.10.
What is intended with respect to the structure of the partially irrevocable trust,
in its simplest form, is one trustee holding "separate trusts under one instrument with-
out physical separation or segregation of the trust assets." Id. This is possible pro-
vided "the trust instrument authorizes such act and separate books and records are
maintained." Id.; see A. ScoTT, supra note 227, at § 77.
238. That portion of the trust property which qualifies for the marital deduction will
pass to the surviving spouse free of the federal estate tax. See INT. REv. CODE Op
1954, § 2056.
239. Property in excess of the maximum marital deduction which passes from a de-
cedent to his spouse and qualifies for the marital deduction will be taxed in both the
decedent's estate and his spouse's estate at her subsequent death unless she consumed
it or disposed of it during her lifetime. See id. § 2056. There is an exception
for annuities for the joint lives of husband and wife. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-i
(g)(3) (1974).
240. See notes 20-27 supra and accompanying text.
241. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. This portion of the trust will re-
main revocable for the life of the surviving spouse. The trust agreement will probably di-
rect that upon the death of the surviving spouse the revocable portion be distributed
to those persons specified as distributees of the irrevocable trust.
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will be taxed to the first to die and will escape taxation in the estate
of the last to die.242 Thus, this scheme should cause the respective
estates of the spouses to be equalized for federal death tax purposes.
In outline form, the partially irrevocable trust will look like this:
1. The trust will be completely revocable until the death of the first
to die of the settlor spouses. 243
2. Upon the death of the first of the settlor spouses to die, that portion
of the trust which exceeds the maximum marital deduction allowed
the estate of the first spouse to die will become irrevocable.244
242. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
The partially irrevocable trust scheme bears a likeness to the scheme considered
in Hornor's Estate v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1942), and Estate of Julia
Hornor v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1962). The partially irrevocable trust
calls for all the trust property to be included in the estate of the first spouse to die except
to the extent the survivor can prove contribution. In this respect, it is like Hornor.
However, it differs from Hornor, in the respect that not all of the trust will become
irrevocable at the death of the first to die. A portion of the trust will remain revocable
in which event it will qualify for the marital deduction. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2056. While qualification for the marital deduction is not critical to the success of
the partially irrevocable trust as a tax saving device, see note 249 infra and accompany-
ing text, the irrevocable portion of the trust can be made more acceptable to a client
if he or she knows that the portion qualifying for the marital deduction will be avail-
able to them without restriction.
However, the partially irrevocable trust could be modified without loss of the mari-
tal deduction if it were thought that the surviving spouse needed not only professional
management but also protection against the importunings of a second spouse or her own
inexperience in order to preserve the trust property for her lifetime and for lineal de-
scendants. In such case, the so-called revocable portion of the partially irrevocable
trust could also be made irrevocable at the death of the first spouse but the survivor
would be given a life estate plus a testamentary general power of appointment over the
remainder. This modification would allow the marital deduction to the estate of the
first spouse to die with respect to that property in which the survivor has the life estate
and general power of appointment. See INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (5). See
text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
243. Appropriate provisions with respect to revocation will have to be placed in the
trust agreement. The trust could be revocable at the option of either spouse either in
its entirety or as to one-half or some other portion. Or it could be made revocable
only with the consent of both spouses as was the case with the Hornor trust. It should
be noted, however, that requiring the consent of both spouses to revoke arguably could
cause the establishment of the trust to have gift tax consequences even though it was
revocable. For example, if the property included in the trust was held by the spouses
as joint tenants with right of survivorship, the older spouse could be deemed to have
made a gift to the younger spouse at the establishment of the trust because the older
spouse's rights under the trust agreement would be worth less than his pre-trust rights
(which included his right to transfer one-half the property without the consent of his
spouse).
244. To obtain maximum advantage from this self-adjusting mechanism in the trust,
it would be appropriate for each spouse to execute a pour-over will making the trust
beneficiary of all other probate property. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying
text
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3. The surviving spouse will continue to have an interest in the irrevo-
cable portion of the trust but her interest will not be such as to
require the inclusion of this portion of the trust in her gross estate
for federal estate tax purposes. There are, however, some special
problems here which will be discussed later in this Article.245
4. The revocable portion of the trust will continue to be revocable at
the option of the survivor, and as such will qualify for the marital
deduction. 246  It is clear, of course, that this portion of the trust
can be made irrevocable and still qualify for the marital deduction
if the surviving spouse has a right to all of the income from this
portion of the trust and, also, a general power of appointment over
the remainder.247
The practical effect of the partially irrevocable trust is that the
spouses must be willing for the survivor of them to have little or no
control over the property held in the non-marital trust. This feature
may be a significant deterrent to the use of this device. For example,
if each spouse were willing, during lifetime, to allow a substantial
portion of their jointly held property to be put irrevocably beyond his
or her control, it would be appropriate in many cases for the spouses
to work a lifetime split of this property as was suggested earlier.248
More importantly, it must be recognized that if no part of the
trust property is included in the estate of the first spouse to die, there
will be no marital deduction since the split-off of the irrevocable
portion of the trust is keyed to the marital deduction, and since there
would be no marital deduction, the entire trust will become irrevocable.
That could happen when all the trust property was attributable to the
resources of the survivor.249 For that reason, the planning should take
a further step in anticipation of the fact that the non-contributing
spouse may die first. The trust should provide that in the event the
property passing to the survivor which qualifies for the marital de-
duction is less than the amount necessary to equalize the two estates
245. See notes 264-73 infra and accompanying text.
246. If the Service includes all of the corpus of the revocable trust in the decedent's
estate under section 2040 ("the gross estate shall include the value of all property to
the extent of the interest therein held as joint tenants," INT. REv. CODF OF 1954, §
2040), the Service would seem to be bound to allow a marital deduction under section
2056 ("such interest was, at the time of the decedent's death, held by such person and
the decedent . . . in joint ownership," id. § 2056(e)(5)). The case involving the
estate of William M. Hornor did not deal with this issue because the marital deduction
was not available when Mr. Hornor died.
247. See note 242 supra.
248. See notes 64-70 supra and accompanying text.
249. If the survivor happened to be the dominant party to the union, it is doubtful
that he could tolerate this limitation on his unrestricted use of the property.
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for federal death tax purposes, the portion of the trust which becomes
irrevocable shall be limited to one-half the spouses' combined assets.
Such a trust provision might provide:
In no event shall the portion of the trust becoming irrevocable ex-
ceed one-half the spouses' combined adjusted gross estates. The de-
cedent's adjusted gross estate shall be the amount determined for fed-
eral estate tax purposes. The survivor's adjusted gross estate shall be
determined as of the date of death of the first spouse but shall only
include the survivor's separate property computed (1) as if she prede-
ceased her spouse; (2) without reduction for those items specified as
deductions in sections 2053 and 2054 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954; (3) by excluding life insurance proceeds on policies of insur-
ance on the survivor's life, life insurance cash values, interests in jointly
held property, and the value of any property subject to any general
power of appointment as defined by section 2041 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954.
This limitation would require some provision allowing the trustee to
rely upon the certification of the survivor as to the nature and extent of
his property for federal estate tax purposes; otherwise there would be
no objective measure of the survivor's estate.2 50
(2) Illustration: Problems in Application
There are several additional problems unique to the partially ir-
revocable trust which require the inclusion of special provisions in the
trust agreement to prevent unwanted federal estate and gift taxation.
The terms, purpose, and importance of each of these provisions can
be best explained by describing through an example the tax conse-
quences which result at the death of each spouse. For these reasons,
consider the following illustration. H and W, husband and wife, trans-
fer $150,000 of jointly held property to a trustee under a trust agree-
ment which is expressly revocable for their joint lives. At the death
of the first spouse to die, a portion of the trust becomes irrevocable;
the balance remaining revocable -for the life of the survivor. H dies
first. At his death, H was found to own $50,000 of separate property
which passed to W under his will. H provided all the consideration
for the jointly held property.
250. This assumes, of course, the survivor's cooperation. To insure that later coop-
eration a provision could be placed in the trust conditioning the survivor's interest in
the trust on her cooperation with the trustee on this point. Perhaps there should also
be a provision in the trust to the effect that a certification by the survivors legal guard-
ian would be sufficient.
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1. All the jointly held property will be included in H's gross estate
except to the extent W can prove her contribution.
Inclusion of the jointly held property in H's gross estate will not
be a disadvantage because of the estate splitting provisions available
through the marital deduction. In this case it will mean that H's estate
will incur a federal estate tax liability of $4,800. Of course, if W can
prove that she provided all the consideration for the jointly held prop-
erty, the jointly held property will be excluded from H's gross estate
and H's estate will incur no federal estate tax. However, even if W
can prove that her resources were responsible for the acquisition of
some part or all of the jointly held property, the government may insist
upon the integrity of the revocable trust and deny W the opportunity
to prove her contribution. 51 In that event, one-half of the jointly held
property will be included in H's gross estate on the ground that this is
the interest he transferred in trust subject to a retained life estate.
In either event, the surviving spouse should resist any temptation
to prove her contribution to the jointly held property.2 52  That advice
251. See notes 224-25 supra and accompanying text.
252. Section 2040 is somewhat vague about who has the burden of proof with re-
spect to contribution to jointly held property but the regulations clearly impose that
burden on the decedent's executor. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a) (1954). The lan-
guage of the regulations even implies that the matter of proof of contribution is com-
mitted to the executor and if he declines, the Service could not usurp his function. Id.
The entire value of jointly held property is included in a decedent's gross es-
tate unless the executor submits facts sufficient to show that property was not
acquired entirely with consideration furnished by the decedent . . . . Id.
Attention should, however, be given to Richard V. Madden, 52 T.C. 845, aff'd per
curiam, 440 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1971), in which it was held that for purposes of the
basis rules of section 1014, the decedent's executor has the burden of proving that
jointly held property was required to be included in the estate of the deceased joint
tenant. In this case, the surviving spouse argued that the jointly held property
had acquired as its basis for income tax purposes that value at which it was included
in the estate of the deceased joint tenant. Noting that the estate tax rules for jointly
held property have been on the books since 1916, the court said:
However, we cannot believe that Congress contemplated that the term "re-
quired" should be construed so as to give survivors an option to decrease in-
come tax by increasing estate tax, or to shift to the resvondent, in income
tax controversies, the burden of proving that less property was required to
be included in gross estate than was actually included. There is no indication
that Congress contemplated that it was conferring upon a surviving joint ten-
ant the privilege of paying more estate tax than was necessary so as to reduce
his income tax liability on the subsequent sale of the property. It seems more
likely that when the term "required" was used, it was assumed that the execu-
tor or other interested person would attempt to secure the maximum exclusion
of the jointly owned property from the estate; only to the extent that the
executor was unable to show that the property was not excludable was it
required to be included in gross estate. Such an interpretation of "required"
is consistent with the practice that existed in 1954 and has the effect of im-
posing the burden upon the person who has the information most readily
available. Id. at 849.
In considering Madden it may be appropriate to note that the government volun-
[Vol. 1974:669
Vol. 1974:6691 PLANNING FOR JOINT TENANCIES
is necessary if the partially irrevocable trust device is to fulfill its role
as a device to equalize the spouses' respective estates. By its terms
it anticipates that all the jointly held property will be included in the
estate of the first to die, and therefore it is geared to the federal estate
tax marital deduction. For this reason, it will be administratively
simpler for all the jointly held property to be included in the estate of
the first spouse to die.
Obviously, if H provided all the consideration for the jointly held
property, the government will demand that the revocable trust be dis-
regarded and everything be included in H's gross estate.2 53  This, of
course, would be desirable.
2. The portion of the trust not qualifying for the marital deduction
in Is gross estate (but limited to one-half their combined assets) be-
comes irrevocable.
It will be held for W for life; the remainder interest will be subject
(probably) to a special power of appointment in W. This event may
or may not have federal gift tax consequences to W. From W's stand-
point, the trust becoming irrevocable in part (and the gift becoming
complete) is equivalent to the case previously discussed in which H
and W, while both were living, established an irrevocable trust for
their jointly owned property. 254 W's gift tax liability can be determined
only after consideration of the kinds of property in the trust; when the
trust property was originally acquired by H and W; and whether H
and W held the property as tenants by the entirety or as joint tenants
with right of survivorship prior to the establishment of the trust.255
The following examples are illustrative:
a. Where cash formerly held in a joint bank account is the only prop-
erty in the trust, the fact that the trust becomes irrevocable would
have no gift tax consequences for W.256
tarily refunded the estate tax paid by the decedent's executor which was attributable
to the inclusion of the joint property in her estate. The court seemed to find this sig-
nificant. It said: "We are not concerned with a situation in which there has been
a final determination of the amount includable in gross estate; the estate tax return
involved herein was not accepted by the respondent." Id.
Obviously, the standards for inclusion under sections 1014 and 2040 respectively are
different. Perhaps, for that reason, it is inappropriate to even suggest that Madden
may have any application where federal estate tax liability is at issue.
253. See notes 216-17 supra and accompanying text.
254. See notes 191-92 supra and accompanying text.
255. In analyzing transactions in terms of federal gift tax cost, the taxpayer must
be constantly reminded of the gift tax exemption, exclusion, marital deduction and gift
splitting provisions. See notes 125-28 supra and accompanying text.
256. See text accompanying notes 210-11 supra.
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b. Where ABC common stock which was formerly held as joint tenants
with right of survivorship is the subject matter of the trust, W will
incur some gift tax liability when the trust becomes irrevocable un-
less the portion that remains revocable is at least equal to one-half
the value of the stock.25 7
c. Where Neuteracre which was acquired, for example, on December
31, 1954 by H and W as tenants by the entirety, is the subject
matter of the trust when it becomes irrevocable, W will incur no
gift tax liability so long as the portion of the trust which remains
revocable is at least equal to the actuarially determined value of
her interest in Neuteracre at the time a portion of the trust becomes
irrevocable.258
d. Where Greenacre which was acquired in 1960 by H and W as joint
tenants with right of survivorship is the subject matter of the trust,
there will be no gift tax consequences to W at the time the portion
of the trust becomes irrevocable. 259
It has been assumed in each of the foregoing examples that the
trust contained only one kind of property. Rarely will that be the
case in practice. Where there are different kinds of property in the
trust, can the trustee pick and choose which property shall be allocated
to the revocable portion of the trust or will the allocation consist of a
fractional interest in each item of trust property? It must also be
remembered that the size of the portion of the trust which becomes
irrevocable is dictated not by federal gift tax considerations but by a
formula pegged to federal estate tax considerations.2 0  Perhaps these
potentially conflicting interests can 'be reconciled by including a pro-
vision in the trust instrument directing the trustee to pick and choose
the property to be allocated to the revocable and irrevocable portions
of the trust after first considering the gift tax implications of his de-
cisions to the surviving spouse.26'
257. See text accompanying notes 202-07 supra.
258. See text accompanying notes 208-09 supra.
259. This illustration assumes that no gift tax was ever paid on this property. See
text accompanying notes 210 & 212 supra.
260. See note 238 supra and accompanying text.
261. In order to insure the availability of the marital deduction in the estate of the
first to die, a provision should be inserted in the trust requiring the trustee, in making
the allocation to the revocable trust, to select items of property which are representative
of the appreciation or depreciation experienced by the trust between date of death and
date of allocation. See Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1964-1 CuM. BuLL. 682.
It is theoretically possible that this allocation of property between the revocable
and irrevocable portions of the trust will have capital gains consequences. In support
of such a position, reference could be made to Rev. Rul. 69-486, 1969-2 Cum. BULL.
159 where the Service claimed a "sale or exchange" occurred within the meaning of
section 1002 when a trust made a non-pro rata distribution of property. The ruling
[Vol. 1974:669
Vol. 1974:6691 PLANNING FOR JOINT TENANCIES
The more critical problem has to do with funding the revocable
and irrevocable portions of the trust. In the absence of an express di-
rection to the trustee with respect to such funding it is extremely doubt-
ful that the government would allow 'the surviving spouse to claim
that her fractional interest in the trust property (or property having a
value equivalent to the value of her fractional interest) was allocated to
the revocable portion. Probably the government would assume the
contrary position.20 2 It would argue that it was the survivor's fractional
interest in the trust property which became irrevocable. That would
mean that all the trust property was included in the estate of the first
of the spouses to die and that the same event-the death of the first
spouse--caused the survivor to make a taxable gift of an interest in the
same property. How can two people both transfer the same interest in
the same property simultaneously? 26 If it is possible, then the survivor
may be limited to its facts, see A. CASNEa 1391 (Supp. 1973), but it may cast doubt
on the validity of Rev. Rul. 56437, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 507. That ruling stated that
a division of property between co-owners does not constitute a taxable exchange. See
note 80 supra for discussion of income tax consequences of terminating joint tenancies.
262. It would find ample precedent in Estate of Bomash v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d
308 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'g 50 T.C. 667 (1968). The decedent, Louis Bomash, estab-
lished a testamentary trust and purported to fund the trust not only with his share of
his marital community property but also that of his wife, Fannie. The trust provided
that Fannie would receive fifty percent of the income from the trust property. The
court found that Fannie's consent to subject her half of the marital community property
to Louis' trust qualified her as a "transferor" of property in which she retained a life
estate for federal estate tax purposes. The court then held that Fannie's gross estate
included fifty percent of the trust:
The retention of 50% income from the entire trust corpus (which includes
Fannie Bomash's half contribution) is identical in substance to a retained
100% income life estate in her one-half of the community property. The
objective economic reality of this case is the fact that Mrs. Bomash did not
alter her position by placing her community property share in trust. We are
guided by the Supreme Court's caution in United States v. Grace's Estate, ...
that "the law searches out the reality and is not concerned with the form."
Most importantly, we heed the Grace Court's clear rule that "the taxability
of a trust corpus * * * does not hinge on a settloer's motives, but depends
on the nature and operative effect of the trust transfer."
Since the record demonstrates that (in the words of Grace) Mrs. Bo-
mash's "effective position * * * vis-a-vis the property did not change at all"
when the trust was established, it was error for the Tax Court to conclude
that the Bomash estate should not have been taxed on 50% of the entire
trust's corpus. 432 F.2d at 311. (footnotes omitted).
As in the analogous Hornor cases, see notes 216-18 supra, all of the Bomash com-
munity property was included in Louis' gross estate at his death. Id. Thus, the court
said, it is impossible to determine precisely in which portion of the trust Fannie had re-
tained a life estate. The Tax Court had concluded that only twenty-five percent of the
trust estate should be included in Fannie's gross estate. Id. at 310.
263. See Kaufman v. United States, 462 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1972). In this case
the wife got more than half of the insurance proceeds from a policy owned by the com-
munity. The Service unsuccessfully argued that one-half of the proceeds that went to
the daughters was a gift taken out of the wife's share of the community property. The
court rejected the imposition of a gift tax because it "would plainly mean that,
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who fails to provide some mechanism for earmarking her portion of the
jointly held property as that which continues in the revocable portion
of the trust may find that she has made some unexpected taxable gifts.
Perhaps the appropriate manner in which to avoid unwanted tax
liability in such a case would be to insert additional language in the
trust further directing the trustee as follows:
In making the allocation of trust property between the revocable and
irrevocable portions of the trust, the decedent's interest in the various
items of trust property shall first be allocated to the irrevocable portion
of the trust and the survivor's interest in those items shall first be allo-
cated to the revocable portion insofar as practicable. The survivor's
interest shall be determined by application of the rules developed for
determining federal gift tax consequences of transfers of jointly held
property.
This language should solve the problems of unwanted federal gift
tax liability as a result of: (1) trustee decisions with respect to pick-
ing and choosing which items of property will be allocated to the ir-
revocable and the revocable portions of the trust, respectively; (2)
government arguments that the portion of the trust which became ir-
revocable consisted of the fractional interest in each item of property
attributed to the surviving spouse by state law.
3. At W's subsequent death, only that portion of the trust which con-
tinues to be revocable should be included in her gross estate.
In order to insure this result and keep the irrevocable portion of
the trust out of W's gross estate, it is imperative that all distributions
from the irrevocable portion of the trust be completely at the trustee's
discretion.264 Although W can be a permissible beneficiary of the ir-
revocable trust, she can have no right to demand any benefits of the
trust.
This stipulation is largely the result of anticipating two distinct
possibilities. The first is that W's resources might be found to have
provided the consideration for the jointly held property. While the
partially irrevocable trust agreement provides that a portion of the trust
shall become irrevocable even if no part of the jointly held property is
upon the single event of the husband's death, the same 61,750 dollars would be taxed
once through the estate tax on the husband's estate and once as a gift assessed to the
wife on her husband's death." Id. at 441. The court explained: "When that spouse
receives his or her share or more there must be some evidence of donative intent in
order to assess a gift tax." Id. at 443. But cf. Lewis v. United States, 485 F.2d 606
(Ct. Cl. 1973), discussed in note 285 infra.
264. See notes 274-75 infra and accompanying text.
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included in the estate of the first to die,265 the government would cer-
tainly maintain that the irrevocable portion of the trust consisted of W's
property. If W has a right to any benefits from the irrevocable portion
of the trust, she will be deemed to have made a transfer in trust sub-
ject to a retained life estate. 266
The second possibility which must be anticipated is a govern-
ment attempt to include both the revocable and the irrevocable por-
tions of the trust in W's gross estate at her death even though all the
jointly held property was included in H's gross estate at his death. 67
The government would argue that the irrevocable portion of the trust
contains a portion of the jointly held property attributed to W for fed-
eral estate tax purposes by prevailing law. To do so the government
would have to disregard the plain instruction of the trust agreement
to the effect that the interests of the first spouse to die in the various
items of trust property are to be allocated to the irrevocable portion
of the trust. 6 ' Nonetheless, it would seem likely that the government
would take this position. Arguably, the government would be main-
taining inconsistent positions in permitting half of H's gross estate to
escape taxation at H's death under the rubric of the marital deduction
and then claiming at W's death that the portion which was taxed in
H's estate at his death-the non-marital share now in the irrevocable
trust-was really W's all the time. But really, the position is no more
inconsistent than that taken in the two Hornor cases. In William M.
Hornor,2 69 the court looked to the tax notion of contribution and, in
265. See notes 249-250 supra and accompanying text.
266. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
267. See Estate of Julia Hornor v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1962),
discussed in text accompanying note 218 supra; Miller v. United States, 325 F. Supp.
1287 (E.D. Pa. 1971), discussed in note 147 supra.
268. See text accompanying note 261 supra. This possibility suggests disastrous
consequences. If the government takes this position, it would mean that:
a. All of the trust property would be included in the estate of the first
spouse to die even where he or she provided none of the consideration for
the jointly held property. See text accompanying notes 251-53 supra.
(This result would be reached even if no trust were ever created.)
b. All the trust property would be included in the estate of the surviving
spouse at her subsequent death. (This, too, would happen even if no trust
were created and the property remained jointly held.)
c. The portion of the property included in the irrevocable trust would
represent a gift for tax purposes by the surviving spouse. If this occurred
it would mean that the same property was taxed in both estates for
estate tax purposes and part of it was also subject to gift tax. Of course,
the gift tax credit would be available to ameliorate the harshness of the
result. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2012. To eliminate this risk,
distributions from the irrevocable trust must be at the discretion of the
trustee, and the surviving spouse may retain no rights in the trust. See
text accompanying notes 274-75 infra.
269. Hornor's Estate v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1942), discussed in
text accompanying note 216 supra.
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Julia Hornor2 70 it looked -to state law conceptions. In the case of
partially irrevocable trust, the government would be saying that all of
the jointly held property was included in H's estate because he pro-
vided all the consideration and the irrevocable portion of the trust was
included in W's estate because state law gave her an interest in the
property which she allowed to be transferred to a trust in which she
had a life estate.27'
A different view-and an unlikely one-would be for the govern-
ment to take the position that, in the absence of identifiable fractions,
one-half of the portion which became irrevocable belonged to the sur-
vivor. 272 This position makes as much sense as any other. If it pre-
vails and the survivor is found to have a life estate in the irrevocable
portion, she Will be deemed a transferor of one-half of -the irrevocable
trust property at her death and that amount will be included in the
gross estate. Since the marital share of the deceased spouse's estate-
the revocable portion of the trust-will be included in the survivor's
estate at death, 73 the addition of a portion of the irrevocable trust
means double taxation in the same generation of the same property.
As noted above, the draftsman can anticipate these problems by
the simple expedient of altering the survivor's rights in the irrevocable
portion of the trust. Instead of a life income interest, the survivor will
have to be content with a discretionary power in the trustee to dis-
tribute principal and income in such amounts as the trustee shall de-
termine. Giving the trustee complete discretion over distributions
should frustrate any suggestion that the surviving spouse has retained
a life estate in the irrevocable portion of the trust.2 74 There must
obviously be an independent trustee and an absence of any evidence
of any agreement or collusion between the donor and trustee with re-
spect to the exercise of his discretion.27 5
270. Estate of Julia Hornor v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1962), dis-
cussed in text accompanying note 218 supra.
271. Cf. Miller v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Estate of
Koussevitsky, 5 T.C. 650 (1945).
272. Estate of Bomash, 50 T.C. 667 (1968), rev'd, 432 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1970),
discussed in note 262 supra.
273. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038.
274. See National City Bank v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957); Com-
missioner v. Irving Trust Co., 147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1945); Herzog v. Commissioner,
116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941) (dictum); Zissman, Problem Areas in the Estate Tax,
41 TAXES 875, 884 (1963).
275. Cf. Estate of Skinner v. United States, 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963); Commis-
sioner v. Vander Weele, 254 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1958). But cf. Commissioner v. Irving
Trust Co., 147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1945); Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d
Cir. 1941).
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The taxpayer and his spouse will be reluctant to commit the nec-
essary kind of discretion to a disinterested trustee, but it is essential if
the property subject to the irrevocable portion of the trust is to be ex-
cluded from the surviving spouse's gross estate at her death.2 76  Prob-
ably, the surviving spouse would feel better about the trust if the
trustee's discretion were subject to some kind of standard such as
maintenance, care and support. That, however, is not possible if the
trust is to be excluded from the survivor's gross estate.17 7  While the
survivor would not necessarily receive anything from the trust unless
the conditions were met, the trustee could be compelled to exercise his
discretion in her behalf. However, it is the very existence of the
standard that leads to another argument for the taxpayer. Since the
trustee would have little discretion because of the standard, it is argu-
able that only that portion of the trust corpus which is attributable to
the amount necessary for the survivor's maintenance, care and sup-
port should be included in her gross estate. The problem is one of
valuation. How shall the court determine the value of the right to
maintenance, care and support? In one case which is factually analo-
gous, the decedent retained the right to receive $100 per month from
the income of the trust and the court concluded that only that portion
of the trust corpus necessary to produce $100 per month should be in-
cluded in the decedent's gross estate.2 78
One can only speculate whether a court would attempt to value
the portion of the trust necessary to produce an, amount determined,
perhaps by -hindsight, to be equal to the value of the right to mainte-
nance, care and support. It is probable that such a judicial determin-
ation would be refused on the ground that the decedent could look to
the entire trust corpus for satisfaction of his right to income.2 79  It
comes to mind, however, to ask how that is different from the case
276. Perhaps it is appropriate to note that with the discretionary pay feature a part
of the irrevocable trust, it is no different for tax purposes from the case where the
property remained jointly held, and at the death of the first spouse the survivor estab-
lished an irrevocable trust with a discretionary pay feature. See text accompanying
note 274 supra. The partially irrevocable trust has appeal, however, in cases where
professional management of jointly held property is important during the lifetime of
both spouses. While a transfer of all the jointly held property to an irrevocable trust
while both spouses are alive will have approximately the same tax consequences as the
partially. irrevocable trust, compare notes 190-212 supra and accompanying text, with
notes 237-73 supra and accompanying text (gift taxes will be greater with the irrevoca-
ble trust), the partially irrevocable trust affords greater flexibility in that a portion of
the trust will remain revocable for the life of the surviving spouse.
277. Commissioner v. Irving Trust Co., 147 F.2d 946, 949 (2d Cir. 1945) (dictum).
278. National City Bank v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957).
279. See Toeller's Estate v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1948).
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where the decedent could look 'to all the trust income to satisfy his re-
tained right to $100 per month from that income.280
While giving the survivor a discretionary life income interest
rather than a mandatory pay interest has obvious federal estate tax
savings appeal, it may have negative significance for gift tax purposes.
So long as the survivor had a mandatory pay life estate in the irre-
vocable portion of the trust, the only gift she would be deemed to have
made was the remainder interest in that portion, if any, of the irre-
vocable trust which is attributed to her for federal gift tax purposes.2 81
If all distributions from the trust are at the discretion of an independ-
ent trustee, it would seem the surviving spouse will be deemed to have
made a taxable gift of all that portion of the irrevocable trust which
is attributed to her without any reduction for the value of a retained
life estate.2 82  This, of course, assumes that the irrevocable portion of
the trust will be treated as holding the surviving spouse's portion of the
jointly held property.283 Hopefully, the special provision included in
the irrevocable trust for this purpose will prevent this result.28 4
(3) Lewis v. United States
In Lewis v. United States285 the decedent's will purported to dis-
pose of the property which he and his spouse, Nellie, held as tenants
by the entirety. For reasons not important to this analysis, the ten-
ancy by the entirety was not to be terminated during the spouses'
joint lifetimes. Therefore, in order to make her husband's will opera-
tional with respect to the tenancy by the entirety property, Nellie ex-
ecuted an "irrevocable" trust agreement directing that the tenancy by
the entirety property be distributed under her husband's will. Her
husband died some months later and Nellie survived. Pursuant to the
terms of Nellie's trust, the tenancy by the entirety property was dis-
tributed under her husband's will. The court held that all the tenancy
by the entirety property was includable in the husband's gross estate
and that Nellie made a taxable gift of all of the tenancy by the en-
280. National City Bank v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957).
281. Whether she had an interest would be determined by considerations of actuarial
factors, state law, and rules of contribution. See notes 254-63 supra and accompanying
text
282. See Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941); Rheinstrom v.
Commissioner, 105 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1939); Estate of Ben F. Hazelton, Jr., 9 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 1 40,425 (1940). But see Commissioner v. Vander Weele, 254 F.2d 895
(6th Cir. 1958); Rev. Rul. 62-13, 1962-1 CuM. BuLL. 181.
283. See notes 262-63 supra and accompanying text.
284. See notes 262-63 supra and accompanying text.
285. 485 F.2d 606 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
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tirety property at his death when she allowed this property to be dis-
posed of by his will.
It is unfortunate that the Lewis court did not better explain its
decision. One could conclude from a casual reading of the opinion
that it would be precedent for holding that the partially irrevocable
trust would (1) not only cause all the trust property to be subject to
federal estate taxation at the death of -the first spouse to die, but, (2)
also cause that portion which becomes irrevocable at the death of the
first to die to constitute a taxable gift from the survivor. It is the latter
possibility which would be disadvantageous since it would mean, prac-
tically speaking, that all of the trust property would have been included
in the estate286 of the first spouse to die and would also be treated as
a taxable gift by the survivor.
Turning to Lewis, a careful reading will suggest that the so-
called "irrevocable" trust was no trust at all until such time as Neillie's
spouse died. 5 7 It was only at that time that the trust acquired a res
and, accordingly, only then that it came into being. Had the jointly
held property in Lewis been -held in joint tenancy with right of sur-
vivorship (rather than as tenants by the entirety), Nellie could have
severed the joint tenancy without her spouse's consent and transferred
one-half of the jointly held property to the trust. Since the property
was held as a tenancy by the entirety she could make no such transfer
to the trust during her lifetime unless her husband joined in the con-
veyance. Hence at Mr. Lewis's death, Nellie's interest in the tenancy
by the entirety expanded by operation of law to include the entire
property, and, at that point in time, she had the unrestricted right to
dispose of all the jointly held property as she saw fit. Her promise to
transfer the property to the trust was unsupported by consideration
and, while a moral obligation, it was otherwise unenforceable.288
286. Of course, the marital deduction would be available as to that property included
in the revocable portion of the trust. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
287. Nellie, a resident of Pennsylvania, assigned to the trustee the right that she
would have had in the jointly held property if she were the surviving tenant. Under
Pennsylvania property law a tenant by the entirety has "nothing more than a mere ex-
pectancy" while both tenants are still alive. Estate of Julia Hornor v. Commissioner,
305 F.2d 769, 771 (3d Cir. 1962). Ordinarily, an "expectancy" cannot be the subject
matter of a trust. See A. Scorr, supra note 227, § 86.1. A valid trust cannot exist
without a subject matter (the res).
288. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 30 (1959); RrrcimE, ALFORD &
EFFLAND, DECEDEN'S ESTATES & TRusTs 383-84 (4th ed. 1971).
It could be argued that Nellie had a contingent right of survivorship in the ten-
ancy by the entirety property and that it was assigned to the trust when it was estab-
lished (thereby giving the trust a res from its inception). That, however, is not how
the court saw the issue or else it could not have reached the result that it did. The
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Thus, her transfer of the property to the trust after her husband's
death was purely gratuitous and legally unnecessary."" It was there-
fore a transfer subject to federal gift tax to the extent it was com-
plete.290
The partially irrevocable trust is unlike Nellie Lewis's "irrevo-
cable" trust in the sense that the jointly held property is actually trans-
ferred to the partially irrevocable trust by the action of both spouses
while they are both living. From that point forward, conditions for
the enjoyment of the property are determined by the terms of the
trust agreement and not by state law as was the case in Lewis where the
transfer in trust did not occur until Nellie's spouse died. It would be
incorrect to suggest that the property in a partially irrevocable trust
remains jointly held, and therefore at the death of the first spouse to
die the survivor could choose whether to transfer the jointly held prop-
erty to the trust or make some other disposition as Nellie Lewis could
do. Nellie Lewis was in this position because her so-called "irrevo-
cable" trust had not affected her survivorship rights in the tenancy by
the entirety property. In the case of the partially irrevocable trust, the
joint tenancy relationship was terminated for state law purposes when
the property was conveyed to the trust.
While the partially irrevocable trust will be disregarded for fed-
eral estate tax purposes so long as it remains revocable and the trust
property treated as if it had remained jointly held, the issue under con-
sideration is what interest could the surviving spouse transfer for gift
tax purposes when the trust becomes irrevocable in part. That can
only be determined by the kind of property involved, the time it was
acquired, and whether gift tax returns were filed.2 1 For example, if
shares of ABC corporation were held in joint tenancy with right of
court held that a gift was made when Nellie's husband died and Nellie allowed the
tenancy by the- entirety property to pass to the trust. Had the court believed that Nel-
lie transferred a contingent right of survivorship to the trust at its inception, the gift
would be deemed to have been made at that time and not at the death of Nellie's hus-
band. Nellie could not have been deemed to have made gifts on both occasions of
the same property interest.
In this case it should be noted that the court found the evidence indicated that
Nellie's irrevocable trust was considered revocable by Nellie and the trustee. 485 F.2d
at 613 n.8. In the event that the trust was in fact revocable, no gift tax would be
due because the gift would be incomplete. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2 (1954).
289. The court said that "upon her husband's death, plaintiff transferred (via the
provisions of the trust agreement) her ownership of the margin account . . . ." 485
F.2d at 614. However, this statement should not be read to mean that Nellie had to
transfer the property; rather the court is just reciting what Nellie let happen.
290. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2 (1954).
291. See text accompanying notes 80-101 supra.
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survivorship prior to being placed in the trust, the only taxable gift
either spouse could have made was of a one-half interest.292 This
one-half interest would have been all Nellie Lewis could have given
away had she been able to make the transfer effective prior to the
time that the right of survivorship mechanism operated to give her the
entire interest in the jointly held property. In the case of the partially
irrevocable trust, the survivorship mechanism has been destroyed and
there is no way that the surviving spouse could find herself in Nellie's
position once the transfer to the trust has been accomplished.
Admittedly, a portion of the partially irrevocable trust becomes
irrevocable at the death of the first spouse to die, but, theoretically,
that portion of the trust contained the decedent's portion of the jointly
held property.2" 3 The survivor's portion of the jointly held property
remains in the revocable portion of the trust. While there may be rea-
sons for imposing a gift tax upon the survivor,294 the fact that a portion
of the trust becomes irrevocable is not one of them.
(4) Revenue Ruling 71-51
Revenue Ruling 71-51295 presented a situation somewhat similar
to that contemplated by the partially irrevocable trust. In the situ-
ation presented in the revenue ruling, husband and wife owned prop-
erty as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The husband died in
1954. Some years prior to his death, he and his wife had executed
a joint, mutual, and contractual will which provided that
all property, real as well as personal, of whatever kind and wher-
ever situated at the time of the death of either, was to be held by the
survivor during his or her life with the right to the income therefrom
for life. Upon the death of the survivor, the remainder interest in the
property was to be distributed to their children.296
The Service ruled that the jointly held property qualified for the mari-
tal deduction in the husband's estate in that all of it was included in
292. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text. Speculation about the conse-
quences of disregarding the trust for gift tax purposes leads nowhere. For example,
if the trust is disregarded for gift tax purposes, the spouses will find themselves holding
the property jointly and making transfers of jointly held property. The gift tax conse-
quences of such transfers have already been examined. See text accompanying notes
80-101, 201-12 supra.
293. See notes 262-63 supra and accompanying text.
294. See text accompanying notes 262-63 supra.
295. 1971-1 CuM. BuLL. 274. It should be noted that this revenue ruling is the
estate tax counterpart of the Lewis case.
296. Id. at 274-75.
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the wife's gross estate on the ground that she had transferred the prop-
erty subject to a retained life estate.
It could be suggested that this revenue ruling will cause the gov-
ernment to include not only the revocable portion of the partially ir-
revocable trust but also the irrevocable portion of the trust in the sur-
vivor's gross estate on the ground that she retained a life estate in the
irrevocable portion. While this position is arguable, it suffers two dis-
tinct weaknesses. First, the ruling is premised on the notion that the
contractual limitation on the disposition of the jointly held property
could not prevent the survivor's interest in that property from ripening
or expanding to include the entire interest at the death of the first
spouse to die. It is almost as if the Service were analogizing to Lewis
and suggesting that the surviving spouse in the situation presented by
the ruling could choose to ignore the terms of her contractual undertak-
ing and dispose of the jointly held property to a third person. That
is probably true, but the beneficiaries under the contractual will would
have an action against her for damages for breach of contract.
20 7
The second weakness is to an extent premised, as was the first,
on the notion that the contractual will could not encumber the jointly
held property in any way to prevent the survivor from disposing of it
as she pleased. On that assumption, the ruling is correct in holding
that all the jointly held property subject to the contractual will should
be in her gross estate as a transfer subject to a retained life estate
since she had the right to all the income for life.298 However, the
question becomes one of asking whether there is any inconsistency be-
tween the position of the ruling and those cases where jointly held
property has been placed in an irrevocable trust and each joint tenant
is deemed to have a one-half interest for federal estate tax purposes.2 90
The answer probably is that there is no real conflict given the premise
of the ruling that the joint tenancy relationship was never terminated
until the death of one of the spouses. In all the other situations ex-
amined in this Article in which only one-half the property was included
in the estate of the first to die, the joint tenancy relationship had been
clearly terminated during the joint lifetime of the spouses.
For purposes of the partially irrevocable trust, the issue becomes
one of determining whether the joint tenancy relationship is terminated
by the transfer of the jointly held property to the trust so long as the
297. See RrrcHmE, ALFORD & EFFLAND, supra note 288, at 731-33.
298. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
299. See, e.g., Estate of Julia Hornor v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.
1962), discussed in text accompanying note 218 supra; Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner,
175 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1949), discussed in text accompanying notes 140-42 supra.
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trust is revocable. The Service would probably agree that it was. In
the ruling, emphasis was placed on the state law notion of survivorship
inherent in the joint tenancy relationship (as was also done in Lewis).
Since the revocable trust terminates the joint tenancy relationship for
state law purposes 3°°-clearly, the beneficiaries of the partially irre-
vocable trust are marching to the tune of the trust agreement and not
state law notions about joint tenancies-the principle of the ruling
should have no application to the partially irrevocable trust.
(5) Summary
Many clients may find the discretionary pay feature of the irrevo-
cable portion of -the trust too high a price to pay for estate tax certainty.
Given the context of clients who are reluctant to terminate joint owner-
ship arrangements, perhaps it is wishful thinking to even propose the
partially irrevocable trust. Nonetheless, it would seem that a trust of
this sort would have appeal in cases where one of the spouses is clearly
the dominant party to the union. In that kind of case, the dominant
party will probably welcome some device to limit the dominated party's
interest in the jointly held property after the death of the dominant
party.
In the ordinary case, perhaps the partially irrevocable trust can
be "sold" on the ground that one-half the property will clearly be
available to the survivor in the revocable trust. Thus, the survivor
only compromises control as to the irrevocable portion of the trust.
From this discussion, it should be apparent that it is clearly prefer-
able to equalize the respective estates of the spouses during lifetime for
maximum tax advantage. 0 1 Nonetheless, for those who are reluctant
to accomplish such equalization, yet want tax savings and/or profes-
sional management, the partially irrevocable trust has appeal. In fact,
the partially irrevocable trust differs from the estate equalization
scheme discussed earlier in only one particular: the discretionary pay
feature of the irrevocable trust. In cases where the discretionary pay
feature is a stumbling block to the use of the partially irrevocable trust
and the clients are unwilling to equalize their estates, perhaps it would
be appropriate to give the survivor a right to income from the irrevo-
cable trust and accept the estate tax risks that it entails. 302
300. See note 227 supra. The Gift Tax Regulations state that a joint tenancy rela-
tionship is terminated anytime the joint tenants "alter the nature of their respective in-
terests in the property." Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(2) (1954).
301. See notes 64-79 supra and accompanying text.
302. See note 268 supra.
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The one true disadvantage of using the partially irrevocable trust
is that it remains untested in the courts. For that reason it lacks pre-
dictability, the most important ingredient to successful preventive law
practice. However, in those cases where taxpayers want both tax sav-
ings and control over property, they must be prepared to sacrifice pre-
dictability. Lawyering is a process of developing alternatives and mak-
ing predictions as to their success. It is for the client to choose among
the alternatives after giving what he believes to be appropriate weight
to predictability of result.
In summary, then, ,the partially irrevocable trust is clearly analogous
to the traditional A and B trust arrangement, but it differs in several
important particulars.
a. Because the trust is funded with jointly held property, it
should be possible in many cases to achieve the much desired
estate equalization between the spouses without regard to the
order of their death. In order to make that possible, the trust
agreement must contain a provision requiring a portion of the
trust containing the jointly held property to become irrevoca-
ble when the first spouse dies, whether or not any portion of
the jointly held property is includable in that spouse's gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes.30 3
b. To avoid adverse federal gift tax consequences the trust must
contain special provisions regarding allocation of the property
in .the -trust between the revocable and irrevocable portions8 04
c. All distributions from the irrevocable portion of the trust must
be at the complete discretion of the trustee.305  Although the
surviving spouse may be a permissible beneficiary under the
irrevocable portion of the trust, she may have no right to de-
mand any benefits from that portion of the trust.
Turning back to the illustration involving H and W, it appears
that use of the partially irrevocable trust will mean that H's and W's
estates will each incur a federal estate tax liability of $4,800 without
regard to the order of their deaths. However, if they had not estab-
lished a partially irrevocable trust but continued to hold their property
as joint tenants, the federal estate tax liability, if H had died first, would
have been $4,800 at H's death and $32,700 at W's death. (If W had
died first, all the jointly held property would be included in her estate
except to the extent H could prove contribution. If H could not prove
303. See text accompanying note 242 supra.
304. See text accompanying notes 262-63 supra.
305. See text accompanying notes 274-75 supra.
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contribution, the federal estate tax at W's death would be $1,050 and
at H's subsequent death, $32,700. (Or if H could prove contribution,
nothing would be included in W's gross estate at her death, and at H's
death the federal estate tax liability would be $32,700.) Had H and
W used a conventional A and B trust arrangement, and H died first,
H's federal estate tax liability would have been $4,800 and W's would
have been $17,900. (If W died first, nothing would have been included
in her gross estate and at H's subsequent death his estate would incur
a federal estate tax of $32,700.) And if the estates were equalized
between the spouses during lifetime (and the first to die established
an irrevocable trust of his property for the survivor for life), the fed-
eral estate tax at the death of each spouse would be $4,800 without
regard to the order of their deaths.
H Dies First
H Estate Tax
No -trust; property jointly held $ 4,800
Conventional A and B Trust 4,800
Partially Irrevocable Trust 4,800
Estate Equalization 4,800
No trust; property jointly held
Conventional A and B Trust
Partially Irrevocable Trust
Estate Equalization
W Dies First
$32,700
32,700
4,800
4,800
W Estate Tax
$32,700
17,900
4,800
4,800
$ 1,050
1,050
1,050
4,800
Total
$37,500
22,700
9,600
9,600
$33,750
33,750
5,850
9,600
VII. POSTMORTEM PLANNING
No doubt there will be cases when, through oversight or lack of
understanding, taxpayers whose estates consist largely of jointly held
property will employ the conventional A and B trust arrangement.
In such cases, the survivor will have an opportunity to make her
estate responsive to the plan since the plan is not responsive to the
estate. To do so, the survivor must be prepared to disclaim that por-
tion of the jointly held property passing to her which is in excess of
the maximum marital deduction available to the decedent's estate. She
will be expected to argue that she never had dominion and control
over the property and that this is the first opportunity she has had to
demonstrate her refusal to accept the gift. 8°6 Naturally, this reasoning
assumes that the surviving spouse has never exercised any dominion
306. The taxpayer in Lewis attempted a similar argument and got nowhere. The
court said, "Although completely passive, she still had the capability of control and that
power did not atrophy because of the lack of exercise." 485 F.2d at 611 (citations omit-
ted).
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over the property for her own benefit. To the extent she has exer-
cised such dominion she would argue that it was exercised for the bene-
fit of the family unit and that the joint tenancy relationship was estab-
established for convenience only.
While disclaimers are expressly sanctioned by the Treasury Regu-
lations, 307 the courts have almost uniformly resisted any effort by a
survivor to disclaim an interest in jointly held property. 08  This re-
sistance is difficult to understand given the increasing willingness on
the part of state courts to take evidence-at least in the case of joint
bank accounts-on the issue of whether the survivor took the jointly
held property at the contributor's death. 09 One state, South Dakota,
has recently gone so far as to specifically authorize disclaimers of jointly
held property.3 10 Unfortunately, there are no reported cases under this
statute which consider the federal gift tax consequences of such dis-
claimers. It would be assumed, however, that the judicial resistance
would weaken given the Service's position (as expressed in the Regula-
tions311) that local law is controlling on the question of disclaimers.
307. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1954).
308. See Krakoff v. United States, 439 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1971); Bishop v. United
States, 338 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Miss. 1970), affd mem., 468 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1972);
Lewis v. United States, 485 F.2d 606 (Ct. Cl. 1973). Contra, Estate of Chrysler v.
Commissioner, 361 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966). By way of explanation, it has been stated:
[Wlill the survivor be able to disclaim what passes under the right of survi-
vorship? It would seem that a disclaimer in this situation comes too late be-
cause the original acquiescence in the establishment of the joint ownership is
an acceptance of a property interest which cannot be eliminated except by a
transfer. Of course, if the survivor has done nothing as yet to indicate acqui-
escence in the establishment of the joint ownership, he should be able to refuse
to accept what was given him originally, including any benefit from the right
of survivorship. A. CASNER 1038 (Supp. 1973).
The negative attitude the courts have taken toward disclaimers is hard to reconcile
with decisions like Estate of Albert Rand, 28 T.C. 1002 (1957), in which the surviving
spouse was able to have excluded from her deceased husband's gross estate that portion
of his property which she was deemed to have given him for convenience. The prop-
erty was not jointly held. Title was in his name alone. The Internal Revenue Service
acquiesced to this decision in 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 7.
309. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
310. S.D. ComIP. LAws § 43-4-29 (Supp. 1973). Consider the language of the stat-
uta':
Any person who may be entitled to receive any property or beneficial interest,
vested or otherwise, under any will of or by inheritance from a decedent, or
as a surviving joint tenant of a decedent, or under the terms of an inter vivos
trust shall have the right to disclaim irrevocably the whole or any part of such
property or beneficial interest. Id. (Emphasis supplied.).
See also A. CASNER 1040 (Supp. 1973).
311. "Where the law governing the administration of the decedent's estate gives a
beneficiary ... a right to completely and unqualifiedly refuse to accept ownership
.... ,a refusal to accept ownership does not constitute the making of a gift ... ."
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1954). This regulation does not expressly include the re-
nunciation of a joint tenant's interest.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
It goes without saying that estate planning is made more difficult
by the presence of jointly held property in the estate. The advent of
the marital deduction in 1948 imposed a special charge on lawyers
engaged in estate planning. When it is determined that a taxpayer's
estate will be subject to federal estate tax, the lawyer is obligated to
advise the taxpayer about the benefits of the marital deduction, prin-
cipally the opportunity to have one-half of his property taxed to him
at his death and the other one-half taxed to his wife at her death.
While the marital deduction is available as to jointly held property,
the presence in an estate of jointly held property in excess of one-half
of the decedent's adjusted gross estate will frustrate the common A
and B trust arrangement and, in many cases, cause the federal estate
tax to apply a second time to that property which was taxed to the
husband at his death. If this so-called second tax is to be avoided on
jointly held property and the estates equalized for federal estate tax
purposes, the surviving joint tenant must be willing to make gifts dur-
ing the balance of her life of that portion of the jointly held property
which was taxed to the first joint tenant at his death. While the sur-
vivor may retain no interest in the transferred property if the gift pro-
gram is to be effective in avoiding the second tax, it is possible for the
survivor to transfer the excess jointly held property to a trust after the
death of the first joint tenant and give the trustee complete and un-
restricted discretion to distribute income and principal from the trust
for the benefit of the survivor and yet keep this property out of the
survivor's estate for federal estate tax purposes. However, most tax-
payers are not willing to place their resources beyond their control dur-
ing their lifetimes.
The only realistic solution to planning for jointly held property
is to counsel the taxpayer to split the jointly held property between
himself and his spouse during lifetime in such a way as to equalize
their respective estates. Each spouse should then make a will direct-
ing that all of his property be held in trust for the survivor for life,
remainder as the survivor shall appoint among a limited class of per-
sons, probably the taxpayer's children. The trustee can have discre-
tion to distribute principal from the trust where necessary for the
maintenance, care, and support of the survivor without adverse estate
tax consequences. Moreover, the trust for the survivor can be ex-
cluded from the survivor's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes
even when the survivor is trustee of such a trust.
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IX. EPILOGUE
While estate planning for jointly held property is important, the
most significant contribution that the lawyer can make is to discourage
the use of jointly held property except with respect to residential real
estate312 and small amounts of cash in checking accounts. Admittedly,
in those estates where tax planning will never be important-if it is
ever possible to make that prediction with complete accuracy-jointly
held property should be encouraged.3 13 For that reason it is hard to
argue that the bias of most laymen (and, unfortunately, some attor-
neys) in favor of joint tenancy should be changed but, perhaps, at the
very least, banks and other savings depositories should refrain from in-
discriminately recommending this form of property ownership.314
312. Residential real estate is not an especially suitable item for trust management
313. See T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 59-63 (1972).
314. It is clear that trust departments of most banking institutions discourage joint
tenancies with right of survivorship. Unfortunately, in too many cases, the personnel
in the New Accounts departments encourage it and create an impression that taxes and
problems normally associated with probate can be avoided by holding property as joint
tenants with right of survivorship.
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